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The first chapter of this dissertation examines the phenomenon of labor market segre-
gation. Using a regression discontinuity (RD) design, I exploit the variation in base-
year minority shares across single-establishment firms to document the dynamics of
establishment-level segregation in two five-year intervals: 1995-2000 and 2000-2005. Us-
ing the Longitudinal Employer-Household Dynamics (LEHD) infrastructure files, I first
show that systematic establishment-level segregation still exists in all industries. Then, I
show that the dynamics of segregation among these single-establishment firms are non-
linear and exhibit “tipping” patterns in both five-year intervals, although the magnitude
is much larger in the earlier time period. The observed tipping pattern is primarily driven
by non-Hispanic whites leaving. The effect due to minorities entering is much smaller.
Alternative explanations such as non-linear changes in establishment characteristics or
omitted variables do not explain the observed changes in minority shares. Finally, I find
that, unlike the 1995-2000 period, during which tipping behavior seems to have been
driven equally by blacks and Hispanics, Hispanics are the sole driving force in the 2000-
2005 period. Overall, this chapter provides the first suggestive evidence that the dynam-
ics of establishment-level segregation are highly nonlinear and exhibit a tipping pattern.
The second chapter of the dissertation describes the technical linking process and ex-
amines the properties and the qualities of the crosswalk files. The crosswalk between the
Longitudinal Employer-Household Dynamics (LEHD) infrastructure file system and the
Census Business Register (BR) is authorized as part of the LEHD Infrastructure Project.
This document describes the LEHD - BR crosswalk and its component inputs: the Busi-
ness Register, Longitudinal Business Database (LBD), and the LEHD Infrastructure File
system. The output files include the LEHD - BR crosswalk at both the establishment
and employer levels. These output files can facilitate linking a wide range of contextual
variables relating to characteristics of the current and prior employers and co-workers of
current employees. Match and non-match rates for various populations are defined and
estimated in order to examine the properties and quality of the LEHD - BR crosswalk
output files.
The third chapter of this dissertation exploits plausibly exogenous changes in fam-
ily size caused by the initial implementation and subsequent relaxations in China’s One
Child Policy to estimate the causal effect of family size on educational attainment. I find
that the average family size has decreased substantially since the One Child Policy im-
plementation. By employing an Instrumental Variable estimation strategy, I find clear
evidence indicating that there is indeed a negative trade-off between child’s quantity and
quality in urban China. An additional child can lead to a decrease of 1.2 years of school-
ing. A simple back-of-the-envelope calculation reveals that the implementation of the
One Child Policy has significantly increased the average completed years of schooling by
approximately 0.68 years in urban China. This effect is in fact larger for women than for
men. No negative trade-off effect is found for the rural households in the sample.
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Chapter 1
Tipping Points: The Dynamics of
Workplace Segregation by Race and
Ethnicity
1.1 Introduction
With the rise in minority shares in the U.S., research has demonstrated that racial and ethnic
segregation still prevails in residential places (Cutler et al., 1999; Ananat, 2011; Card et al.,
2008a), in schools (Caetano and Maheshri, 2014), and in the labor market (Higgs, 1977;
Albelda, 1986; Carrington and Troske, 1998; Hellerstein and Neumark, 2003; Hellerstein
et al., 2008; Grad´ın et al., 2011). Segregation in the labor market is said to exist if members
of different groups are more likely to work with coworkers who are more like themselves than
would be predicted by a random allocation of workers to firms (Hellerstein and Neumark,
2008).
Labor market segregation by race and ethnicity is an important area of research because,
leaving aside the potential social issues, it may account for - at least in a statistical sense - a
significant share of wage differentials between whites and various minority groups (Hellerstein
1
et al., 2008). To date, most empirical research has documented the magnitude of segregation
at the industry-level or at the occupation-level (Higgs, 1977; Albelda, 1986; King; Grad´ın
et al., 2011), and identified some of its possible causes (Carrington and Troske, 1998; Heller-
stein and Neumark, 2003, 2008). Segregation at the workplace level, however, has been
noticeably under-studied. Data constraints, in particular, the lack of matched employer-
employee data, have been a major cause. Nonetheless, research on workplace segregation
should be emphasized because it may be much more salient for interactions between racial
and ethnic groups than is residential segregation. In fact, Hellerstein et al. (2008) found
that racial and ethnic segregation at the three-digit industry level is usually one-third as
large as the establishment-level segregation experienced by minority workers. In this paper,
I will first document the extent of racial and ethnic segregation at the workplace level using
the Longitudinal Employer-Household Dynamics (LEHD) infrastructure files – a matched
employer-employee dataset.
In the literature on residential segregation, Card et al. (2008a) have shown that once the
base-period minority share in a census tract reaches a certain level, white flight occurs. They
define such phenomenon as the evidence of tipping and assert that tipping process can capture
the underlying mechanism that leads to residential segregation. Caetano and Maheshri
(2014) have demonstrated that a similar tipping effect also exist in school segregation. The
dynamic process of labor market segregation, on the other hand, is not as well understood.
The dynamics of labor market segregation have crucial implications for understanding its
persistence. Better understanding of the dynamics might also facilitate the evaluation of
policy measures aimed at promoting racial and ethnic integration in the context of the labor
market. The second goal of this paper is to use the LEHD infrastructure files to begin to
unravel the dynamics of workplace segregation by race and ethnicity.
Figure 1.1 illustrates that the sudden percentage changes in net establishment-level white
employment, defined as the percentage change in white employment net of the percentage
2
change in minority employment, 1 in all industries pooled, and in the service-producing
NAICS supersector 2 appear to be related to a workplace’s base-period minority share. Here
and throughout the paper, minorities are defined as nonwhites and white Hispanics; whites
are defined as non-Hispanic whites only. Each plot depicts the mean percentage changes in
net white employment from 1995 to 2000 deviated from the average of the same variable
within the NAICS sector, grouping establishments into one-percentage-point wide cells by
the minority share in 1995. Figure 1.1 shows striking evidence of non-linearities in the
percentage change in net white employment. Such non-linearities may be a function of base-
period minority share. This is suggestive of the existence of a “tipping phenomenon” at the
workplace, where workplace minority composition increases rapidly once the the base-year
minority share reaches or exceeds a critical threshold. The threshold level at which this rapid
change occurs is called a “tipping point (Card et al., 2008a; Pan, 2010).”
What theoretical model can explain these non-linear patterns of workplace minority com-
position changes? I hypothesize that the classic social interaction model posited by Schelling
(1971) can account for this empirical finding. A large body of work has focused on theorizing
about the causes of segregation, for instance, the statistical discrimination models (Phelps,
1972; Arrow, 1973), the taste-based discrimination theory (Becker, 1971; Blau et al., 2010),
the “pollution” theory of discrimination (Goldin, 2002), and other models using supply and
demand in the labor market (Altonji and Blank, 1999; Kaufman, 2002; Reskin et al., 1999;
Sorensen, 2004). However, these explanations overlook the possible effect of “post-hiring”
dynamics on workplace composition (Sorensen, 2004) and provide little insight on the un-
derlying mechanisms driving the segregation. Schelling (1971), on the other hand, developed
the social interaction model to show that substantial segregation can arise from social in-
teractions and weak prejudice against one group (Card et al., 2008a; Pan, 2010). Since its
1The percentage change in establishment-level white employment is expressed as the change in white
employment as a percentage of the total employment in a single-establishment firm in the base year. The
percentage change in establishment-level minority employment is defined in a similar manner.
2Refer to Appendix 1.7.A. for definitions. In this paper, industries and NAICS sectors are used inter-
changeably.
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development, Schelling’s model has been used in many areas of research such as residential
segregation (Card et al., 2008a) and gender segregation in the labor market (Pan, 2010).
This paper studies the possible effects of “post-hire” dynamics on workplace composi-
tion. It attempts to unravel the underlying dynamics of workplace segregation by race and
ethnicity. I test whether establishments exhibit “tipping”-like behavior in response to firm-
specific shocks in minority labor supply that occur over two five-year intervals: 1995-2000
and 2000-2005. I also analyze the shifting composition of single-establishment firms in the
U.S. labor market, which could help explain the persistence of segregation and shed light on
the potential effectiveness of policies promoting workplace integration. Only Sorensen (2004)
has investigated workplace dynamics and minorities in the paper modeling the relationship
between worker turnover and the racial composition of the employing establishment’s work-
force using a three-year panel data of one multi-unit firm. The author finds that the worker
turnover rate is negatively correlated with the minority share in that firm.
This paper uses a Regression Discontinuity (RD)-tipping design as developed by Card
et al. (2008a) and also used by Pan (2010). As depicted in Figure 1.1, the RD research strat-
egy exploits the cross-sectional variation in base-year minority shares across workplaces to
test whether workplaces exhibit tipping patterns as the initial minority share in a workplace
exceeds a certain critical threshold. The location of the candidate tipping points is assumed
to be sector-specific and is identified by a “fixed-point” procedure that builds on the shape
of Figure 1.2. Figure 1.2 plots the mean net percentage changes in white employment in
the construction sector (NAICS Sector 23) from 1995 to 2000 against the minority share in
1995. The horizontal line depicts the unconditional mean net white employment growth.
The vertical line is the estimated tipping point using the “fixed-point” procedure elaborated
below. The figure shows clear evidence that, compared to an average single-establishment
firm in the construction sector, white employment increases relative to minority employment
to the left of the tipping point and decreases substantially to the right of the tipping point.
In Appendix Figure 1.A, I show that similar patterns exist in a broad sample of sectors for
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both of five-year intervals studied.
Unlike the work of Pan (2010), which is conducted using occupation-state cells and is ag-
nostic about the level at which the tipping mechanism operates, this paper uses establishment-
level data from the Census Bureau’s LEHD infrastructure files. With these data, I can study
employment segregation dynamics at the otherwise hard-to-observe workplace level, where I
expect to produce more accurate estimates of the magnitude of segregation and the tipping
effect. Moreover, the linked employer-employee data structure enables me to show the shift-
ing racial and ethnic composition of employers at the workplace level. In this way, my study
delineates potential mechanisms under which workers respond to changes in the minority
composition of their employers.
To motivate my econometric analyses, I first use the Duncan and Duncan index of dis-
similarity 3 to show that segregation exists in the sample of firms used in this study. Because
the social interaction model relies on the explicit assumption that workers have perfect infor-
mation about minority shares, I use only single-establishment firms in the analysis. 4 Thus,
most of the firms in my sample are small- to medium-sized. For small firms, indices such
as the Duncan and Duncan index and the Gini index, which are widely used to quantify
segregation, tend to overestimate its true magnitude (Carrington and Troske, 1997, 1998).
This issue was first elaborated by Blau (1977) in the gender segregation literature. The
3The Duncan and Duncan index of dissimilarity is a measure widely used to quantify the degree of
segregation. It can be written as
DKi−j =
∑K
k=l |Xki −Xkj |
2
where i and j denote different demographic groups; Xki and X
k
j denote the percent distribution of group
i and j in occupation/industry/firm k; therefore
∑k
i = 100 and
∑k
j = 100 hold. Basically, the value of
the index indicates the percentage of workers in group i who must change occupations/industries/firms to
achieve an occupational/industry-wide/firm distribution identical to that of the group j workers. The index
takes values between zero and one. When it equals zero, it indicates that groups i and j have the identical
occupational distributions, i.e. no segregation; when the index equals 100, it indicates that group i and j
workers are never in the same occupation, i.e. complete segregation.
4One clarification is necessary before delving into details. In this paper, the definitions of firms and estab-
lishments follow Abowd et al. (2009) in which establishments are defined as the place where the employees
actually perform their work, and firms are defined as the legal entities that employ workers. Thus, firms
can either be single-establishment employers or multi-establishment employers. In the following sections,
the terms workplace, establishment, and single-establishment firm share the same definition and are used
interchangeably in this paper.
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causes of this distortion are two-fold: first, an integer constraint exists in which each worker
must be uniquely allocated to one unit; second, the random allocation of workers to units
does typically generate some deviation from complete evenness for small firms (Blau, 1977).
To address this problem, Blau (1977) develops a random worker-to-firm allocation model.
Inspired by Blau’s model, I first verify systematic workplace-level segregation by computing
the actual and expected Duncan and Duncan indices. Then, I proceed to my tipping-point
estimation.
Turning to the employment dynamics, I find that establishment-level segregation is widely
evident at the end of both five-year time periods. Using the 2000 and 2005 establishment-
level data from the LEHD infrastructure files, I find that, compared to whites, minorities are
much more likely to work at firms with at least 50 percent minority employment. I further
confirm the existence of systematic workplace segregation across all sectors in both years.
The average estimated candidate tipping points, which are measured in base-year minority
shares and are estimated using the fixed-point procedure, are 14.16 percent in 1995-2000 and
15.51 percent in 2000-2005. Heterogeneity in the locations of the candidate tipping points
does exist by industry.
In summary, I find strong evidence confirming that tipping exists in both five-year in-
tervals among the single-establishment firms in the sample and it is rather robust to adding
flexible controls of establishment-level covariates. I also demonstrate that the observed tip-
ping pattern is mostly driven by non-Hispanic whites leaving. The effect due to minorities
entering is small or even trivial. Such findings suggest that tipping patterns are associated
with shrinking firms. That raises the concern that rather than social interactions, it may
just be that whites are leaving firms that are not performing well. To address this concern, I
restrict the analysis to establishments with minimal employment changes over each five-year
period. Results show that the same tipping patterns still emerge. Alternative explanations,
such as nonlinear changes in establishment characteristics, also fail to explain the observed
effects. The tipping patterns described above are primarily found in service-producing sec-
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tors rather than in the goods-producing sectors. Finally, I find that, unlike the 1995-2000
period, during which tipping behavior was driven equally by blacks and Hispanics, Hispanics
are the sole driving force in the later 2000-2005 period. Taken together, this paper provides
some of the first evidence suggesting that the dynamics of establishment-level segregation are
highly nonlinear and exhibit a tipping pattern that is largely consistent with the Schelling
(1971) social interaction model.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 1.2 lays out the model and the identification
strategy and research design. Section 1.3 elaborates on the firm-level data from the LEHD
infrastructure files, the unit of analysis, and the sample for this paper. In Section 1.4, a
model of the random allocation of workers to firm developed by Blau (1977) is used to
baseline the extent of racial and ethnic segregation in the sample. Section 1.5 shows the
main empirical results on tipping. Robustness checks are also presented. In particular,
section 1.5.4 goes beyond estimating tipping patterns to study the dynamics of the shifting
composition of firms. The question is whether the observed tipping pattern is driven by white
flight or by minority entry. In section 1.5.7, I explore various definitions of “minority” and
examine whether these distinct racial and ethnic minority groups drive the tipping pattern
differentially. Finally, Section 1.6 summarizes and concludes.
1.2 Model and Identification Strategy
My goal is to investigate the underlying mechanism that leads to workplace segregation by
race and ethnicity. In particular, I want to test whether workplaces exhibit tipping pat-
terns as the initial minority share in a workplace exceeds a certain critical threshold. The
main analysis assesses whether social interaction models, as originally outlined by Schelling
(1971), can account for the empirical evidence on nonlinear patterns of workplace minority
composition changes. A brief review of Schelling’s model (originally applied to residential
segregation) is presented in Appendix 1.7.B. Schelling’s tipping model has two key features:
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(1) for tipping to occur, heterogeneity in preferences over neighborhood minority composi-
tion must exist; and (2) because the tipping point and the actual tipping are characterized as
an unstable equilibrium and a dynamic adjustment process, there must be some friction that
ensures that individuals do not always immediately go to the long-run stable equilibrium. In
Schelling’s model, this friction arises because individuals are myopic decision-makers (Cae-
tano and Maheshri, 2014). Following the standard setup, the theoretical model presented in
section 1.2.1 adopts these two key features as well.
A central insight of Schelling’s model is that at any given point, neighborhoods may
be observed in the process of tipping, i.e., in disequilibrium, rather than a stable long-
run equilibrium. However, most current empirical neighborhood-choice models assume that
household choices are observed in equilibrium. Models that are always in equilibrium cannot
be used to implement empirical versions of Schelling’s tipping model (Caetano and Maheshri,
2014). Card et al. (2008a) circumvented this problem using an approach that identifies a
tipping point as a bifurcation point or threshold around which the flows of both whites and
minorities are quantitatively different (Caetano and Maheshri, 2014; Card et al., 2008a,b).
In other words, unlike Schelling’s model, in which the only stable equilibria are complete seg-
regation and the neighborhood tipping points are characterized as disequilibria, the tipping
points in Card et al. (2008a) represents the maximum minority share at which a neigh-
borhood can maintain a stable integrated equilibrium (Card et al., 2008a,b) which permits
empirical identification. This paper builds on Card et al. (2008a). I present in this section
a model of firm tipping and an identification strategy to estimate the tipping phenomenon
at the workplace level. A direct empirical implementation examines whether evidence of
discontinuous changes in workplace minority composition at candidate tipping points exists.
1.2.1 A Model of Firm Tipping
I present a simple, static, partial equilibrium model in which whites’ labor supply to single-
establishment firms depends on the share of minority workers in that firm. I assume ho-
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mogeneity in the job positions. 5 To focus attention on workers’ labor supply decisions, I
assume that labor demand is constant and that employers are non-discriminating. Based on
these assumptions, in a partial equilibrium, workers from different groups will be paid equal
wages in the same firm. 6
Assume that there are two types of workers with distinct racial and ethnic characteristics:
non-Hispanic whites (W ) and racial/ethnic minorities (M). Workers observe the wage offers
posted by all firms. Workers have perfect information about the minority shares in each





, where j indexes the firm, and NMj and N
W
j
are the total employment of minorities and whites in firm j. Workers are utility maximizing
agents who differ in their tastes and preferences for the minority share at their employers.
Due to the assumption of perfect information on wage offers and minority shares in each
firm, i.e., (ωj, Rj), worker i of type t ∈ {W,M} solves the following problem:
max U ti (ωj, Rj)
s.t. j ∈ {1 · · · J}
where U(·, ·) is continuous and twice differentiable. The following first-order and second-












> 0, ∀i, t
Workers are myopic in the sense that they make decisions based on the wage offers and
5According to Appendix 1.7.A., NAICS “groups establishments into industries based on the activity
in which they are primarily engaged. Establishments using similar raw material inputs, similar capital
equipment, and similar labor are classified in the same industry....” (www.bls.gov/bls/naics.htm). Since
the analysis is conducted in a sector-specific manner, this assumption is not unreasonable.
6The implicit assumption here is that workers from different racial and ethnic groups are perfect substi-
tutes. Though assuming non-discriminating firms is a strong assumption, Becker (1971) developed a model
of employee discrimination showing that employees’ tastes of discrimination alone can lead to labor market
segregation. Additionally, even if an employer has a taste of discrimination, Blau (1977) argues that there
are institutional constraints internal to a firm that place limits on the employer’s ability to differentiate
among individual workers.
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minority shares they observe without taking into account the simultaneous decisions made
by other agents. Let ntj denote the number of workers of type t who supply their labor to




1(i : j = argmax U ti (ωj, Rj), j ∈ {1 · · · J})
= ntj(ωj, Rj)
In this model the labor supply of type W and type M workers to firm j depends on
the firm’s wage rate ωj and its share of minority workers, Rj. Given the continuity and
monotonicity of the utility function, the inverse labor supply functions exist and are unique.
Let ωWj (n
W









as an example, “nWj ” whites are willing to work in firm j with minority share Rj and wage
ωWj . In a partial equilibrium with non-discriminating employers, fixed labor demand, and
perfect substitutability, the following condition holds:
ωWj (n
W




j , Rj) ∀ j (1.1)
To simplify the notation in what follows, the firm index j is dropped, but all the equations are












, represent the social interaction effects. These interactions imply that whites
require a premium to work with minorities in firms. This premium is assumed to be higher
in firms with higher minority shares, i.e.,
∂ωW (nW , R)
∂R
> 0. and
∂2ωW (nW , R)
∂2R
> 0.
Under the assumption that labor demand is fixed and that employers are non-discriminating,
I normalize the total number of workers in a firm to L¯ = nW + nM = 1. Given this normal-
ization, in an integrated equilibrium with minority share R ∈ (0, 1), we have the following
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condition:
ωW (1−R,R) = ωM(R,R) (1.2)











In equation (1.3), the first term is negative. With a positive social interaction effects, the




small at R = 0 and becomes more positive as R increases, the white inverse labor supply
function may initially be downward sloping. As the minority share rises, the positive social
interaction effect will dominate, which leads to an upward-sloping inverse labor supply curve.
7 For illustrative purposes, ωM(nM , R) is assumed to be upward-sloping and linear. 8 The
two inverse labor supply curves are depicted in Figure 1.3.
The firm depicted in Figure 1.3 has three equilibria: two integrated equilibria and one
all-minority equilibrium. Point A is a locally stable integrated equilibrium. For instance,
for any small perturbation to the right of point A, the marginal minority worker requires a
higher wage than the marginal white worker, and the non-discriminating firm will therefore
hire the marginal white worker, which will return the system to point A. Using similar reason,
point B is not a stable equilibrium. Any positive shock at B will start the system trending
toward the all-minority equilibrium C instead of back to B.
An increase in the supply of minority workers pushes the minority inverse labor supply
function downward, as shown in Figure 1.4. Figure 1.4 illustrates a series of equilibria for
this firm due to such a shift, assuming the white inverse labor supply function has the
shape illustrated in Figure 1.3. At the low level of minority labor supply, R = 0 is a stable
7To ensure the existence of the critical point R∗, the social interaction function needs to be steeper
than the function that characterizes the derivative of the own inverse labor supply curve, i.e. the following
condition needs to be true:
∂2ωW (nW , R)
∂R2
>
∂2ωW (nW , R)
∂nW 2







could be downward if minorities have strong distaste towards all-white firms when R is low.
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equilibrium (point A0 in Figure 1.4). However, as the minority labor supply increases, i.e.,
ωM shifts downward, wages begin to fall, and a few minority workers displace whites with
the lowest willingness to supply. The firm will be in a stable integrated equilibrium (such as
points A1 and A2 in Figure 1.4). Further increase in the supply of minority labor will cause
the minority share to increase until ωM is just tangent to ωW . The minority share denoted
as R∗ is a “tipping point,” representing the maximum minority share at which a firm can
be in a stable integrated equilibrium. Once R = R∗, any further increase in minority labor
supply will cause the integrated equilibrium to disappear and will lead to a fully segregated
equilibrium (all-minority equilibrium, i.e., point D’s in Figure 1.4). The location of the
tipping point (R∗) depends on the strength of the social interaction effect.
Several points are worth emphasizing. First, notice that this model features a one-sided
tipping pattern: firms with minority shares below the tipping point are potentially stable, but
those that exceed the critical threshold rapidly converge to 100 percent minority composition.
This contrasts with the classic Schelling model, which delivers a two-sided tipping outcome.
9 Second, my model delivers a tipping point even though white preferences for firm-level
racial composition are continuous. In addition, wages evolve smoothly through the tipping
point, even though employment shares change discontinuously. The smoothness of wages
around the tipping point occurs because the upward-sloping minority inverse labor supply
curve takes over smoothly from the white inverse labor supply curve at the discontinuity.
Wages at the long-run R = 1 equilibrium can be higher or lower than at the tipping point
depending on the shape of the minority inverse labor supply curves and their movements
once tipping is underway.
9Using the census tract-level data from 1970 to 2000, Card et al. (2008b) find evidence that suggests
tipping behavior is one-sided, and that minority composition in neighborhoods with initial minority shares
below the tipping points stay relatively stable over time.
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1.2.2 Empirical Implementation
Figure 1.4 assumes steady increases in relative minority labor supply (i.e. ωM(R,R) −
ωW (1 − R,R)). On average, this is likely to be true because since the passage of the 1965
Immigration Act, the U.S. has experienced a new wave of immigration. These so-called “new
immigrants” are mostly from less industrialized countries in South America and Asia (Xie
and Gough, 2009). Due to firms’ geographic dispersion and depending on the sectors which
the firms belong to, there are likely to be firm-specific shifts in relative labor supply of whites
and minorities. The model presented above explains how firm-level minority composition
responds to these firm-specific shocks in relative minority labor supply. These insights can
be broadly summarized with three scenarios:
(i) For a firm with an initial minority share Rt−1 somewhat less than R∗, small shifts
in relative minority labor supply will produce small changes in the location of the
integrated equilibrium, and the firm will move smoothly toward the new integrated
equilibrium, so long as the minority share remains below R∗. Formally, for the set of
firms with initial minority share Rt−1 ∈ [0, R∗ − s) where s represents the maximum
relative minority labor supply shock between period t − 1 and t, E[∆Rt | Rt−1] =
g(Rt−1) for some continuous function g(·).
(ii) Firms with initial minority share above R∗ have already begun tipping, the expected
change in minority shares for such firms is going to be positive and large. Formally, for
the set of firms with initial minority share Rt−1 > R∗, E[∆Rt | Rt−1] = h(Rt−1) > 0.
(iii) The intermediate range, firms with initial minority share in [R∗ − s, R∗], will tip only
if they experience sufficiently large shocks, but not otherwise.
Assuming s is very small, then the E[∆Rt | Rt−1] can be written as follows:
E[∆Rt | Rt−1] = 1(Rt−1 < R∗)g(Rt−1) + 1(Rt−1 ≥ R∗)h(Rt−1) (1.4)
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If lim→0+ h(R∗ + ) − g(R∗ − ) > 0, the right-hand side of equation (1.4) is discontinuous
at R∗ leading to a “jump.” Given the nature of g(·) and h(·), such a jump is likely to be
large. As a result, the empirical strategy is to test for a discontinuity in E[∆Rt | Rt−1] at
candidate values of R∗. Strictly speaking, a consequence of equation (1.4) is that for some
firms, some time horizons, and some heterogeneity in the location of firm-specific tipping
points the function E[∆Rt | Rt−1] might not be strictly discontinuous at R∗. Instead, it will
be very steep with a slope in the [R∗ − s, R∗] range. In this paper, such a pattern, if any, is
also interpreted as evidence of tipping.
1.2.3 Empirical Strategy & the Identification of the Tipping Point
The empirical analysis uses data for single-establishment firms. I measure changes in their
employment composition over a five-year interval. 10 Because the social interaction model re-
lies on the explicit assumption that workers have perfect information about minority shares,
I use only single-establishment firms. Let Wijs,t, Mijs,t and Pijs,t = Wijs,t +Mijs,t denote the
total numbers of whites, minorities, and total employment in firm i, industry j, state s and
year t. The main dependent variable, which measures the establishment minority composi-







In order to reveal the dynamics of the shifting composition of firms and document whether
the observed tipping patterns are driven by white flight or minorities entering, I also examine
10In previous studies on residential and occupational segregation that employ a similar empirical strategy,
10-year changes calculated from the decennial census of population are usually used (Card et al., 2008a,b;
Easterly, 2009; Pan, 2010). In this paper, instead of 10-year changes, I use five-year changes because: (1)
workplace dynamics are more volatile compared to census tracts and occupations; and (2) data from the
LEHD infrastructure files are collected more frequently than the population census data. This eliminates
some of the data limitations faced by previous studies.
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Equation (1.4) from section 1.2.2 implies that E[Dwijs,t | Rijs,t−5] is a smooth function
of Rijs,t−5 except, perhaps, at the tipping point R∗. In this paper, the tipping point, if any,
is assumed to be industry specific because some industries may be more prone to minority
inflows than others. For instance, in 1995, approximately 17 percent of total employment in
the construction sector was black or Hispanic. This share increased to 21 percent in 2000
and to nearly 30 percent in 2005. In comparison, the percentage of blacks and Hispanics
employed in finance, insurance, and real estate has remained between 16 to 18 percent since
1995. 11
Denote R∗j,t−5 as the potential tipping point for industry j in year t − 5, let δijs,t−5 =
Rijs,t−5−R∗j,t−5 be the deviation in minority share of firm i from its industry specific tipping
point. The basic empirical specification is:
Dwijs,t = φ(δijs,t−5) + d1[δijs,t−5 > 0] +Xijs,t−5β + ηj + τs + εijs,t (1.8)
where φ(·) is a smooth control function, modeled as a third-order polynomial; ηj is the
fixed NAICS sector effect, τs measures the fixed state effect; Xijs,t−5 is a vector of firm-level
control variables. The contols including the share of workers who are at least 57 years old
in the base period (%RETijs,t−5). The age cutoff is set to be 57 years old because people
11Due to data limitations, only blacks and Hispanics are discussed here. Data are retrieved from the
1995, 2000, and 2005 Statistical Abstract data collected for the Statistical Compendia program (http:
//www.census.gov/prod/www/statistical_abstract.html). The data are collected from the section on
Labor Force, Employment and Earnings.
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of this age or older are at risk of retiring during the next five-year window. Age 62 is
the earliest age that one can claim social security benefits for retirement. Many studies
have confirmed the effects of social security benefits on the elderly labor supply. Firms
might experience decreases in white employment simply because they have larger shares of
workers who are close to retirement age. Firm-level controls also include the share of young
workers (%Y OUNGijs,t−5). In this paper, young workers are defined as those who are 24
years old or younger in the base-period. Because young workers tend to change jobs more
frequently, firms might experience large changes in minority composition simply because they
have larger shares of younger workers. Finally, firm-level log average earnings (log eijs,t−5)
are also controlled because workers may leave a firm simply because they find better pay
elsewhere.
Unlike most research using the conventional RD design, in which the running variable
12 and the cutoff are clearly defined, a critical issue in estimating an empirical model like
equation (1.8) is that the discontinuity point R∗j,t−5 is unknown and must be estimated from
the data. To elucidate the method used to obtain the candidate tipping point, assume, for
the moment, that a tipping point do exists. The method used here, the so-called “fixed-
point” procedure, is borrowed from Card et al. (2008a). This approach uses the shape of
smoothed approximation to E[Dwijs,t | j, Rijs,t−5] for industries. Figure 1.2 reveals that
firms that have not hit the industry-specific tipping point tend to experience greater-than-
average growth in net non-Hispanic white employment; however, firms that have reached or
exceeded the industry-specific tipping point tend to experience relative declines. Formally,
this finding implies the following:
E[Dwijs,t | j, Rijs,t−5 = R∗j,t−5−ξ] > E[Dwijs,t | j] > E[Dwijs,t | j, Rijs,t−5 = R∗j,t−5+ξ] (1.9)
for some ξ > 0. Thus, the industry-specific tipping point is the minority share at which the
12It is also known as the observed “assignment” variable that determines the treatment status in the RD
literature (Lee and Lemieux, 2010).
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white employment of a firm grows at the average rate for the industry. To identify this level,
I first obtain a smooth approximation to E[Dwijs,t | j, Rijs,t−5]−E[Dwijs,t | j] and then solve
for the root of this function, which is the industry-specific tipping point. 13 If the functional
form is correct, this procedure will consistently estimate the location of the tipping points.
A result in the structural break literature is that sampling error in the location of a change
point (e.g., R∗j,t−5) can be ignored when estimating the magnitude of the break (e.g., d) (Card
et al., 2008a). I borrow this result and do not adjust the standard errors for the estimation
of R∗j,t−5.
1.2.4 Hypothesis Testing
Because equation (1.8) is estimated using the candidate tipping points located using the
data, the estimates of d, d̂ will have a non-standard distribution under the null hypothesis
that there is no discontinuity (Hansen, 2000). Card et al. (2008a) call this a specification-
research bias problem. Conventional test statistics tend to reject the null hypothesis d = 0
too often. Hansen (2000) recommends comparing the estimates to a simulated distribution
of d̂ under the null hypothesis that there is no discontinuity. Card et al. (2008a) propose
a split-sample technique that uses a randomly selected sub-sample 14 to locate the tipping
point and the remainder of the sample to estimate the magnitude of the tipping effect. The
authors claim that because the two sub-samples are independent, estimates of d̂ from the
second sub-sample will still have a standard distribution and will thus permit conventional
hypothesis testing under the null hypothesis. In this paper, the split-sample technique is
used to facilitate conventional hypothesis testing. I use a simple random 50 percent subset
of my sample for the estimation of the tipping points. The remaining 50 percent is used for
further econometric analysis.
13A detailed description on the “fixed-point” procedure can be found in Appendix 1.7.C. on Tipping
Estimation.
14Two-thirds of the sample was used to locate the tipping points in Card et al. (2008a) because the
“fixed-point” procedure is quite data-intensive.
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1.3 Data & Sample
1.3.1 Firm-level Data and Unit of Analysis
The Longitudinal Employer-Household Dynamics (LEHD) infrastructure file system is a
job-based longitudinal frame designed to represent the universe of individual-employer pairs
covered by the state unemployment insurance system reporting requirement (with federal
employees added in 2012). Information about employer characteristics is constructed using
the Quarterly Census of Employment and Wages (QCEW). Demographic information about
workers comes from two administrative data resources: the Person Characteristics File (PCF)
and the Composite Person Record (CPR), which are sourced from administrative records.
The longitudinally linked employer-employee structure of the LEHD data allows researchers
to follow both workers and firms over time. Additionally, one can also identify workers who
share a common employer in any given quarter. Firms in the LEHD data are defined by
their state-level unemployment insurance account number. 15 Basic information about firms
includes total payroll, firm size, firm age, geography, and industry. Information on individual
demographic characteristics includes race, ethnicity, education, date of birth, sex, and place
of birth. A more comprehensive overview and description of the LEHD infrastructure files
can be found in Abowd et al. (2009).
To explore labor market segregation by race and ethnicity, there is a question of what the
appropriate unit of analysis should be (Pan, 2010). Goldin (2002) finds that the “pollution”
of occupational prestige by women may occur at the level of firms, occupations, industries,
or within some sort of spatial boundaries such as cities, municipalities, or states. Due to
the lack of availability and accessibility of firm-level datasets, most studies have focused on
racial segregation at the level of occupations or industries. However, Hellerstein et al. (2008)
found that racial and ethnic segregation at the three-digit industry level in the Decennial
15That is to say, for example, a Target in New York and a Target in New Jersey are considered different
firms, but a Target in Ithaca, New York, and a Target in Binghamton, New York, are considered to be part
of the same firm.
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Employer-Employee Dataset (DEED) is usually one-third as large as the establishment-level
segregation they document. They further assert that workplaces, i.e., establishment, should
be the units of observation for studying labor market segregation since the essence of social
interaction among workers is better captured at the workplace level.
Using the LEHD infrastructure files, this study can be conducted at the level of estab-
lishments or workplaces by considering only the single-establishment firms. Since the main
dependent variable is the five-year change in non-Hispanic white employment as a fraction
of the base-year total employment net of the minority fraction, this paper does not exploit
the full longitudinal structure of the LEHD data but focuses on changes over two five-year
windows: 1995 to 2000 and 2000 to 2005. These five-year windows were chosen to be con-
secutive and to cover a 10-year time span. The base year of the first five-year interval was
chosen such that the sample covers a sufficient number of states. Since many states provide
data to the LEHD program beginning in the mid-to-late 1990s, 16 I choose 1995-2000 to
be the first five-year interval. To avoid any possible confounding impact due to the Great
Recession, no further analysis is conducted for 2005-2010.
1.3.2 Sample
The sampling universe (frame), which is applied to both five-year intervals, is defined as
follows: (1) firms must be private, non-farm (no NAICS sector 11) and non-public adminis-
tration (no NAICS sector 92) firms; (2) firms must remain single-establishment in the base
year and in the end year of a five-year interval; and (3) firms’ establishment-level employment
growth during a five-year interval must lie within 2.5 standard deviations of the state and
NAICS sector averages for that time window. The purpose of restricting the sample in this
manner is to avoid results driven by extreme values. The samples used for the 1995-2000
and 2000-2005 analyses are 50 percent simple random samples of establishments in each
frame. The sampling procedure also selects the worker-level data for all individuals who are
16Detailed start dates for each state can be viewed at http://download.vrdc.cornell.edu/qwipu/
starting_dates.html.
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employed in their dominant job at the selected single-establishment firms in the base year
and in the end year of a five-year interval.
Given the quarterly-based LEHD infrastructure files, there are many ways to construct
the main dependent variable. In this paper, I used measures based the beginning-of-quarter
employment in the second quarter 17 to construct the variables used in the empirical speci-
fication. The rationale is that the April 1 (the beginning of the second quarter) as the base
for employment measures in a given year is closest to March 12, the reference date used by
the Census Bureau for employment measures contained in its Business Register and in the
Economic Censuses and Surveys (Abowd et al., 2009). A second rationale is that measures
based on April 1 avoid discontinuities in the Unemployment Insurance wage records that
occur at the change of calendar years.
In order to obtain the most economically meaningful results, the following sample re-
strictions are also applied. These restrictions are necessary because the earnings data in
the LEHD infrastructure data are extracted from Unemployment Insurance covered earn-
ing records, in which any payment of at least one dollar made to an individual during the
quarter will appear in the data. As a consequence, many one-time payments that do not
necessarily agree with the general definition of employment between a firm and a worker
appear as a “job” that lasts one quarter. Therefore, it is important to define a dominant
job for a worker. Once the definition is formed, I consider a worker to be an employee only
of her dominant-job firm. In this paper, I define a worker’s dominant job in a year as the
highest annual earning job for that year. Currently, individuals who have more than one
dominant job (a small group who have identical earnings in two jobs over the year) or who
indicate two or more races (a larger group) are excluded.
The final sample for 1995-2000 includes 200,000 unique single-establishment firms matched
between 1995 and 2000 from 19 states, 18 6,540,000 individuals in 1995, and 7,280,000 indi-
17Again, the definition of beginning-of-quarter employment follows Abowd et al. (2009)
18These 19 states include: CA, CO, FL, ID, IL, KS, LA, MD, MN, MO, MT, NC, NY, OR, PA, RI, TX,
WA, and WI.
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viduals in 2000. The final sample for 2000-2005 includes 341,000 unique single-establishment
firms matched between 2000 and 2005 from 42 states, 19 11,900,000 individuals in 2000, and
12,300,000 individuals in 2005. 20
The individual characteristics file (ICF) in the LEHD infrastructure files contains all
the necessary demographic variables used in this paper, including race, ethnicity, and date
of birth. Approximately 3 percent of the individuals found in the unemployment insurance
wage records do not link to the PCF 21(Abowd et al., 2009). To use effectively, the LEHD in-
frastructure files have undergone sophisticated multiple imputations using general Bayesian
methods. 22 Ten independent missing data implicates are created to impute missing demo-
graphic variables for these individuals (Abowd et al., 2009). Each missing data implicate,
combined with the observations with non-missing demographic information is referred to as
an implicate file. To ensure the inference validity using the multiple imputation data, all
the statistics and estimation are computed following Chapter 5 in Little and Rubin (2002).
Each statistics or estimate is first computed 10 times using the 10 implicate files, individ-
ually. The final result is the mean estimand obtained by averaging across the results from
the 10 implicate files. Standard errors are further corrected to account for missing data
contribution to variance. 23
19These 42 states include: AK, CA, CO, CT, DE, FL, GA, HI, IA, ID, IL, IN, KS, LA, MD, ME, MI,
MN, MO, MT, NC, ND, NE, NJ, NM, NV, NY, OH, OK, OR, PA, RI, SC, SD, TN, TX, UT, VA, VT, WA,
WI, and WV.
20These numbers are rounded to three significant digits for disclosure avoidance review purposes.
21As described in section 1.3.1, demographic information about workers comes from two administrative
data resources: the Person Characteristics File (PCF) and the Composite Person Record (CPR).
22Refer to Little and Rubin (2002) for a detailed description of the general Bayesian methods for multiple
imputation.
23Detailed computation formulas used in this paper are presented in Appendix 1.7.D.
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1.4 Evidence on Systematic Firm-Level Segregation By
Race and Ethnicity
1.4.1 Suggestive Evidence on Establishment-Level Segregation
Hellerstein et al. (2008) verify the existence of establishment-level segregation by race, eth-
nicity, and skills, using the Decennial Employer-Employee Dataset (DEED) in 1990 and
2000. This section shows that establishment-level segregation is still widespread at the end
of each five-year window in the sample of firms used in this paper. Figure 1.5 is constructed
to present the distributions of white and minority workers across single-establishment firms
grouped by minority composition categories. This is done for all sectors pooled and for the
goods-producing and service-producing NAICS supersectors, separately.
Overall, Figure 1.5 presents evidence suggesting that substantial establishment-level seg-
regation is pervasive in 2000 and 2005. In particular, a comparison between the distributions
of whites and minorities across various firm minority composition categories reveals a striking
pattern: compared to non-Hispanic whites, minorities are much more likely to be employed
in firms with higher minority shares. For instance, the top left figure, constructed for all
sectors pooled in 2000, shows that approximately 3 percent of all minority workers work in
firms where minorities account for less than 10 percent of the employment. Nonetheless,
these firms account for close to 30 percent of all non-Hispanic white workers. In comparison,
more than 30 percent of all minority workers work in firms where minorities account for 50
percent to 75 percent of the employment. This share remains high even when considering
firms where more than 75 percent of the employment is minorities. On the other hand, these
two groups of firms account for approximately 12 percent of all non-Hispanic white workers
- approximately 10 percent in firms where minorities account for 50 percent to 75 percent of
the employment and only about 2 percent in firms where minorities account for more than
75 percent of the employment. The all-sector pooled sample in 2005, which is depicted in
the lower left figure in Figure 1.5, shows similar patterns.
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Figure 1.5 also shows that the goods-producing and the service-producing supersectors
in 2000 and 2005 exhibit patterns nearly identical to the one discussed above. A close
comparison between the top and the bottom panels in Figure 1.5 indicates very minimal
changes in the uneven distributions of whites and minorities between 2000 and 2005. To
further illustrate that these trends and findings also exist in each NAICS sector, Appendix
Figure 1.B is constructed using NAICS sector 23 (construction) and NAICS sector 62 (health
care and social assistance), separately, as examples.
To examine whether various racial and ethnic minority groups exhibit different segre-
gation patterns, I replicate Figure 1.5 for Asians, blacks, and Hispanics, separately. The
results are presented in Appendix Figure 1.C. Although all three minority groups experience
establishment-level segregation, blacks (represented by the red bars in Appendix Figure 1.C)
seem to face the least. For instance, in 2000 and 2005, less than 50 percent of all black work-
ers were employed in firms with 50 percent or higher minority shares in all sectors pooled.
In both years, however, more than half of all Asian workers (represented by the blue bars
in Appendix Figure 1.C) and Hispanic workers (represented by the green bars in Appendix
Figure 1.C) were employed in these firms. Additionally, blacks have the highest proportion
of workers at firms with less than 25 percent minorities in all sectors. By contrast, His-
panic workers have the lowest proportion. These findings also hold for the goods-producing
and service-producing supersectors. Because Asians and Hispanics are the main immigrant
groups in recent decades and, compared to blacks, have a much shorter history in the U.S.,
the results seem to suggest that these two minority groups might face more prejudice. 24
1.4.2 Evidence on Systematic Firm-Level Segregation
A conventional way to document segregation is to compute the Duncan and Duncan index.
As discussed in Section 2.1, when firm sizes are relatively small, the Duncan and Duncan
index tends to distort the true magnitude of segregation (Blau, 1977; Carrington and Troske,
24Although it is entirely possible that these newer immigrant groups have not assimilated and therefore
distribute more unevenly.
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1997, 1998). The main cause of this distortion is that the conventional Duncan and Duncan
index characterizes “no segregation” with an absolute zero value. However, research has
shown that the segregation indices can be positive when workers are allocated randomly
across units (Carrington and Troske, 1997, 1998). In an effort to address this concern, Blau
(1977) developed a random worker-to-firm allocation model to adjust and allow complete
randomness to be characterized by a non-zero benchmark Duncan and Duncan index.
Though Figure 1.5 provides suggestive evidence, it does not present any information
on whether the observed pattern is systematically different from what would have been
randomly observed by chance. To provide this information, I apply the random worker-to-
firm allocation model developed by Blau (1977) to the same set of firms used in the previous
section. 25 This model enables me to compute the distribution of firms that would have
been observed by chance under the conditions of random worker-to-firm allocation, taking
into account the minority composition of the labor pool for a state-NAICS sector. Then,
this theoretical distribution of firms and the actual distribution can be used to compute the
expected and the actual Duncan and Duncan index for each state-sector. Next, weighted
averages of these two indices across all available states within each sector are computed.
These sector-specific Duncan and Duncan indices for 2000 and 2005 are in Table 1.1. The
expected Duncan and Duncan index defines the “evenness,” and the difference between the
expected and the actual Duncan and Duncan index measures the magnitude of systematic
segregation. It is important to note that although I do not expect an absolute zero value
in the Duncan and Duncan index to indicate evenness, as shown in Table 1.1, the expected
Duncan and Duncan index is considerably less than the actual one.
As Table 1.1 demonstrates, a sizable proportion of minorities would have to reallocate
among firms such that the actual distribution could be considered as indistinguishable from
random worker-to-firm allocation. This statement holds for every sector. For instance, in
2000, close to 20 percent of minority workers in construction (NAICS 23) would have to
25The details of the random worker-to-firm allocation model are provided in Appendix 1.7.E.
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reallocate among firms to approximate a situation of random allocations. In 2005, this index
still remains higher than 18 percent. In both years, the sector that showed the most severe
systematic segregation was health care and social assistance (NAICS 62). The Duncan and
Duncan indices for this sector in both years are higher than 30 percent and have remained
fairly constant between 2000 and 2005. Among all sectors listed, utilities (NAICS 22) has
the smallest difference between the actual and expected Duncan and Duncan index for 2000
and 2005. Even then, for utilities to be considered a sector without systematic segregation,
approximately 12 percent of minorities in 2000 and 14 percent in 2005 would have to be
reallocated among firms. 26 Thus, Table 1.1 indicates that systematic segregation does exist
at the establishment level in 2000 and 2005, although its extent appears to vary by industry.
Nonetheless, the magnitude seems to vary minimally between 2000 and 2005. 27
1.5 Do Firms Exhibit “Tipping-like” Patterns?
1.5.1 Descriptive Statistics
Table 1.2 presents descriptive statistics for the establishment-level data in all sectors pooled.
The same descriptive statistics are also computed for establishments in the goods-producing
supersector as well as in the service-producing supersector. The mean establishment-level
minority shares in these two five-year intervals across sectors are very similar and are between
33% and 34%. In particular, Hispanics always comprise the largest minority group.
Overall, there is rapid employment growth in the period 1995-2000, which reflects the
economic boom in the mid-to-late 1990s. As shown in Table 1.2, the goods-producing su-
persector and the service-producing supersector are equally affected by the economic boom.
Although between 1995-2000, non-Hispanic white employment grows by more than 4 per-
26I have also applied the chi-square “goodness of fit” test developed by Blau (1977) to test whether the
theoretical distribution of firms is systematically different from the actual distribution. Most state-sectors
reject the hypothesis of random worker-to-firm allocation and thus confirm systematic segregation.
27To further visualize the pattern of systematic establishment level segregation, Table 1.1 is also converted
into Appendix Figure 1.D.
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cent, over 60 percent of the total employment growth is driven by growth in minority em-
ployment. This is true for all sectors pooled, the goods-producing supersector, and the
service-producing supersector. Hispanic employment experiences the largest growth com-
pared to the other racial and ethnic minority groups. In comparison, total employment
growth between 2000 and 2005 is considerably slower. The goods-producing supersector
even experienced contraction, which reflects the economic recession that occurred in early
2000 and the loss of manufacturing jobs in the U.S. In all sectors pooled, almost all em-
ployment growth can be attributed to minority employment growth. Specifically, between
2000-2005, total employment grows by 3.49 percentage points, and 3.10 percentage points
are due to growth in minority employment. Interestingly, only non-Hispanic whites and
blacks experience employment contraction in the goods-producing supersector, with the for-
mer being close to −3.8 percentage points. As in 1995-2000, Hispanics undergo the largest
employment growth in 2000-2005 compared to the other minority groups.
Table 1.3 compares five subgroups of establishments defined by the fraction of minority
shares in the base year, i.e., 1995 or 2000. Table 1.3 shows how the growth in non-Hispanic
white employment is affected by the base-year minority share. Taking all sectors pooled
in 1995 as an example, one can see clearly from Table 1.3 that in establishments that have
minority shares from 0 to 5 percent, more than 70 percent of the growth in total employment
is driven by the growth in white employment. Establishments that were 5 to 20 percent
minority saw relatively slower growth in white employment. Nonetheless, growth in non-
Hispanic white employment accounts for approximately one half of total employment growth.
In contrast, establishments that were 20 to 50 percent minority experienced much slower
growth in white employment, although the magnitudes of total employment growth are not
dramatically different compared to establishments with lower minority shares. When base-
year minority shares further increase, growth in white employment remains low.
The findings here suggest that once the establishment-level minority share reaches a
certain level in the base year, non-Hispanic white employment growth over the five-year
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window tends to dramatically slow down. Because there is no such indication on total
employment growth, the summary statistics presented in Table 1.3 imply that once the base-
year minority share reaches a threshold level, minority composition increases dramatically,
i.e., the tipping phenomenon occurs. It can be seen that the described pattern and trends
hold true for all sectors listed in Table 1.3 except for the goods-producing supersector in 2000-
2005. The nonconformity of the goods supersector may be due to the loss of manufacturing
jobs during the recession in the early 2000s. Additionally, these trends generally remain
true for all sectors, individually. To illustrate this finding, Appendix Table 1.A reproduces
Table 1.3 for the construction and health care and social assistance sectors separately.
1.5.2 Pooled Analysis of Changes in Net Non-Hispanic White Em-
ployment Growth
In order to implement the RD-tipping design and estimate the empirical specifications de-
veloped in section 1.2.3, I use the fixed-point procedure first to obtain the candidate tipping
points. The estimated sector-specific tipping points for 1995-2000 and 2000-2005 are pre-
sented in Table 1.4. These candidate tipping points range from 5.26 to close to 40 percent
in 1995 and 2.44 to 38.6 percent in 2005. The mean tipping point across 18 sectors is 14.16
percent in 1995 and 15.51 percent in 2000. The increase in the average tipping point from
1995 to 2000 suggests an increasing level of tolerance for working with minorities in the same
firm, although the increase is quite small.
I now turn to specifications that pool the data in all sectors but estimated separately for
the 1995-2000 and 2000-2005 periods. Figure 1.6 depicts the relationship between the base-
year minority share in a single-establishment firm, deviated from the sector-specific candidate
tipping point, and the percentage change in the net non-Hispanic white employment in the
establishment, deviated from its sector-specific mean. The dots in the figure represent mean
changes in one-percentage bins of δijs,t−5 = Rijs,t−5 − R∗j,t−5. The solid green line is a
local linear regression fitted separately on each side of the candidate tipping point with an
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Epanechnikov kernel and a bandwidth of 5. Finally, the solid blue line shows fitted values
from a global third-order polynomial in δijs,t−5, allowing an intercept shift at δijs,t−5 = 0. I
limit attention to δijs,t−5 ∈ [−20, 20].
Figure 1.6 suggests establishment-level tipping. In particular, the Figure presents clear
evidence of a discontinuous change in the minority composition when comparing establish-
ments just below and just above the tipping point. Although visually telling, Figure 1.6
does not permit formal hypothesis tests and does not control for other establishment-level
characteristics that might affect worker mobility, making it hard to determine whether the
observed tipping behavior is due to differences in other covariates close to the candidate
tipping points.
1.5.3 Formal Econometric Evidence on Establishment-level Tip-
ping
Table 1.5 presents estimates of d̂ from equation (1.8) pooling all sectors pooled in 1995-2000
and 2000-2005. The regression analysis assesses the magnitude of tipping for establishments
with an initial minority share just above the sector-specific candidate tipping points, com-
pared to establishments with an initial minority share just below the tipping points. The
main dependent variable is the change in net non-Hispanic white employment over a five-year
window as a percentage of the establishment total employment in the base year (columns
(1) and (2)). To reveal the dynamics of the shifting composition of firms and to document
whether the observed tipping pattern is driven by white flight or by minority entry, I also
examine analogous measures for whites and minorities, separately (columns (4) and (5) for
non-Hispanic whites; columns (6) and (7) for minorities; the results are discussed in detail
in section 1.5.4).
The estimation controls for a flexible control function in a form of third-order polynomial
in δijs,t−5, establishment-level covariates as described in section 1.2.3, fixed state effects, and
fixed sector effects. Standard errors are clustered on the state-sector level. All estimates are
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computed and averaged across the 10 implicate files. The variance-covariance matrices of
the estimates are corrected by taking into consideration of the variance contribution of the
missing data and multiple imputation. 28 The corrected standard errors are presented in
parentheses. The Rubin missingness ratios are presented in brackets.
The estimated coefficients for the models in columns (1) and (2) confirm that the change
in net non-Hispanic employment as a percentage of the establishment total employment is
discontinuous in the initial minority share around the candidate tipping points. When I esti-
mate the model without any establishment controls (column (1)), the estimated, statistically
significant, discontinuities are approximately −6 and −3 percentage points in 1995-2000, and
2000-2005, respectively. In 1995-2000, other things equal, the growth in net non-Hispanic
white employment in establishments with an initial minority share just above the sector-
specific candidate tipping points is 6 percentage points less than in establishments with
initial minority shares just below the tipping points. In 2000-2005, the discontinuity is also
statistically significant, although the magnitude decreases to −3 percentage points. When
establishment controls are included (column (2)), the estimated discontinuities in both five-
year intervals remain largely unchanged. 29
Column (3) in Table 1.5 presents estimates where the dependent variable is the change in
the establishment’s minority share, i.e., Rijs,t−Rijs,t−5. The estimated tipping effect on this
variable, which is the traditional focus of tipping models (Card et al., 2008a; Easterly, 2009;
28The computation formulas can be found in Appendix 1.7.D.
29I re-estimated equation (1.8) by adding another establishment-level covariate: share of foreign-born
workers. The concern is that maybe it is nationality rather than race and ethnicity that is causing this
observed threshold effect. This is a reasonable speculation as since the mid-1990s foreign-born workers are
much more likely to be racial and ethnic minorities as compared to native-born workers. It turns out that
even with this addition control, the results described here remain largely unchanged.
Additionally, because people tend to live close to where they work, another major concern is that what
I am capturing here is actually residential tipping as studied in Card et al. (2008a) rather than workplace
tipping effect. To examine this hypothesis, I re-estimated equation (1.8) by adding in another covariate: five-
year change in county-level minority share of those who are at least 15 years old. This variable is calculated
using the county population estimates produced by the Census Bureau’s Population Estimates Programs.
Once calculated, it is merged in using firms’ county FIPS code. Basically, after controlling for five-year
change in county-level minority shares, although the magnitudes of the coefficients become slightly smaller,
the significance level remain unchanged. In summary, changes in neighborhood minority composition fall
short in explaining the workplace tipping effect by race and ethnicity I have presented here.
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Pan, 2010), is significant in both five-year intervals, although it is larger in 1995-2000. For
instance, the estimate obtained for 1995-2000 implies that, compared to the establishments
with initial minority shares just below the candidate tipping points, there is a significant
increase in minority share of more than 2 percentage points in establishments with initial
minority shares just above the tipping points.
One possible reason that the estimated tipping effect decreased between 1995-2000 and
2000-2005 might be the effect of changes in the state composition of my main estimation
sample. The 1995-2000 sample includes single-establishment firms from only 19 states com-
pared to 42 states covered in the 2000-2005 sample. To verify that my results are not due
to the change in the number of states covered in the second five-year interval, I replicate
columns (2), (3), (5), and (7) in Table 1.5 for all 19 states from the 1995-2000 sample in
2000-2005. Table 1.6 presents these results. Table 1.6 shows that the magnitude of the
observed discontinuity is indeed smaller compared to 1995-2000, even when using the same
19 states in 1995-2000 and 2000-2005.
Another possible explanation for the estimated decrease might be the recession that oc-
curred in 2001 and the associated drops in quits and total separations. 30 Research has
shown that worker churning and job-to-job mobility during recent recessions have declined
considerably (Kahn and McEntarfer, 2013). In Appendix Figure 1.E, I plot the seasonally
adjusted time-series data on quits and total separations of private establishments from the
Job Openings and Labor Turnover Survey (JOLTS) produced by the Bureau of Labor Statis-
tics (BLS). The Appendix Figure 1.E confirms that significant decreases in quits and total
separations did occur in the 2001 recession (marked as the first shaded area in Appendix
Table 1.E). The levels of quits and total separations remained fairly low until late 2003 and
early 2004. In a different paper, Kahn (2010) finds that the cohorts who graduate from
college in a bad economy also tend to have slightly higher tenure.
Thus far, all the analyses have been conducted using the pooled sector samples. Het-
30For the accurate start and end date of this recession, refer to http://www.nber.org/cycles.html
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erogeneity in the tipping effect almost surely exists across different sectors. To explore this
issue, Table 1.7 presents the results of applying the RD models to the goods-producing and
services-producing NAICS supersectors, separately. The specifications are otherwise identi-
cal to those in columns (2), (5), and (7) in Table 1.5. It is clear that the observed tipping
phenomena seems to exist only in the services-producing supersector. Discontinuity in the
goods-producing supersector does not seem to exist in either five-year window. To further
confirm this finding, Figure 1.7 plots the change in the net non-Hispanic white employment
in the establishment, deviated from the sector-specific mean in the services-producing super-
sector in 1995-2000 and 2000-2005. These figures are identical in structure to Figure 1.6. In
comparison, the pattern in Figure 1.6 is almost indistinguishable from that in Figure 1.7 for
both five-year intervals, reinforcing the finding that the observed discontinuity exists only in
the service-producing NAICS supersector.
1.5.4 Whites Leaving or Minority Entering?
The evidence presented thus far is consistent with the social interaction model and the tip-
ping argument. However, there are alternative mechanisms that could also lead to a tipping
phenomenon, such as changes in production technology or learning dynamics (Pan, 2010).
For instance, the production technology argument suggests that the increase in minority
labor supply into the labor market might lead firms to switch to a minority-intensive pro-
duction technology, which could result in a sharp increase in minority employment growth
over some range of initial minority share. Alternatively, a learning-dynamics model implies
that at low minority shares, little information about a particular job is available, hence mi-
nority employment growth is slow. As the minority share rises, information accumulates
and learning accelerates, which could lead to a rapid increase in minority employment (Pan,
2010).
A common way to try to distinguish these models from the social interaction model is
to consider whether establishment-level tipping is driven by white flight or by minorities
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entering. Schelling’s mechanism suggests that tipping should be driven primarily by a sharp
decline in non-Hispanic white employment, although it is entirely possible that minority
employment might increase substantially in response to white flight. Nonetheless, if we
observe a sharp decline in non-Hispanic white employment that is not accompanied by a
sharp increase in minority employment, this would suggest that tipping is driven mostly by
the social interaction model.
To examine the shifting composition of firms and, in particular, to examine whether
establishment-level tipping is driven by white flight or minority entry, columns (4)-(7) in
Table 1.5 present models for the changes in white and minority employment as a percentage
of base-year total establishment employment for 1995-2000 and 2000-2005. The specifications
are otherwise identical to those in columns (1) and (2) in Table 1.5. Columns (4)-(7) show
that in 1995-2000, there was a significant decline in white employment growth and an upward
jump in minority inflows at the sector-specific tipping points. In other words, the observed
discontinuity in minority composition during this five-year window is driven almost equally
by whites leaving and minorities entering, although the magnitude of the former is slightly
larger. In comparison, in 2000-2005 the observed tipping effect is driven solely by whites
leaving, and the upward jump in minority employment at the candidate tipping points is
negligible. These results indicate that although tipping is confirmed to be a mechanism
leading to establishment-level segregation in the sample of firms used in this paper, I cannot
rule out that multiple explanations might explain the observed tipping phenomenon. For
instance, while both the production-technology and learning-dynamics models would have
trouble explaining the negligible effect due to minority entry in 2000-2005, I cannot reject
a possible role for these hypotheses in the earlier five-year window (1995-2000). Therefore,
it is entirely possible, and even likely, that more than one underlying process is operating.
The purpose of this paper is to document the tipping patterns and to demonstrate that at
least some of these observed patterns are broadly consistent with predictions from a simple
Schelling-type social interaction model.
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1.5.5 Does Tipping Only Exist in Shrinking Firms?
The specifications in Table 1.5 show that tipping is associated with a discontinuous drop
in non-Hispanic white employment growth but a smaller or negligible jump in minority em-
ployment growth. Such findings suggest that tipping patterns are associated with shrinking
firms. That raises the concern that rather than social interactions, it may just be that whites
are leaving firms that are not performing well. Similarly, in Table 1.3 I find that establish-
ments with initial minority shares below 20 percent experienced faster employment growth
over the next five years compared to those with higher initial shares. These observations call
attention to an important element that is missing from the model: labor demand.
With fixed labor demand, as in the model in Section 1.2, any decline in white labor supply
is mechanically offset by minority labor inflows. To approximate an environment of fixed
labor demand, I identify a subset of establishments where total employment has changed by
less than 10 percentage points over a five-year interval. The model specification is otherwise
identical to Table 1.5. The results are presented in Table 1.8.
In the establishments with fixed labor demand, the estimated discontinuity in net non-
Hispanic white employment growth at the tipping point is −4.24 percent in 1995-2000 and
−1.87 percent in 2000-2005. This is somewhat smaller than the corresponding estimate from
the full sample (Column (2) in Table 1.5) but is still large and statistically significant. In
these establishments with fixed labor demand, total employment growth shows no disconti-
nuity at the tipping point, while the estimated discontinuity in white employment growth
is approximately equal and opposite to the jump in minority employment growth. This
observation is true for both 1995-2000 and 2000-2005. Column (2) of Table 1.8 presents
estimates where the dependent variable is the change in establishment’s minority share. The
estimated tipping effect on this variable is apparent, although it is rather small in 2000-2005.
Thus, Table 1.8 demonstrates that mobility patterns in these establishments with fixed labor
demand closely match the predictions from the model with fixed labor demand.
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1.5.6 Omitted Variables and Effect on Establishment Covariates
An additional concern with the RD model used in the previous sections is that the discon-
tinuous relationship between net white mobility flows and the initial minority share might
be due to omitted establishment characteristics that happen to be discontinuously related
to the minority share. Although the main specifications (columns (2), (5), and (7) in Ta-
ble 1.5) include a vector of establishment controls, these linear controls might not be flexible
enough to absorb the nonlinear effects. To assess this possibility and to test whether the re-
sults presented in Table 1.5 are sensitive to flexible controls for the pre-period establishment
characteristics, Table 1.9 presents a series of extended specifications that add a third-order
polynomial in these establishment-level covariates. Table 1.9 shows that the estimates of
d̂ are rather robust to such inclusions, suggesting that omitted variables of this kind are
unlikely to account for the observed discontinuities.
The empirical analysis thus far has focused on changes in minority composition due
to non-Hispanic white or minority employment growth. In other words, the analysis has
primarily looked at changes in quantities. Nonetheless, apart from quantities, there are other
outcomes worth examining. These include whether earnings, the share of retiring workers, or
the share of young workers are affected by tipping. This part of the analysis therefore looks
at how these establishment-level characteristics behave around the sector-specific candidate
tipping points.
Table 1.10 reports results from regressions in which the dependent variable is replaced
by changes over a five-year window in log average earnings for all workers, in the share of
retiring workers, and in the share of young workers. In each regression, a flexible third-order
polynomial in δijs,t−5, fixed state effects, and fixed sector effects are controlled. Similarly,
standard errors are clustered on the state-sector. According to Table 1.10, there is little
evidence of significant changes in the establishment-level covariates around the candidate
tipping points. Thus, from Table 1.10 I conclude that the observed discontinuity is not
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driven by abrupt changes in establishment-level characteristics around the tipping points. 31
1.5.7 Minority Definition
Thus far, I have defined minorities as nonwhites and white Hispanics. Nonetheless, it is
entirely possible that whites might react to inflows of different minority workers differently.
Specifically, evidence presented in Appendix Figure 1.C suggests that different racial and
ethnic minority groups seem to face different degrees of segregation and Table 1.2 shows
clear heterogeneity in employment trends across Asians, blacks, and Hispanics. In this
section, I present a series of models in which I vary the definition of minority to explore this
issue.
Tables 1.11 and 1.12 present estimates that explore alternatives that count only blacks
or only Hispanics as minorities for 1995-2000 and 2000-2005, separately. I also present a
composite model that includes indicators for being beyond the tipping point for all three
minority definitions. As in earlier tables, the dependent variable in each specification is
the change in net non-Hispanic white employment, the change in white employment, or
the change in minority (all nonwhites and white Hispanics) employment, as a percentage
of total establishment employment. Candidate tipping points are estimated separately for
each definition of minorities, using the fixed-point procedure discussed in section 1.2.3 and
Appendix 1.7.C. Each model also includes a third-order polynomial in the deviation of the
establishment’s minority share from the candidate tipping point. The composite model
includes all three third-order polynomials. The establishment controls are identical to those
in Table 1.5. Fixed State and sector effects are included. Standard errors are clustered on
the state-sector.
The estimates in columns (1)-(4) in Table 1.11 suggest that in 1995-2000, tipping be-
havior was driven slightly more by the black shares than by the presence of other minority
31Unfortunately, this is not true when I use the five-year change in the share of foreign-born workers as
the dependent variable to conduct this robustness check. In other words, I cannot completely rule out the
possibility that the workplace tipping effect may be driven by discontinuity in the share of foreign-born
workers at the establishment-level.
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groups, although the effect of the Hispanic shares is quite strong as well. When I decom-
pose the observed discontinuity in net non-Hispanic white employment change into changes
in white employment and minority employment and examine them separately, Table 1.11
(columns (5)-(8)) shows that changes in non-Hispanic white employment alone exhibit even
stronger tipping beyond the black-share fixed point and the Hispanic-share fixed point. In-
terestingly, the results in Table 1.11 (columns (9)-(12)) seem to show that even minority
workers leave establishments once its black share or Hispanic share reaches the candidate
tipping points, with both measured the same way. However, the latter discontinuity is much
smaller compared to the former.
In comparison, the results presented in Table 1.12 imply that in 2000-2005, almost all
observed tipping behavior is driven solely by the Hispanic share. When I look at the white
employment change and the minority employment change individually, the Hispanic shares
seem to be the only driving force again. In particular, non-Hispanic white employment in
establishments with initial Hispanic share just above the sector-specific candidate tipping
points, measured in Hispanic share in 2000, experience a 7 percentage point decrease (column
(7) in Table 1.12) compared to establishments with shares just below the tipping points.
The discontinuity observed in minority employment change is much smaller, although it is
statistically significant and of approximately −2.5 percentage points in magnitude (column
(11) in Table 1.12). In all, estimates presented in Table 1.11 and 1.12 suggest that as
Hispanics become the largest minority group in the U.S., they might face stronger distaste
from non-Hispanic whites, and such distaste might even exist among other ethnic minority
groups.
1.6 Conclusion
In summary, using the establishment-level data from the LEHD infrastructure files and the
random worker-to-firm allocation model developed by Blau (1977), this study first confirms
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that systematic racial and ethnic workplace segregation exists in 2000 and 2005. Then, the
paper makes use of a Regression Discontinuity design developed by Card et al. (2008a) and
demonstrates the importance of tipping. My approach uses the cross-sectional variation
in base-year minority shares across establishments to test whether establishments exhibit
tipping-like behavior in response to firm-specific shocks in minority labor supply that occur
over two five-year intervals: 1995-2000 and 2000-2005.
The average NAICS sector-specific candidate tipping point, estimated using the fixed-
point procedure, is 14.16 percent in 1995 and 15.51 percent in 2000. The increase in the
average tipping point from 1995 to 2000 suggests an increasing tolerance level for working
with minorities in the same firm, although this increase is quite small.
Overall, I find clear evidence that tipping is a feature of the dynamic process of establishment-
level segregation in the sample of firms used in this paper. The estimated, statistically signifi-
cant, discontinuities are close to −6, and −3 percentage points in 1995-2000, and 2000-2005,
respectively. One possible reason for the decrease in the observed tipping effect between
1995-2000 and 2000-2005 is the recession that occurred in 2001. To examine the shifting
composition of firms, and in particular, to explain whether establishment-level tipping is
driven by white flight or minorities entering, I find that tipping in 1995-2000 is driven by
whites leaving and minorities entering together. In comparison, in 2000-2005, the observed
tipping effect is solely driven by white leaving, the upward jump in minority employment
at the candidate tipping points is quite negligible. By using a subset of establishments that
have undergone minimal employment growth over a five-year window to approximate an
environment with fixed labor demand, I demonstrate that mobility patterns in these estab-
lishments closely match the predictions from the social interaction model with fixed labor
demand presented in this paper. Taken together, the analysis in this paper provides some of
the first evidence suggesting that the dynamics of establishment-level segregation are notice-
ably nonlinear and exhibit a tipping pattern. This observation is largely consistent with the
Schelling (1971) social interaction model, although at this point, I cannot completely rule
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out alternative explanations for the observed discontinuity. It is possible, and even likely,
that more than one underlying process is operating here. Future work should assess how
social interactions interact with other underlying mechanisms, which will provide a far richer
picture of the dynamics of workplace segregation.
As part of robustness checks, I present evidence confirming that the tipping effects for
both five-year windows are robust to adding flexible controls of establishment-level covariates.
I also demonstrate that the observed tipping patterns are not driven by nonlinear changes
in establishment characteristics. Finally, I present composite model estimates in which I
explore alternative definitions of minority. In particular, I find that in 1995-2000, tipping
behavior seems to have been driven slightly more by the black shares than by the presence
of other minority groups, although the effect of the Hispanic shares is quite strong as well.
In comparison, in 2000-2005, the observed tipping behavior seems to be driven solely by
Hispanic shares. This change seems to suggest that as Hispanics become the largest minority
group in the U.S., they might face stronger distaste from non-Hispanic whites. As the
minority composition in the U.S. changes, this finding has implications for understanding
the persistence of current labor market segregation.
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1.7 Appendix
1.7.A. NAICS Sectors and NAICS Supersectors
NAICS stands for the North American Industry Classification System. Developed using a
production-oriented conceptual framework, NAICS “groups establishments into industries
based on the activity in which they are primarily engaged. Establishments using similar
raw material inputs, similar capital equipment, and similar labor are classified in the same
industry. In other words, establishments that do similar things in similar ways are classi-
fied together” (www.bls.gov/bls/naics.htm). Revisions implemented for every Economic
Census (years ending in 2 and 7). In this paper, the 2007 NAICS classification is utilized.
Overall, there are 20 NAICS sectors (www.census.gov/cgi-bin/sssd/naics/naicsrch?
chart=2007).
For purposes of aggregate analysis, the U.S. Economic Classification Policy Committee
aggregated NAICS sectors into “Supersectors.” The goods-producing NAICS supersector
includes natural resources and mining (NAICS 1133, i.e., logging; NAICS 21, i.e., mining),
construction (NAICS 23) and manufacturing (NAICS 31-33) (www.bls.gov/ces/cessuper.
htm). Because the sample in this paper does not include NAICS sector 11 (agriculture,
forestry, fishing, and hunting), the goods-producing NAICS supersector only includes NAICS
sectors 21, 23 and 31-33. The service-producing NAICS supersector includes trade, trans-
portation, and utilities (NAICS 42, i.e., wholesale trade; NAICS 44-45, i.e., retail trade;
NAICS 48-49, i.e., transportation and warehousing; NAICS 22, i.e., utilities), information
(NAICS 51), financial activities (NAICS 52, i.e., finance and insurance; NAICS 53, i.e.,
real estate and rental and leasing), professional and business services (NAICS 54, i.e., pro-
fessional, scientific, and technical services; NAICS 55, i.e., management of companies and
enterprises; NAICS 56, i.e., administrative and waste services), education and health ser-
vices (NAICS 61, i.e., educational services; NAICS 62, i.e., health care and social assis-
tance), leisure and hospitality (NAICS 71, i.e., arts, entertainment, and recreation; NAICS
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72, i.e., accommodations and food services), other services (NAICS 81), and government
(www.bls.gov/ces/cessuper.htm). Because the sample in this paper does not include any
governmental establishments, the service-producing NAICS supersector in this paper does
not include government.
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1.7.B. Schelling’s Bounded-neighborhood Model
Schelling’s Bounded-neighborhood model and its extension into the tipping model use the
preference interaction perspective to analyze (residential) segregation by race (Schelling,
1971). Preference interaction occurs when an agent’s preference ordering on the alternatives
within her choice set depends on actions chosen by other agents (Manski, 2000).
In this model, there is a well-defined “neighborhood” with clear boundaries. People are
either in or out of this common neighborhood. Everybody in this neighborhood is concerned
with the minority share. This concern is characterized by a upper limit or tolerance for the
minority share. An individual will reside in the neighborhood only if the minority share
in the neighborhood has not reached his own limit. If an individual’s limit is exceeded, he
will leave and choose somewhere else that meets his tolerance level. This model assumes
heterogeneity in individual preferences over the neighborhood-level minority share, ranging
from complete integrationist to complete segregationist. Agents are assumed to have perfect
information about the minority share within the neighborhood when they decide whether to
leave or to enter a neighborhood. However, agents are myopic about other agents’ intentions
and their future moves. Zero mobility costs are also assumed. There are no neighbor-
hood capacity constraints and adding-up constraints in the neighborhood to enforce that
the population-weighted average of neighborhoods’ minority shares be equal to the system-
wide share of minorities in the population (Easterly, 2009; Schelling, 1971; Zhang, 2011).
Therefore, Schelling’s model cannot be viewed as a general equilibrium model.
Given this model setup, Schelling (1971) shows how only a modest preference of whites
to live next to other whites can lead to nearly complete residential segregation. In this
model, even a relatively small fraction of minorities could cause the neighborhood to tip from
completely white to completely minority. The fraction at which this happens is called the
“tipping point.” The tipping point in Schelling’s model represents an unstable equilibrium,
since even a slight perturbation in the level of minority shares around the point can lead to
complete segregation (Caetano and Maheshri, 2014). As a result, Schelling’s model has the
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feature that the only stable equilibria are fully segregated equilibria. A neighborhood with a
mixed minority composition is inherently unstable. The triggered dynamic process can lead
to either 0 percent or 100 percent minority share, i.e., two-sided tipping (Card et al., 2008b).
A more detailed description of Schelling’s Tipping model can be found in Schelling (1971).
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1.7.C. Tipping Estimation
I use the fixed-point procedure discussed in section 1.2.3 to identify NAICS sector-specific
tipping points in the 50 percent simple random subsample of establishments. I identify the
roots of
E[Dwijs,t | j, Rijs,t−5]− E[Dwijs,t | j] (1.10)
as the estimated tipping point. I fit Dwijs,t − E[Dwijs,t | j] to a third-order polynomial in
Rijs,t−5. Following Card et al. (2008a), I use only firms with minority shares below 60 percent.
This polynomial is fitted separately for each NAICS sector. For each NAICS sector, I identify
a root of this polynomial, taking into consideration the range of the minority shares in the
remainder 50 percent subsample used for model estimation. In particular, I first exclude
those roots above 50 percent minority share. The reason for restricting observations and the
identified roots to this range is that this paper focuses on how establishments with lower
shares of minorities in the base year respond to minority entry. Second, for each NAICS
sector, I select roots that are strictly greater than the minimum value of base-year minority
shares in establishments reserved for estimation. Finally, when there are multiple roots, the
one that yields the most negative slope of the polynomial function is selected. The estimated
sector-specific tipping point is presented in Table 1.4.
43
1.7.D. Computation Formulas for Multiple Imputation Statistics
This section follows Chapter 5 in Little and Rubin (2002). Let Y denote the data, which
can be further partitioned into the observed and unobserved parts, if needed.
Y = (Yobs, Ymis)
Let Q(Y ) denote the statistics of interest to be estimated. Let
Qm(Y
m) = estimand from the mth implicate
Let M denote the total number of implicates. Then, the average estimand over all implicates,








m) = covariance matrix of Qm(Y
m) from the mth implicate






Let B denote the between-implicate variation of Qm(Y







The corrected covariance matrix, T , of Q(Y ), which accounts for the missing data con-
tribution to variance, is defined as





The Rubin missingness ratio is defined as





where bii and tii are the diagonal elements of B and T . The Rubin missingness ratio essen-
tially measures the proportion of the total variance that is due to between implicate variance.
Q,
√
tii, and the Rubin missingness ratio are the final results presented in all tables.
Within-implicate variance, i.e., Vm, for each estimate in Tables 1.1, 1.2, 1.3, Appendix
Table 1.A, Figures 1.5, Appendix Figures 1.B, and 1.C is computed using the bootstrap
method. The bootstrap samples for each implicate file m are generated by a simple random
sampling with replacement, holding the sample size of that implicate file constant. The
number of repetition is set to equal 1000. To compute the within-implicate variance for
implicate file m, I first compute an estimand of interest, Q, for each bootstrap sample.
Upon completion, the within-implicate variance of the estimand Q for implicate file m can
be computed.
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1.7.E. Random Worker to Firm Allocation Model
This paper adopts the random worker-to-firm allocation model developed by Blau (1977)
and computes the expected and actual Duncan and Duncan indices for each NAICS sector
presented in Table 1.1.
For each state and NAICS sector, let
p = the proportion of the individuals with the requisite industry-specific skills that is
minority;
q = 1− p = the proportion of the labor pool that is non-Hispanic white;
xi = the number of minorities employed in firm i in the given state and NAICS sector;
ni = the total number of employees in firm i in the given state and NAICS sector;
pi = 100 ∗ xi
ni
= the share that minorities account for all workers in firm i in the given
state and NAICS sector.
Under the random worker-to-firm allocation, xi can be viewed as the outcome of ni tri-
als of an experiment in which each trial consists of selecting an individual at random from
the labor pool, where the likelihood of getting a minority is p, and the likelihood of getting a
non-Hispanic white is q = 1−p. Therefore, xi can be characterized by a binomial probability
distribution as:






Then, firms are grouped according to size. Each size category contains firms with the same
values of ni. The possible outcomes, xi, are grouped into ten categories according to the
value of pi: 0 ≤pi < 10, 10 ≤pi < 20, 20 ≤pi < 30, 30 ≤pi < 40, 40 ≤pi < 50, 50 ≤pi < 60,
60 ≤pi < 70, 70 ≤pi < 80, 80 ≤pi < 90, 90 ≤pi ≤ 100.
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Further, let:
nj = the number of firms in the j th size category;
pjk = the probability that a firm selected at random from the j th size class has a value of pi
that falls in the kth minority composition category;
ejk = the expected number of firms in the j size class and kth minority composition category;
Ek = the total expected number of firms in the kth minority composition category;
Pk = the probability of obtaining a firm in the kth minority composition category, given
the size distribution of firms.
Then, given the binomial probability distribution described earlier, pjk can be written as:




Therefore, to find the theoretical distribution of firms with N firms in the state-two digit
NAICS sector cell, ejk, Ek, and Pk can be written as:






The distribution of non-Hispanic white and minority workers among establishments that
would prevail under the condition of random worker-to-firm allocation can be derived
directly from the theoretical distribution of firms. Again, for each state and NAICS sector,
let:
nij = the number of workers in firms included in the j th size class;
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pik = the simple average of the pi included in the kth minority composition category divided
by 100;
mjk and wjk = the expected number of minorities and whites, respectively, employed in
firms that fall into the j th size class and kth minority composition category;
Mk and Wk = the total expected number of minorities and whites, respectively, employed in
firms included in the kth minority composition group.
Therefore, mjk and wjk can be approximated by
mjk = ejk · nij · pik
wjk = (ejk · nij)− (mjk)









Then, the state-sector-specific expected and actual Duncan and Duncan indices are
calculated using the following formula:
Within each state and NAICS sector cell
Let pi = the percentage that minority workers comprise the labor force in firm i. Then,
firms are grouped into ten categories according to the value of pi: 0 ≤pi < 10, 10 ≤pi < 20,
20 ≤pi < 30, 30 ≤pi < 40, 40 ≤pi < 50, 50 ≤pi < 60, 60 ≤pi < 70, 70 ≤pi < 80, 80 ≤pi <
90, 90 ≤pi ≤ 100.Letmk and wk equal the percentages of all minority workers and all
non-Hispanic white workers who are employed in firms included in the kth minority
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composition category. The Duncan and Duncan index of segregation for a given state and
sector cell is defined as:
D =
∑10
k=1 |mk − wk|
2
The actual Duncan and Duncan index of segregation is computed using the employment
distribution of whites and minorities observed in the sample. The expected Duncan and
Duncan index is computed using the theoretical distribution derived. Once the state and
sector-specific indices are calculated, the NAICS sector-specific actual and expected indices
are simply the weighted averages among all the available states. The weight used is the total
number of firms in a given state-sector cell.
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Figure 1.1. Change in a Pooled Sample of Firm-level Minority Composition, by Rela-
tionship to Candidate Tipping Points 1995-2000
All NAICS Sectors Pooled
Service-producing NAICS Supersector
Notes: the X axis is minority share in establishment minus the estimated tipping point in
a NAICS sector. The tipping point is estimated using the fixed-point procedure described
in subsection 1.2.3. The Y axis is the percentage change in net white employment between
1995 and 2000, expressed as a percentage of the total establishment-level employment in
1995 and deviated from the mean in the NAICS sector. Dots depict averages in
1-percentage-point bins of the 1995 minority share. All series use only the 50% of
establishments not used to identify the tipping points.
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Figure 1.2. Firm-level Minority Composition Change in NAICS Sector 23 - Construc-
tion, 1995-2000
Notes: Dots show the mean of the change in the net establishment-level white employment
between 1995 and 2000 as a percentage of the total employment in 1995, grouping
establishments into cells of width 1% by the 1995 minority share. The horizontal line
depicts the unconditional mean. The vertical line depicts the estimated tipping point using
the fixed-point procedure described in subsection 1.2.3 and a 50 percent sample of
single-establishment firms in NAICS sector 23.
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[0%, 10%) [10%, 25%) [25%, 50%) [50%, 75%) [75%, 100%]
Minority Composition Category
Non-Hispanic white Racial and Ethnic Minority
Services-producing NAICS Supersector
Notes: Blue bars represent non-Hispanic whites and red bars represents racial and ethnic
minorities. Each of the statistics is computed and averaged across the results obtained
using the 10 implicate files. The standard errors of the estimates are corrected taking into
consideration of the variance contribution of multiple imputation. Standard error bars are
included. The Rubin missingness ratios of these estimates can be found in Appendix
Table 1.B.
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Figure 1.6. Minority Composition Change in All NAICS Sectors Pooled Sample, by
Relationship to Candidate Tipping Point
1995-2000
2000-2005
Notes: the X axis is minority share in establishment deviated from the estimated sector-specific
tipping point. The Y axis is the change in net white employment in a five-year interval as a
fraction of the total base year employment and deviated from the mean in the NAICS sector.
Dots depict means in 1-percentage-point bins. The green line is a local linear regression fit
separately on either side of zero using an Epanechnikov kernel and a bandwidth of 5. The blue
line is a global third-order polynomial with an intercept shift at zero. All series use only the 50%
of establishments not used to identify the tipping points.
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Figure 1.7. Minority Composition Change in Service-producing NAICS Supersector
Pooled Sample, by Relationship to Candidate Tipping Point
1995-2000
2000-2005
Notes: the X axis is minority share in establishment deviated from the estimated sector-specific
tipping point. The Y axis is the change in net white employment in a five-year interval as a
fraction of the total base year employment and deviated from the mean of this in the NAICS
sector. Dots depict means in 1-percentage-point bins. The green line is a local linear regression fit
separately on either side of zero using an Epanechnikov kernel and a bandwidth of 5. The blue
line is a global 3rd order polynomial with an intercept shift at zero. All series use only the 50% of
establishments not used to identify the tipping points.
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Table 1.1. Actual and Expected Duncan & Duncan Index by NAICS Sector
NAICS Sector
Duncan & Duncan (DD) Index
Actual Expected Difference
Year 2000
21 Mining, Quarrying, and Oil and Gas Extraction 36.8 13.4 23.3
22 Utilities 29.1 17.3 11.8
23 Construction 36.2 16.4 19.9
31-33 Manufacturing 41.1 11.1 30.0
42 Wholesale Trade 40.0 16.0 24.1
44-45 Retail Trade 40.2 17.0 23.2
48-49 Transportation and Warehousing 38.9 13.0 25.9
51 Information 31.8 10.7 21.1
52 Finance and Insurance 34.2 12.5 21.7
53 Real Estate and Rental and Leasing 37.9 17.4 20.5
54 Professional, Scientific, and Technical Services 31.7 15.1 16.6
55 Management of Companies and Enterprises 28.6 15.0 13.6
56 Administrative & Support and
40.5 11.2 29.3
Waste Management & Remediation
61 Educational Services 35.3 11.3 24.0
62 Health Care and Social Assistance 42.7 12.1 30.6
71 Arts, Entertainment, and Recreation 35.2 12.4 22.8
72 Accommodation and Food Services 41.7 16.4 25.3
81 Other Services (except Public Administration) 42.7 18.4 24.3
Year 2005
21 Mining, Quarrying, and Oil and Gas Extraction 36.1 14.6 21.5
22 Utilities 31.6 17.6 13.9
23 Construction 35.9 17.6 18.3
31-33 Manufacturing 39.9 11.2 28.7
42 Wholesale Trade 38.3 16.1 22.3
44-45 Retail Trade 39.2 17.3 21.9
48-49 Transportation and Warehousing 38.4 13.1 25.3
51 Information 29.6 11.7 17.9
52 Finance and Insurance 32.9 13.1 19.8
53 Real Estate and Rental and Leasing 36.8 17.1 19.7
54 Professional, Scientific, and Technical Services 33.3 16.9 16.4
55 Management of Companies and Enterprises 28.8 12.3 16.5
56 Administrative & Support and
40.3 11.8 28.5
Waste Management & Remediation
61 Educational Services 35.2 10.8 24.4
62 Health Care and Social Assistance 42.0 11.3 30.7
71 Arts, Entertainment, and Recreation 35.4 12.9 22.6
72 Accommodation and Food Services 40.5 16.0 24.5
81 Other Services (except Public Administration) 41.4 19.1 22.3
Notes: The sector-specific actual and expected DD indices are computed by averaging the
state-specific actual and expected DD indices, weighted by the numbers of firms in the sector
and state cell. Each statistic is computed and averaged across the results obtained using the
10 implicate files. The corrected standard errors and Rubin missingness ratios are presented
in Appendix Tables 1.D and 1.E.
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Total # of Firms 200, 000 48, 500 151, 000 341, 000 78, 300 263, 000
Mean % Minority 33.60 34.40 33.40 33.20 32.90 33.30
Std. Dev. (23.2) (24.1) (22.9) (23.1) (23.3) (23.0)
Mean % Asians 5.88 4.83 6.21 5.95 4.51 6.38
Std. Dev. (13.0) (11.2) (13.5) (13.3) (10.8) (13.9)
Mean % Blacks 9.02 7.64 9.46 10.20 8.68 10.60
Std. Dev. (14.9) (12.7) (15.5) (15.7) (13.5) (16.3)
Mean % Hispanics 18.70 21.90 17.70 16.90 19.50 16.10
Std. Dev. (21.4) (23.1) (20.7) (20.5) (21.9) (20.0)
Growth in:
White Employment 4.14 4.05 4.18 0.39 −3.77 2.17
Minority Employment 7.23 7.97 6.89 3.10 1.16 3.93
Asians 1.49 1.80 1.35 0.85 0.43 1.03
Blacks 1.73 1.00 2.05 0.46 −0.61 0.92
Hispanics 4.15 5.31 3.63 1.90 1.44 2.09
Total Employment 11.40 12.00 11.10 3.49 −2.60 6.10
Notes: Year at top of column is the base year. The numbers of firms do not sum up due to
rounding for disclosure avoidance purposes. Each statistic is computed and averaged across
the results obtained using the 10 implicate files. The corrected standard errors and Rubin
missingness ratios are presented in Appendix Tables 1.F and 1.G.
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Total # of Firms 200, 000 48, 500 151, 000 341, 000 78, 300 263, 000
0 to 5% Minority in BY:
# of Firms 10, 800 3, 470 7, 380 18, 600 5, 590 13, 000
as % of Total # of Firms 5.40 7.15 4.89 5.45 7.14 4.94
Growth in:
Total Employment 12.30 11.10 13.00 4.16 −3.75 9.07
White Employment 8.86 7.88 9.48 1.82 −5.29 6.23
5 to 20% Minority in BY:
# of Firms 65, 800 14, 900 50, 900 114, 000 25, 400 89, 000
as % of Total # of Firms 32.90 30.72 33.71 33.43 32.44 33.84
Growth in:
Total Employment 13.10 12.40 13.40 4.98 −1.88 7.76
White Employment 6.08 5.28 6.39 0.97 −4.70 3.26
20 to 50% Minority in BY:
# of Firms 81, 900 18, 500 63, 400 139, 000 30, 300 108, 000
as % of Total # of Firms 40.95 38.14 41.99 40.76 38.70 41.06
Growth in:
Total Employment 10.50 13.90 9.22 3.15 −1.80 5.02
White Employment 1.57 2.37 1.26 −0.92 −4.28 0.36
50 to 80% Minority in BY:
# of Firms 33, 200 9, 520 23, 700 55, 600 14, 200 41, 400
as % of Total # of Firms 16.60 19.63 15.70 16.30 18.14 15.74
Growth in:
Total Employment 9.65 11.70 8.48 1.01 −3.22 3.09
White Employment 1.85 1.91 1.81 0.24 −1.11 0.91
80 to 100% Minority in BY:
# of Firms 8, 170 2, 160 6, 010 13, 500 2, 850 10, 700
as % of Total # of Firms 4.09 4.45 3.98 3.96 3.64 4.07
Growth in:
Total Employment 7.90 3.49 10.20 1.68 −7.56 5.26
White Employment 3.36 2.69 3.70 2.64 1.63 3.03
Notes: “BY” stands for “Base Year.” Year at the top of the column is the base year. The num-
bers of firms do not sum up due to rounding for disclosure avoidance purposes. Each statistic,
except the number of firms as a percentage of the total number of firms, is computed and aver-
aged across the results obtained using the 10 implicate files. The corrected standard errors and
Rubin missingness ratios are presented in Appendix Table 1.H.
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1995− 2000 2000− 2005
21 Mining, Quarrying, and Oil and Gas Extraction 15.10 23.30
22 Utilities 10.90 18.60
23 Construction 14.20 9.74
31-33 Manufacturing 16.00 38.60
42 Wholesale Trade 13.20 7.18
44-45 Retail Trade 7.55 2.44
48-49 Transportation and Warehousing 19.20 9.90
51 Information 14.70 19.50
52 Finance and Insurance 12.50 13.00
53 Real Estate and Rental and Leasing 8.05 5.56
54 Professional, Scientific, and Technical Services 6.47 8.88
55 Management of Companies and Enterprises 15.80 16.80
56 Administrative & Support and
15.00 7.81
Waste Management & Remediation
61 Educational Services 11.10 17.50
62 Health Care and Social Assistance 11.60 12.80
71 Arts, Entertainment, and Recreation 18.60 27.30




All NAICS Sector Average 14.16 15.51
Standard Deviation 7.49 9.08
Notes: Observations used to conduct the fixed-point procedure are the 50 percent
simple random subsample of the establishments for each five-year interval. The tip-
ping point is measured in base-year minority shares in each sector. Each estimate is



















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 1.9. Sensitivity to Flexible Controls For Establishment Covari-
ates
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
1995-2000 −5.83 −5.85 −6.02 −5.99 −6.11
(1.16) (1.17) (1.18) (1.18) (1.20)
[0.61] [0.62] [0.63] [0.63] [0.64]
3rd-order polynomial in:
log average earnings y y
share of retiring workers y y
share of young workers y y
2000-2005 −3.25 −3.26 −3.22 −3.17 −3.17
(1.06) (1.07) (1.08) (1.08) (1.10)
[0.50] [0.50] [0.49] [0.50] [0.50]
Notes: The specification in column (1) is that from column (2) of
Table 1.5. The dependent variable is the change in net non-Hispanic
white employment as a percentage of base-year total establishment
employment. The remaining specifications add third-order polyno-
mials in the listed control variables. All specifications are estimated
using only the 50% of establishments not used to identify the tip-
ping points. Standard errors are clustered on the state-sector level.
All estimates are computed and averaged across the results obtained
using the 10 implicate files. The variance-covariance matrices of the
estimates are corrected, taking into consideration the variance con-
tribution of multiple imputation. The corrected standard errors are




















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Appendix Figure 1.A. Firm-level Minority Composition Change in Selected NAICS
Sectors
(a) 1995-2000
NAICS 42: Wholesale Trade NAICS 44-45: Retail Trade
(b) 2000-2005
NAICS 42: Wholesale Trade
NAICS 62: Health Care and Social
Assistance
Notes: Dots show mean of the change in the net establishment-level white employment in a
five-year window as a percentage of the total employment in the base year, grouping
establishments into cells of width 1 percentage point by the base-year minority share. The
horizontal line depicts the unconditional mean. The vertical line depicts the estimated tipping
point using the fixed-point procedure described in subsection 1.2.3 and a 50 percent sample of
single-establishment firms in a NAICS sector.
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Appendix Figure 1.B. White and Minority Workers in Firms Grouped by Minority











[0%, 10%) [10%, 25%) [25%, 50%) [50%, 75%) [75%, 100%]
Minority Composition Category











[0%, 10%) [10%, 25%) [25%, 50%) [50%, 75%) [75%, 100%]
Minority Composition Category
Non-Hispanic white Racial and Ethnic Minority











[0%, 10%) [10%, 25%) [25%, 50%) [50%, 75%) [75%, 100%]
Minority Composition Category











[0%, 10%) [10%, 25%) [25%, 50%) [50%, 75%) [75%, 100%]
Minority Composition Category
Non-Hispanic white Racial and Ethnic Minority
Health Care and Social Assistance
Notes: Blue bars represent non-Hispanic whites and red bars represents racial and ethnic
minorities. Each of the statistics is computed and averaged across the results obtained using the
10 implicate files. The standard errors of the estimates are corrected taking into consideration of
the variance contribution of multiple imputation. Standard error bars are included. The Rubin
missingness ratios of these estimates can be found in Appendix Table 1.C.
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Notes: Blue bars represent Asians, red bars represent blacks, and green bars represent Hispanics.
Each of the statistics is computed and averaged across the results obtained using the 10 implicate
files. The standard errors of the estimates are corrected taking into consideration of the variance
contribution of multiple imputation. Standard error bars are included. The Rubin missingness
ratios of these estimates can be found in Appendix Table 1.B.
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-49 51 52 53 54 55 56 61 62 71 72 81
Industries
Expected DD Index Actual DD Index
















-49 51 52 53 54 55 56 61 62 71 72 81
Industries
Expected DD Index Actual DD Index
Duncan & Duncan Indexes, 2005
Notes: Blue dots represent the expected Duncan & Duncan index, red dots represent the
actual Duncan & Duncan index. Each of the statistics is computed and averaged across the
results obtained using the 10 implicate files. The standard errors of the estimates are
corrected taking into consideration of the variance contribution of multiple imputation.
Standard error bars are included, which are taken from Appendix Table 1.D and Appendix
Table 1.E. The Rubin missingness ratios of these estimates can be found in Appendix
Table 1.D and Appendix Table 1.E.
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Appendix Figure 1.E. Quits and Total Separations: Total Private,





















2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013
Year
Quits, Total Private Total Separations, Total Private
Data Source: Bureau of Labor Statistics, Job Openings and Labor Turnover Survey,
JTS1000QUL and JTS1000TSL. Shaded areas indicate U.S. recessions. The start and end
dates of the recessions are obtained from the National Bureau of Economic Research,
(http://www.nber.org/cycles.html)
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Appendix Table 1.A. Summary Statistics for Establishments by Base-year Minority












Total # of Firms 19, 000 22, 500 35, 400 42, 000
Mean % Minority 31.30 34.90 31.20 34.30
Std. Dev. (21.9) (23.3) (21.6) (23.7)
Growth in:
White Employment 14.60 2.53 2.16 5.93
Minority Employment 11.80 5.42 5.52 6.93
Total Employment 26.40 7.95 7.68 12.90
0 to 5% Minority in BY:
# of Firms 1, 140 1, 110 2, 070 2, 170
as % of Total # of Firms 6.00 4.93 5.85 5.17
Growth in:
Total Employment 27.10 10.30 3.81 14.20
White Employment 22.10 8.18 1.17 12.00
5 to 20% Minority in BY:
# of Firms 6, 750 6, 970 12, 400 13, 700
as % of Total # of Firms 35.53 30.98 35.03 32.62
Growth in:
Total Employment 27.90 9.57 5.81 14.30
White Employment 17.10 3.96 0.63 9.11
20 to 50% Minority in BY:
# of Firms 7, 880 9, 710 14, 800 17, 200
as % of Total # of Firms 41.47 43.16 41.81 40.95
Growth in:
Total Employment 25.40 7.64 9.06 10.90
White Employment 10.40 −0.20 2.15 2.99
50 to 80% Minority in BY:
# of Firms 2, 750 3, 720 5, 320 6, 860
as % of Total # of Firms 14.47 16.53 15.03 16.33
Growth in:
Total Employment 24.90 4.49 11.50 11.30
White Employment 10.90 0.33 6.03 1.40
80 to 100% Minority in BY:
# of Firms 500 1, 030 810 2, 020
as % of Total # of Firms 2.63 4.58 2.29 4.81
Growth in:
Total Employment 21.80 6.03 14.50 15.90
White Employment 10.50 1.33 9.14 2.27
Notes: See Table 1.3 footnote for a description of the table structure. The corrected standard errors
and Rubin missingness ratios are presented in Appendix Tables 1.I and 1.J.
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Appendix Table 1.B. Rubin Missingness Ratios Computed for Estimates Used in






Whites Minorities Asians Blacks Hispanics
Year 2000
ALL
[0, 10%) 0.25 0.25 0.29 0.34 0.26
[10%, 25%) 0.37 0.38 0.26 0.32 0.47
[25%, 50%) 0.18 0.26 0.36 0.34 0.28
[50%, 75%) 0.35 0.34 0.48 0.26 0.24





[0, 10%) 0.27 0.49 0.46 0.39 0.50
[10%, 25%) 0.27 0.39 0.49 0.31 0.42
[25%, 50%) 0.24 0.28 0.23 0.30 0.31
[50%, 75%) 0.16 0.073 0.36 0.23 0.20





[0, 10%) 0.19 0.20 0.12 0.29 0.33
[10%, 25%) 0.33 0.33 0.26 0.32 0.40
[25%, 50%) 0.40 0.44 0.46 0.52 0.31
[50%, 75%) 0.30 0.32 0.32 0.31 0.30
[75%, 100%] 0.26 0.31 0.24 0.50 0.40
Year 2005
ALL
[0, 10%) 0.61 0.63 0.40 0.60 0.62
[10%, 25%) 0.35 0.35 0.45 0.28 0.30
[25%, 50%) 0.51 0.41 0.25 0.43 0.38
[50%, 75%) 0.32 0.37 0.34 0.26 0.37





[0, 10%) 0.47 0.52 0.40 0.52 0.51
[10%, 25%) 0.30 0.24 0.29 0.20 0.34
[25%, 50%) 0.33 0.20 0.26 0.24 0.22
[50%, 75%) 0.25 0.30 0.44 0.25 0.28





[0, 10%) 0.52 0.51 0.32 0.46 0.54
[10%, 25%) 0.41 0.44 0.51 0.36 0.32
[25%, 50%) 0.44 0.41 0.24 0.45 0.33
[50%, 75%) 0.30 0.35 0.26 0.25 0.37
[75%, 100%] 0.32 0.35 0.43 0.34 0.30
Notes: The variable “percent of whites” is used to create the blue bars in Figure 1.5; the
variable “percent of minorities” is used to create the red bars in Figure 1.5; the variable “per-
cent of Asians” is used to create the blue bars in Appendix Figure 1.C; the variable “percent
of blacks” is used to create the red bars in Appendix Figure 1.C; the variable “percent of
Hispanics” is used to create the green bars in Appendix Table 1.C. The Rubin missingness
ratios are computed following the computational formulas presented in Appendix 1.7.D.
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Appendix Table 1.C. Rubin Missingness Ratios Computed for Estimates









[0, 10%) 0.47 0.46
[10%, 25%) 0.30 0.38
[25%, 50%) 0.33 0.19
[50%, 75%) 0.17 0.25
[75%, 100%] 0.25 0.28
62 Health Care & Social Assistance
[0, 10%) 0.28 0.35
[10%, 25%) 0.12 0.20
[25%, 50%) 0.46 0.53
[50%, 75%) 0.17 0.30
[75%, 100%] 0.24 0.29
Year 2005
23 Construction
[0, 10%) 0.44 0.39
[10%, 25%) 0.37 0.25
[25%, 50%) 0.23 0.21
[50%, 75%) 0.28 0.33
[75%, 100%] 0.15 0.19
62 Health Care & Social Assistance
[0, 10%) 0.50 0.48
[10%, 25%) 0.43 0.35
[25%, 50%) 0.48 0.53
[50%, 75%) 0.31 0.39
[75%, 100%] 0.14 0.24
Notes: The variable “percent of whites” is used to create the blue bars in Ap-
pendix Figure 1.B; the variable “percent of minorities” is used to create the red
bars in Figure 1.B. The Rubin missingness ratios are computed following the com-
putational formulas presented in Appendix 1.7.D.
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Appendix Table 1.D. The Corrected Standard Errors and Rubin Missingness Ra-
tios Computed for the Actual and Expected Duncan & Dun-
can Index in Table 1.1, Year 2000
NAICS Sector
Duncan & Duncan Index
Actual Expected Difference
























52 Finance and Insurance
(1.27) (0.86) (1.44)
[0.26] [0.19] [0.29]
53 Real Estate and Rental and Leasing
(0.92) (0.68) (0.97)
[0.17] [0.32] [0.25]
54 Professional, Scientific, and Technical Services
(0.75) (0.51) (0.73)
[0.17] [0.36] [0.22]
55 Management of Companies and Enterprises
(3.15) (1.81) (3.47)
[0.20] [0.35] [0.25]
56 Administrative & Support and (0.97) (0.85) (1.09)




62 Health Care and Social Assistance
(1.05) (0.84) (1.09)
[0.19] [0.28] [0.18]
71 Arts, Entertainment, and Recreation
(1.68) (1.53) (2.46)
[0.26] [0.37] [0.38]
72 Accommodation and Food Services
(0.57) (0.44) (0.68)
[0.11] [0.55] [0.22]
81 Other Services (except Public Administration)
(0.72) (0.54) (0.86)
[0.18] [0.37] [0.30]
Notes: The corrected standard errors and Rubin missingness ratios are computed following
Appendix 1.7.D. The corrected standard errors are presented in parentheses. The Rubin
missingness ratios are presented in brackets.
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Appendix Table 1.E. The Corrected Standard Errors and Rubin Missingness Ra-
tios Computed for the Actual and Expected Duncan & Dun-
can Index in Table 1.1, Year 2005
NAICS Sector
Duncan & Duncan Index
Actual Expected Difference
























52 Finance and Insurance
(1.09) (0.77) (1.23)
[0.36] [0.27] [0.23]
53 Real Estate and Rental and Leasing
(0.89) (0.57) (0.80)
[0.20] [0.10] [0.21]
54 Professional, Scientific, and Technical Services
(0.74) (0.39) (0.75)
[0.31] [0.33] [0.22]
55 Management of Companies and Enterprises
(2.59) (1.25) (2.62)
[0.40] [0.33] [0.33]
56 Administrative & Support and (0.76) (0.60) (0.80)




62 Health Care and Social Assistance
(0.88) (0.78) (0.93)
[0.14] [0.11] [0.23]
71 Arts, Entertainment, and Recreation
(1.71) (1.21) (2.17)
[0.078] [0.26] [0.17]
72 Accommodation and Food Services
(0.61) (0.40) (0.70)
[0.43] [0.16] [0.38]
81 Other Services (except Public Administration)
(0.72) (0.40) (0.79)
[0.23] [0.18] [0.27]
Notes: The corrected standard errors and Rubin missingness ratios are computed following
Appendix 1.7.D. The corrected standard errors are presented in parentheses. The Rubin
missingness ratios are presented in brackets.
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Appendix Table 1.F. The Corrected Standard Errors and Rubin Missingness Ratios












Mean % Minority (0.065) (0.12) (0.081) (0.050) (0.096) (0.060)
[0.37] [0.22] [0.48] [0.36] [0.22] [0.44]
Std. Dev. (0.040) (0.074) (0.053) (0.031) (0.060) (0.039)
[0.39] [0.29] [0.52] [0.33] [0.31] [0.45]
Mean % Asians (0.035) (0.060) (0.043) (0.029) (0.046) (0.035)
[0.32] [0.27] [0.35] [0.40] [0.28] [0.40]
Std. Dev. (0.063) (0.13) (0.07) (0.060) (0.11) (0.069)
[0.23] [0.28] [0.22] [0.50] [0.29] [0.50]
Mean % Blacks (0.036) (0.064) (0.045) (0.032) (0.052) 0.038
[0.17] [0.18] [0.25] [0.29] [0.14] [0.29]
Std. Dev. (0.055) (0.10) (0.066) (0.050) (0.083) (0.058)
[0.25] [0.23] [0.28] [0.48] [0.30] [0.48]
Mean % Hispanics (0.059) (0.12) (0.069) (0.039) (0.090) (0.048)
[0.35] [0.17] [0.41] [0.16] [0.23] [0.33]
Std. Dev. (0.052) (0.091) (0.066) (0.037) (0.075) (0.045)
[0.42] [0.30] [0.49] [0.23] [0.30] [0.31]
Notes: The corrected standard errors and Rubin missingness ratios are computed following Ap-
pendix 1.7.D. The corrected standard errors are presented in parentheses. The Rubin missing-
ness ratios are presented in brackets.
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Appendix Table 1.G. The Corrected Standard Errors and Rubin Missingness Ratios for













White Employment (0.31) (0.46) (0.41) (0.20) (0.31) (0.23)
[0.28] [0.25] [0.31] [0.27] [0.24] [0.22]
Minority Employment (0.19) (0.33) (0.23) (0.12) (0.23) (0.15)
[0.28] [0.26] [0.22] [0.23] [0.41] [0.27]
Asians (0.069) (0.14) (0.074) (0.043) (0.089) (0.052)
[0.34] [0.26] [0.33] [0.24] [0.47] [0.28]
Blacks (0.096) (0.13) (0.12) (0.059) (0.098) (0.078)
[0.23] [0.38] [0.13] [0.15] [0.41] [0.18]
Hispanics (0.098) (0.21) (0.12) (0.069) (0.14) (0.080)
[0.28] [0.24] [0.42] [0.42] [0.42] [0.41]
Total Employment (0.46) (0.67) (0.58) (0.28) (0.46) (0.33)
[0.28] [0.20] [0.28] [0.21] [0.29] [0.17]
Notes: The corrected standard errors and Rubin missingness ratios are computed following Ap-
pendix 1.7.D. The corrected standard errors are presented in parentheses. The Rubin missingness
ratios are presented in brackets.
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Appendix Table 1.H. The Corrected Standard Errors and Rubin Missingness Ratios












0 to 5% Minority in BY:
Growth in:
Total Employment (0.83) (1.34) (1.15) (0.57) (0.99) (0.74)
[0.35] [0.35] [0.46] [0.28] [0.32] [0.42]
White Employment (0.78) (1.23) (1.09) (0.53) (0.94) (0.69)
[0.37] [0.33] [0.47] [0.26] [0.33] [0.41]
5 to 20% Minority in BY:
Growth in:
Total Employment (0.82) (1.39) (0.99) (0.51) (0.90) (0.59)
[0.29] [0.26] [0.28] [0.43] [0.35] [0.46]
White Employment (0.66) (1.11) (0.81) (0.42) (0.73) (0.49)
[0.30] [0.27] [0.32] [0.42] [0.34] [0.47]
20 to 50% Minority in BY:
Growth in:
Total Employment (0.77) (1.38) (0.97) (0.53) (0.81) (0.66)
[0.10] [0.25] [0.15] [0.19] [0.21] [0.18]
White Employment (0.49) (0.83) (0.62) (0.33) (0.46) (0.42)
[0.11] [0.27] [0.15] [0.13] [0.12] [0.13]
50 to 80% Minority in BY:
Growth in:
Total Employment (1.26) (1.67) (1.72) (0.73) (1.13) (1.01)
[0.36] [0.40] [0.33] [0.23] [0.35] [0.31]
White Employment (0.52) (0.59) (0.72) (0.29) (0.41) (0.40)
[0.39] [0.46] [0.34] [0.22] [0.30] [0.24]
80 to 100% Minority in BY:
Growth in:
Total Employment (1.44) (2.55) (1.72) (1.13) (2.14) (1.37)
[0.27] [0.25] [0.28] [0.27] [0.35] [0.28]
White Employment (0.31) (0.48) (0.39) (0.24) (0.36) (0.30)
[0.35] [0.32] [0.32] [0.36] [0.16] [0.39]
Notes: “BY” stands for “Base Year.” Year at the top of the column is the base year. The corrected
standard errors and Rubin missingness ratios are computed following Appendix 1.7.D. The corrected
standard errors are presented in parentheses. The Rubin missingness ratios are presented in brackets.
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Appendix Table 1.I. The Corrected Standard Errors and Rubin Missingness Ratios












Mean % Minority (0.17) (0.22) (0.14) (0.14)
[0.16] [0.47] [0.28] [0.28]
Std. Dev. (0.12) (0.12) (0.097) (0.077)
[0.30] [0.33] [0.40] [0.17]
Growth in:
White Employment (0.84) (0.76) (0.48) (0.46)
[0.11] [0.27] [0.35] [0.26]
Minority Employment (0.52) (0.63) (0.34) (0.31)
[0.25] [0.25] [0.39] [0.26]
Total Employment (1.21) (1.23) (0.73) (0.66)
[0.12] [0.27] [0.39] [0.25]
Notes: Year at the top of the column is the base year. The corrected standard errors and
Rubin missingness ratios are computed following Appendix 1.7.D. The corrected standard
errors are presented in parentheses. The Rubin missingness ratios are presented in brackets.
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Appendix Table 1.J. The Corrected Standard Errors and Rubin Missingness Ra-













0 to 5% Minority in BY:
Growth in:
Total Employment (2.83) (2.35) (1.80) (1.66)
[0.21] [0.37] [0.42] [0.40]
White Employment (2.61) (2.21) (1.66) (1.54)
[0.21] [0.36] [0.41] [0.39]
5 to 20% Minority in BY:
Growth in:
Total Employment (2.00) (1.72) (1.12) (1.15)
[0.34] [0.18] [0.40] [0.47]
White Employment (1.58) (1.51) (0.90) (0.98)
[0.32] [0.22] [0.40] [0.45]
20 to 50% Minority in BY:
Growth in:
Total Employment (2.50) (1.72) (1.16) (1.23)
[0.16] [0.35] [0.26] [0.25]
White Employment (1.54) (1.07) (0.68) (0.79)
[0.16] [0.33] [0.18] [0.26]
50 to 80% Minority in BY:
Growth in:
Total Employment (3.84) (5.13) (2.49) (2.00)
[0.34] [0.35] [0.38] [0.27]
White Employment (1.58) (2.16) (1.00) (0.87)
[0.39] [0.32] [0.42] [0.35]
80 to 100% Minority in BY:
Growth in:
Total Employment (4.96) (3.43) (4.20) (2.96)
[0.13] [0.20] [0.28] [0.44]
White Employment (1.80) (0.77) (0.98) (0.66)
[0.35] [0.28] [0.21] [0.57]
Notes: “BY” stands for base year. Year at the top of the column is the base year. The corrected
standard errors and Rubin missingness ratios are computed following Appendix 1.7.D. The cor-




Linking the Firms and Establishments
in the Longitudinal
Employer-Household Dynamics
Infrastructure Data to the Census
Business Register
2.1 Introduction
The crosswalk between the Longitudinal Employer-Household Dynamics (LEHD) infrastruc-
ture file system and the Census Business Register (BR) is authorized as part of the LEHD
Infrastructure Project. This document describes the LEHD - BR crosswalk and its compo-
nent inputs: the Business Register, Longitudinal Business Database (LBD), and the LEHD
Infrastructure File system. 1 The output files include the LEHD - BR crosswalk at both
the establishment and employer (business) levels. These output files facilitate linking a wide
1If you are reading this document on Census secure computers, then you should be accessing the Census
Confidential version, which includes some information that cannot be included in the public version.
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range of contextual variables relating to characteristics of the current and prior employers
and co-workers of current employees.
The purpose of this technical documentation is to describe the linking process and to
examine the properties and the qualities of the crosswalk files. Section 2.2 provides the
general overview, update frequency, acquisition process, and the naming convention of the
LEHD - BR crosswalk files. Section 2.3 provides a detailed introduction to the two primary
input files used to create this crosswalk: the LEHD - Employer Characteristics File (ECF)
system and the BR. The input file cleaning and preparation is also discussed here. Finally,
Section 2.4 describes and assesses the algorithm used to perform the linking. False match
and non-match rates for various populations are defined and estimated in order to examine
the properties and quality of the LEHD - BR crosswalk output files.
2.2 Overview of the LEHD - BR crosswalk
2.2.1 Definition
The LEHD - BR crosswalk provides linking information at both the establishment level and
employer levels. The LEHD employer-level data and employee (co-worker) characteristics
data can be linked to the Census Bureau establishment and firm level micro-data via this
crosswalk. In particular, unlike the LEHD Business Register crosswalk produced by Chiang
et al. (2005), where the most detailed exact crosswalk is at the Employer Identification Num-
ber (EIN), State, 4-digit industry, and county level, the LEHD - BR crosswalk documented
here provides a many-to-many match that links all of the establishments in the ECF on the
LEHD side with all of their associated establishments on the BR side via the FAS EIN.
FAS EIN is the Employer Identification Number developed for LEHD Firm Age and Size
(FAS) project, which added firm age and size to the Quarterly Workforce Indicators using
national definitions of the employing firm. It is the firm identifier recorded in the LEHD 2011
production snapshot, the primary research version of the LEHD infrastructure file system.
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The FAS EIN was produced to allow the linkage of the LBD - Business Dynamics Statistics
(BDS) micro-data to the LEHD Infrastructure File System. This linkage facilitated the
creation of firm age and firm size variables in the LEHD ECF (Haltiwanger et al., 2014).
Unfortunately, when that linkage was designed, it did not include vintage dating for the
LBD input files that were used–making it very difficult to reverse the linkage and recover
the correct LBD identifiers from the currently supported LBD vintages. 2 The EIN serves
as the basis for the FAS EIN. By using the FAS EIN to create the LEHD - BR crosswalk, we
attempt to replicate the link used in the production of the firm age and firm size variables
in the LEHD infrastructure file system. The main difference here is that we pass directly
to the Business Register, rather than passing through the LBD/BDS. The advantage of
doing so is that we can avoid the vintage issues with the current LBD/BDS linkage, where
the provenance of the LBD identifiers used for the original firm age and firm size variable
integration cannot be verified.
2.2.2 Update Frequency
The Census Bureau’s Employer Business Register is updated annually. The Census Bureau’s
Longitudinal Employer-Household Dynamics Infrastructure File System is updated on a
quarterly basis. The LEHD - BR crosswalk is updated annually.
2.2.3 Acquisition Process
The creation of the LEHD - BR crosswalk files requires the presence of all BR files and the
ECF from the LEHD Infrastructure File System.
2.2.4 Naming Conventions
Four output files are produced:
2This issue has now been addressed in the production of new LBD vintages, which get a proper vintage
label that can be used to verify linkage provenance.
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• lehd br susbm xwalk final pre02.sas7bdat: the employer-level LEHD - BR crosswalk
file by year for 1990 - 2001, 3 using single-unit firms (i.e., establishments) and submas-
ters 4 from the BR Single Unit (SU) file only.
• lehd br susbm xwalk final post02.sas7bdat: the employer-level LEHD - BR crosswalk
file by year for 2002 - current, 5 using single-unit firms (i.e., establishments) and
submasters from the BR Single Unit (SU) file only.
• lehd br sumu xwalk final pre02.sas7bdat: the establishment-level LEHD - BR cross-
walk by year for 1990 - 2001, using single-unit firms (i.e., establishments) from the BR
Single Unit (SU) file and establishments that belong to multi-unit firms or submasters
from the BR Multi-Unit (MU) file.
• lehd br sumu xwalk final post02.sas7bdat: the establishment-level LEHD - BR cross-
walk by year for 2002 - current, using single-unit firms (i.e., establishments) from the
BR Single Unit (SU) file and establishments that belong to multi-unit firms or sub-
masters from the BR Multi-Unit (MU) file.
2.3 Description of the Input Files & Initial Preparation
In this section, the two main input files: the LEHD - ECF file and the BR file are introduced.
Additionally, the initial input file cleaning and preparation, mostly for the BR data, are also
discussed in detail here.
3In 2002, the BR underwent a substantial redesign, changing to an entirely different identification num-
bering system, which is discussed in detail in Section 2.3.2. Therefore, it is necessary to create the LEHD -
BR crosswalk files for 1990 - 2001 and 2002 - current separately.
4See section 2.3.2 for detailed description.
5The current version of the LEHD - BR Crosswalk is available for 2002 - 2012. Because in the LEHD 2011
production snapshot, 2012 quarter one is the last available quarter with data inputs, the current LEHD -
BR crosswalk can only provide linkages between the 2012 BR entities and the LEHD entities in 2012 quarter
one.
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2.3.1 LEHD - Employer Characteristics File (ECF)
The first primary input file underlying the creation of the LEHD - BR crosswalk is the
Employer Characteristics File (ECF) of the LEHD Infrastructure File System. The LEHD
Infrastructure File System is a job-based frame and associated linked files designed to repre-
sent the universe of individual – employer pairs covered by state Unemployment Insurance
(UI) system reporting requirement (with federal employees added in 2012). The underlying
data of the LEHD Infrastructure File system are wage records extracted from the UI admin-
istrative files of each partner state in the Local Employment Dynamics (LED) cooperative
federal – state partnership (Abowd et al., 2009). Besides the UI wage records, LED partner
states also deliver an extract of the file reported to the Bureau of Labor Statistics’ Quarterly
Census of Employment and Wages (QCEW, formerly known as ES-202). These data are
received by LEHD on a quarterly basis, with historical time series extending back to the
early 1990s for many states. In the 2011 snapshot, LEHD Infrastructure File System has
data from all 50 states in the U.S. A more comprehensive overview and description of the
LEHD Infrastructure File System can be found in Abowd et al. (2009).
In the LEHD system, an employer is identified primarily by its state UI account number,
which is recoded to SEIN – State Employer Identification Number. The SEIN is specific
to a state. In LEHD, a single legal employer might have multiple SEINs, and, regardless
of its operations in other states, a legal employer has a different UI account in each state
in which it has statutory employees. 6 An establishment corresponds to a firm’s reporting
unit in ES-202. It is usually the place where the employees actually perform their work.
Establishments in the LEHD Infrastructure File System are identified by SEIN concatenated
with SEINUNIT. Most employers have one establishment. These firms are usually called
single-units. However, most employment is with employers who have multiple establishments.
6That is to say, for example, a Target in New York and a Target in New Jersey are always considered
different LEHD employers, but a Target in Ithaca, New York, and a Target in Binghamton, New York, may
be considered be part of the same SEIN if they have the same owner and, therefore, the same state UI
account.
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These multi-establishment employers are usually called multi-units.
The ECF of the LEHD Infrastructure File System is itself a collection of related files. In
the 2011 snapshot, the ECF consolidates most employer and establishment-level information
into three files: the employer SEIN-level file, the establishment SEINUNIT-level file, and
the newly added firm age and firm size file. The ECF establishment SEINUNIT-level file
contains one record for every year-quarter in which the SEIN-SEINUNIT pair is present in
either the ES-202 or the UI wage records. The ECF employer SEIN-level file contains one
record for every year-quarter in which the SEIN is present in either the ES-202 or the UI
wage records. It is built up from the ECF establishment SEINUNIT-level file. Therefore, the
ECF employer SEIN-level file provides no additional information but is an easier and more
efficient way to access SEIN-level summary data. The newly-added firm age and firm size
file contains one record for every SEIN-SEINUNIT-year-quarter with national employer-level
data and identifiers imported from the LBD/BDS micro-data.
A number of input files are used to build the SEIN-level and the SEINUNIT-level ECF
files from the component the QCEW/ES-202 and the UI wage record data. In particular,
the QCEW/ES-202 collects employment, payroll, economic activity, and physical location
information from employers covered by state UI programs and from employers subject to
the reporting requirements of the ES-202 system. The universe for these data is a reporting
unit, which is the BLS’s definition of an establishment. Over the years, the information
contained in the SEIN-level and SEINUNIT-level files has increased substantially. Common
to all years are information on the employer’s identity (the SEIN), the reporting unit’s
identity (SEINUNIT), ownership information, employment on the twelfth of each month
covered by the quarter, total wages paid over the course of the quarter, and information
pertaining to industry classifications, including both the Standard Industrial Classification
(SIC) and North American Industry Classification System (NAICS). Federal identifiers, (e.g.,
the Employer Identification Number (EIN)), and geographic identifiers are also included.
The creation of the firm age and firm size file relied primarily on data from the LBD and
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BDS micro-data and the National Employer Characteristics File (NECF) augmented with
the LEHD Successor-Predecessor (SPF) state files (Haltiwanger et al., 2014). The LBD/BDS
contains annual longitudinal establishment information based on national firm-level entities
for nearly the entire non-farm private economy and a small portion of the public sector from
1976 through the present. The NECF was generated by interleaving all the state ECFs.
The SPFs identify spurious changes of the firm identifiers due to events such as mergers and
acquisitions in the LEHD. The variables found in the ECF firm age and firm size file include
LBD firm alpha, identifying the enterprise, 7 national firm size, 8 national firm (alpha) age, 9
and the critical identifier that permits the creation of the LEHD - BR crosswalk: FAS EIN.
A Brief Discussion on the FAS EIN
The LEHD - BR crosswalk relies on the identifier called FAS EIN. In particular, to facilitate
the creation of firm age and firm size variables, the LBD/BDS micro-data were enhanced
by integrating the EIN from the Business Register. The result is the EIN input to the
FAS EIN variable: the FAS EIN is the EIN reported in the BR LBD/BDS prepended with
five zeroes that are subsequently edited by the LEHD staff to reflect discrepancies between
the LBD/BDS EIN and the one reported on the QCEW (Haltiwanger et al., 2014).
The corresponding enhancement to the LEHD infrastructure files is not straightforward.
The addition of FAS EIN in the LEHD - ECF required correcting missing, partially missing,
or invalid EINs as reported in the QCEW files delivered via the LED partnership (Halti-
wanger et al., 2014). Once the EINs are edited, if an SEIN has a valid EIN, the FAS EIN
is created by pre-appending five zeros to the EIN. If an SEIN record contains no EIN in
the ECF, the FAS EIN is generated by appending a two-digit number to the SEIN. A more
comprehensive overview and description of the LEHD firm age and firm size file and the
7An enterprise is the parent firm that controls more than 50% interest in the related establishments.
8This variable measures the best initial firm size as of March 12th of the previous year, or current size if
the firm was born in current year.
9This LEHD firm age variable was created as an edited version of the LBD variable such that there
can be no abrupt changes in firm age at the alpha level due to activities such as merger, acquisition, or
establishment entry and exit from the alpha firm(Haltiwanger et al., 2014).
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creation of FAS EIN can be found in Haltiwanger et al. (2014). Table 2.1 provides the per-
centage of FAS EIN identifiers that are valid EINs 10 by year from 1990 to 2012. According
to Table 2.1, approximately 95% or more of all FAS EINs are valid in the LEHD - ECF each
year, which suggests high utility from using of this identifier to link to EIN indexed data like
the BR. 11
The LEHD - ECF File Preparation
To create the LEHD - BR crosswalk, all three files in the LEHD - ECF file system are
used: the SEIN-level file provides information on SEIN-level payroll, SEIN-level employment,
number of units owned by a SEIN, and cleaned SEIN-level 2007 NAICS industry code;
the SEINUNIT-level file provides detailed SEINUNIT-level information on geography; and
finally, the firm age and firm size file provides FAS EIN and the LBD/BDS firm identifier
(alpha).
Due to the different data-reporting frequencies, the quarterly LEHD - ECF is annual-
ized. Specifically, regarding the payroll variable, the annual payroll is simply the sum of all
quarterly payrolls of a SEIN in a year. The quarterly employment variable is annualized by
retaining the SEIN-level employment that is closest to March 12th. For a SEIN - year: if the
first available quarter is quarter 1, the annualized employment variable is set to equal to the
month-three employment of quarter 1 of that year. However, if the first available quarter is
quarter 2, 3, or 4 for the SEIN - year pair, the employment is set to equal to the month-one
employment of the first available quarter of that year.
2.3.2 Business Register (BR)
The Business Register (BR), which was formerly known as the Standard Statistical Estab-
lishment List file (SSEL), is a central repository of legal entities (generally businesses) that
10 A valid FAS EIN, i.e., one that will link to other data indexed by the federal EIN, is the one created
by pre-pending five zeros to a valid EIN.
11The results presented in Table 2.1 are very similar to those presented in Table A1 in Haltiwanger et al.
(2014).
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operate within the U.S. and its island territories as identified by the Master File systems of
the U.S. Internal Revenue Service (IRS) (Census Bureau, 2013b; Jarmin and Miranda, 2002;
Salyers, 2004). The primary function of the BR maintained by the U.S. Census Bureau is
to develop the frames for economic censuses and surveys (Jarmin and Miranda, 2002). Ad-
ditionally, the BR also serves as the central repository of administrative records (primarily
federal tax data) and the main source of basic employment and payroll measures summarized
by industry and geographic area in the annual County Business Patterns (CBP) and ZIP
Business Patterns statistical series (Salyers, 2004).
Input Data Source and Suppliers
Administrative records are the foundation of the BR. the BR’s principal administrative
record supplier is the Internal Revenue Service (IRS). Specifically, the Business Master File
Entity/Directory (BMF), the Employer’s Quarterly Federal Tax Return – IRS Form 941
series (agricultural employers file the Employer’s Annual Tax Return for Agricultural Em-
ployees – IRS Form 943 series), and the annual business income tax returns from the IRS
are of primary importance. The BMF extracts provide the BR with EINs, legal and trade
names, mailing and physical location addresses, principal business activity (industrial) clas-
sification codes, processing indicators, etc; the payroll tax returns data from the Employer’s
first-quarterly Federal Tax Return provides total employment for the pay period including
March 12th and total payroll for the quarter; the annual business income tax returns data
provide basic measures of business receipts/revenue, assets, and a principal business activity
(industrial) classification codes.
Besides the administrative records from the IRS, the Social Security Administration
(SSA) and the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) are also important record suppliers. New
business and organizational taxpayers (i.e., births) file an Application for Employer Identi-
fication Number, Form SS-4, with the IRS. The Census Bureau receives data obtained via
Form SS-4 from the SSA processing. Form SS-4 content supplied to the Census Bureau in-
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cludes EIN, industry (NAICS) codes , geographic information, estimated employment, and
other classification/status indicators. Finally, each quarter, the Census Bureau prepares a
file of EINs that identifies unclassified single units and partially classified manufacturing
single units from the BR. The BLS refers each of these EINs to the Business Establishment
List (BEL) maintained by the BLS, which is QCEW-based, and returns the corresponding
industry (NAICS) codes, whenever possible.
Statistical Units in the BR
The BR identifies four basic types of statistical units: establishment, EIN entity, enterprise,
and alternative reporting unit. In the BR, an establishment is an economic unit, usually a
single physical location, where business is conducted, or where services/industrial operations
are performed. An EIN entity is an administrative unit that the IRS has assigned a unique
identifier, i.e., the EIN, for tax reporting purposes. For single-unit establishments, the EIN
entity and the establishment are the same. This is not the case, however, for establish-
ments of multi-unit firms. A multi-unit firm usually has at least one EIN. Each EIN that a
multi-unit firm reports under is flagged as a “submaster” (Jarmin and Miranda, 2002). An
enterprise, which is also referred to as a parent company, is an economic unit comprising one
or more establishment under common ownership or control. In the BR files, the enterprise is
identified via a 6-digit number called “Alpha”. The concepts of alternative reporting units
are established by the Census Bureau specifically for data collection purposes for industries
that cannot report establishment data. These units typically represent a part of the company
made up of all activity within a given industry and geographic area.
The Organizational Structure of the BR Files and the BR Redesign
There is great variation in terms of the complexity of business organizations. Figure 2.1
shows an example of the complex organizational relationships among establishments, EINs,
and alternative reporting units within an enterprise. This figure is borrowed from Salyers
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(2004). For this particular reason, the BR files are organized based on the level of business
organizational complexity. For each year, the BR has two files – SU and MU. 12 SU stands
for “Single Unit” and MU stands for “Multi-Unit”. The BR - SU file contains single estab-
lishment enterprise records. For a single establishment enterprise, the establishment, EIN
entity, and the enterprise are the same. The SU file also contains the submaster records.
These submasters are EIN-level records, not establishment-level records. The BR - MU file
contains multi-unit establishment records. These establishments are owned by multi-unit
enterprises or owned by submasters. For a multi-unit enterprise, the establishment and the
legal entity are not coincident.
For illustration purposes, Figure 2.2 shows three types of simple organizational structures
of companies: a single-unit establishment (Panel A), a multi-unit company with no submas-
ters (Panel B), and a multi-unit company with submasters (Panel C). Using Figure 2.2 as
an example, the data record for the single-unit establishment (Panel A) is stored in the SU
file; all the establishment-level data records associated with the multi-unit company with no
submasters (Panel B) are stored in the MU file; the data records of the submasters in Panel
C are stored in the SU file, and the establishment-level data records associated with these
submasters are stored in the MU file. In both the SU and the MU files, there is a 6-digit
number – Alpha to identify the enterprise/parent company to which these establishments
and submasters belong.
Before 2002, the old SSEL identified entities by EINs and Census File Number (CFN).
A CFN is an unique identification number assigned to each establishment by the Census
Bureau. The CFN is constructed differently depending on whether an entity is an SU es-
tablishment or MU establishment. For a single-unit company, its CFN is a 10-digit number
consisting of a leading zero prepended to its 9-digit EIN. As a comparison, for a multi-unit
company, its CFN is a 10-digit number with the first 6 digits being the Alpha identifier and
12This is true except for 1988. The 1988 MU file is lost forever, and is replaced by the Census Bureau’s
County Business Patterns (CBP) file. The CBP is an annual series that provides sub-national economic data
by industry. This series includes the number of establishments, employment during the week of March 12,
first quarter payroll, and annual payroll.
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the last four digits being a location number. One issue with the CFN is that it lacks longitu-
dinal consistency. The CFN is usually very consistent within a tax filing year across surveys,
however, it is much less so across time (Salyers, 2004). Additionally, the old identification
number system does not permit the organizational structures of firms to be fully and cor-
rectly retrieved. Using Figure 2.1 as an example again, under the old identification number
system, we can identify all the establishments associated with an enterprise via the Alpha
identifiers. However, we could not accurately link the establishments to their associated
submasters.
In order to improve the support for business surveys and to strength its effectiveness
in providing comprehensive and accurate coverage of the universe of business, in 2002, the
BR underwent an extensive redesign. The BR was redesigned to allow the retention of an
increased number of data elements that were previously lost. It was also redesigned to provide
sufficient flexibility to fully accommodate the complex business organizations involving the
four statistical units described above (Salyers, 2004).
The primary change in the BR redesign is the creation of a set of new identification num-
bers for register entities. Specifically, the CFN was discontinued and replaced by a 10-digit
serial number that has no embedded meaning for each register entity. This new identification
number is referred to as the “estab. identifier” in this paper due to the confidentiality of the
variable name itself. Similar to CFN, this estab. identifier is supposed to be unique in the
annual BR files. One major advantage of the new identifier is that it allows an establishment
to maintain the same identification number irrespective of company organizational changes
or changes in its tax filings. In addition to the estab. identifier, two more identification num-
bers are also developed to facilitate full identification of an establishment’s parent firm and
submaster. These three identifiers together permit the creation of a centralized “link” table
that allows all register entities to be related to each other accurately. Refer to Figure 2.1
again, under the new identification number system after the 2002 BR redesign, we now can
accurately link establishments to their associated submasters and enterprises.
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The BR File Preparation
To create the LEHD - BR crosswalk, prior to the 2002 BR redesign, the SU and MU files
provide four identifiers: CFN, EIN, Alpha, and permanent plant number (PPN). 13 After
the 2002 BR redesign, the SU and MU files provide five identifiers: the three identifiers that
identify an establishment, its associated enterprise, and its associated submaster, EIN, and
Alpha. Besides these identifiers, the SU file provides administrative records on current year
quarterly payroll (IRS Form 941), current year annual payroll for Agricultural Employees
(IRS Form 943), current year employment, activity code, processing division code, and geo-
graphic information including state, county, and place FIPS code; and the MU file provides
data on reported annual payroll, reported employment, activity code, processing division
code, and geographic information including state, county, and place FIPS code.
Though the CFN and the estab. identifier are supposed to be unique and only one data
record for every establishment is supposed to exist each year, there are duplicates in the BR
files. Before creating the LEHD - BR crosswalk, all the BR SU and MU files were cleaned.
Prior to the 2002 BR redesign, CFN duplication only exists in the 1993 SU and MU files.
In Table 2.2, I summarize the unique CFNs that have duplicates and their frequencies. In
the 1993 BR SU file, 56 CFNs have a frequency of 2, which account for 112 observations.
In addition, 1 CFN has a frequency of 4, which accounts for 4 observations. In the 1993
BR MU file, 1 CFN has a frequency of 3, which accounts for 3 observations. The CFN with
the frequency of 4 in the SU file and the CFN with the frequency of 3 in the MU file turns
out to be the code for invalid or missing CFN. These observations were deleted. As far
as the 56 CFNs with the frequency of 2 were concerned, it turns out that for each unique
CFN, the duplicated observation has less information in the form of missing geographic code,
payroll, and employment, etc. The solution for these CFNs is that only the observation with
more information is retained. To identify the CFNs with the frequency of 2 and retrieve the
13PPN is also an establishment identification number assigned by the Census Bureau. However, unlike
CFN, it is a longitudinal ID variable.
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deleted observations from the original BR files, one can use the variable CFN FREQ in the
LEHD - BR crosswalk, which equals 2 for the establishments with duplicate CFNs.
After the 2002 BR redesign, similar duplicates also exist but only in the BR SU files.
Table 2.3 shows the frequencies, the counts of the non-unique estab. identifiers and the
total number of observations accounted for. These numbers are provided for single-unit
establishments and submasters separately. As shown in Table 2.3, all non-unique estab.
identifiers have a frequency of 2. A closer examination reveals that, for each non-unique
estab. identifier, it is always the case that one observation is associated with an active
establishment and the other observation is associated with an inactive establishment, defined
by the BR establishment-level activity code. To resolve the duplication issue, for each non-
unique estab. identifier, the observation associated with the active establishment is kept and
the one associated with the inactive establishment is deleted. In order to identify these estab.
identifiers with the frequency of 2 and retrieve the deleted observations from the original BR
files, one can use the variable Estab Identifier FREQ in the LEHD - BR crosswalk, which
equals 2 for the establishments with duplicate estab. identifiers.
Because the main functionality of the BR is to serve as the repository of legal entities
(generally businesses) in the U.S., many data records in the BR files are there for processing
reasons and should be excluded from statistical studies because they are considered inactive
establishments. Active establishments are defined as those entities with positive employment
and/or payroll within a year. However, given the difference in the update frequencies of the
BR files and the LEHD - ECF files, as well as the different universes of establishments
covered, to maximize the match validity, all BR entities are used for the creation of the
LEHD - BR crosswalk, regardless of activity status. The activity status is flagged by the
variable “active” in the crosswalk. This activity status variable is created using payroll,
processing division code, and BR’s original activity code.
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2.4 The Creation of LEHD - BR Crosswalk
2.4.1 File Structure and Contents
In this section, the entity identifiers and the unit of observation for statistical analyses are
discussed.
Identifiers
Two types of identifying variables in the construction of the LEHD - BR crosswalk files (both
the employer-level and the establishment-level) are used. These are: business identifier and
geographic information. The business identifier used is the FAS EIN which is an enhanced
EIN created for the purpose of incorporating firm age and firm size variables into the LEHD
Infrastructure File System. 14 The key geographic information used to create the crosswalk
is the two-digit state FIPS code.
Unit of Observation
Except for Minnesota, where wage records correspond to the report of an individual’s UI-
covered earnings by a firm’s reporting unit, i.e., the SEINUNIT, most wage records in the
LEHD Infrastructure File System correspond to the report of an individual’s UI-covered
earnings by an employing entity, i.e., the SEIN. As a result, the recommended level of
analysis for most wage determination studies using the LEHD Infrastructure File System is
the SEIN level. The unit of observation in the LEHD - BR crosswalk is a unique CFN/estab.
identifier - FAS EIN - State - SEIN record.
2.4.2 Algorithm
In this section, the algorithm used to create the LEHD - BR crosswalk is discussed in detail.
Each step corresponds to a section of the SAS programs/bash scripts written to create the
14Details on how the FAS EIN is created can be read in section 2.3.1 and Haltiwanger et al. (2014).
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LEHD - BR crosswalk. The programs can be found on the Census Research Data Center
server at:
//nsf-app1/rdcprojects/co/co00538/programs/zheng008/CenHRS/LEHD BR xcrosswalk/.
The LEHD-BR Crosswalk files can be found on the Census Research Data Center server
at://nsf-app1/mixedtmp/co00538/CW LEHD BR/data.
The confidential version of this documentation can be found on the Census Research Data
Center server at://nsf-app1/mixedtmp/co00538/CW LEHD BR/doc.
Step 1: Variables from the LEHD - ECF files are collected. In particular, from the
LEHD - ECF firm age and firm size files, FAS EIN, fas ein flag, fas firm id, quarter, sein,
seinunit, and year are collected; from the LEHD - ECF SEIN-level files, SEIN, year, quar-
ter, sein best emp1, sein best emp2, sein best emp3 (these three variables measure SEIN
monthly employment), sein best wages, NUM ESTABS, MODE ES NAICS FNL2007 EMP,
multi unit, MODE ES COUNTY, MODE ES COUNTY EMP, MODE LEG COUNTY,
MODE LEG COUNTY EMP are collected.
Step 2: Variables from the BR files are collected. Besides the necessary identifiers dis-
cussed in previous sections, variables from administrative records on current year quarterly
payroll (IRS Form 941), current year annual payroll for Agricultural Employees (IRS Form
943), current year employment, activity code, processing division code, and geographic in-
formation including state, county, and place FIPS code are collected from the annual BR
SU file; and the MU files provide data on reported annual payroll, reported employment,
activity code, processing division code, and geographic information including state, county,
and place FIPS code.
Step 3: Because in the original BR files, the same variable may have different length
and format across years, this step is to reformat the variables collected from the BR files
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such that the same variables have the same length and format to facilitate concatenation in
the following steps. In addition, each year’s SU file is split into two files: one containing only
the single-unit establishments and one containing only the submasters. The variables active
and active flag are also created in this step. By completing this step, there are three BR
input files for creating the LEHD - BR crosswalk each year: one contains only the single-unit
establishments; one contains only the submasters; and the MU file.
Step 4: Diagnostics are run and issues with the CFN/estab. identifier duplication are
discovered.
Step 5: The frequencies of CFNs and estab. identifiers are computed for each year’s BR
files and the frequency counts are stored.
Step 6: Diagnostics are run in order to characterize the non-unique establishment identi-
fiers (CFN/estab. identifier). Details are summarized in Section 2.3.2 and Tables 2.2 and 2.3.
Step 7: Duplication of establishment identifiers in the BR files are edited. Details of the
edit are discussed in Section 2.3.2. Tests are run and the results confirm that establishment
identifiers are unique after Step 7.
Step 8: Tests are devised to examine whether we can accurately retrieve the firm struc-
ture involving enterprises, submasters and their associated establishments. It turns out that,
as discussed in Section 2.3.2, only the BR files after the 2002 redesign permit such accurate
linking.
Step 9 and Step 10: These two steps create the establishment-level BR input file
and the employer-level BR input file for each year. To do so, first, tests are devised to
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examine whether any CFNs/estab. identifiers exist in the file containing only the single-unit
establishments, the file containing only the submasters, and the MU file simultaneously. It
turns out that such CFNs/estab. identifiers do not exist. Then, the establishment-level
BR input file is created using the file containing only the single-unit establishments and the
MU file, and the employer-level BR input file is created using the file containing only the
single-unit establishments and the file containing only the submasters. 15 For each year,
the establishment-level BR input file contains all the establishments associated with all the
enterprises (identified by the Alpha identifiers) in the BR. The employer-level BR input file
contains all the single-unit establishments (enterprises with only one establishment) and all
the submasters, which represent a subset of the establishments contained in the MU files.
Step 11: This step is to concatenate the annual BR files. Given the changes in the iden-
tification number system before and after the BR redesign, as well as the distinction between
the establishment-level and the employer-level files, the annual BR files are concatenated into
four final input files to create the LEHD - BR crosswalk: the establishment-level file before
the BR redesign, the establishment-level file after the BR redesign, the employer-level file
before the BR redesign, and the employer-level file after the BR redesign.
Step 12: This step is written to first convert the quarterly SEIN-SEINUNIT-level LEHD
- ECF firm age and firm size file into an annual SEIN-level file. Then, the SEIN-level char-
acteristics including payroll and employment and geographic information are supplemented
using the LEHD - ECF SEIN - level file. The employment and geographic information that
is closest to March 12th is always used. Details on how the payroll and employment variables
are retained are described in Section 2.3.1.
Step 13: This step is to create the simplest match at the FAS EIN level by year. Match
15The employer-level BR input file is essentially the same as the original BR - SU file
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rates are computed and presented in Section 2.4.3.
Step 14: To create the establishment-level and the employer-level LEHD - BR crosswalk
at a finer level using both the FAS EIN identifier and the geographic information, i.e., State,
it is important to ensure that many-to-many record linking is not committed. To do so, in
this step, the number of establishments or employers associated with a FAS EIN - State pair
is computed by year using the BR input files, 16 and the number of SEINs associated with a
FAS EIN - State pair is computed by year using the annualized SEIN-level LEHD - ECF file.
Step 15 and Step 16: Step 15 is to create the match at the FAS EIN - State level by
year. Match rates and FAS EIN coverage rates are computed. The results are presented in
Section 2.4.3. Using the frequency counts created in Step 14, in step 16 a flag is also created
indicating which FAS EIN - State pairs permit one-to-one or one-to-many record linking.
Step 17: Step 17 brings the FAS EIN level match and the FAS EIN - State level match
and all the corresponding flags into one file. This is done separately for the employer-level
files and the establishment-level files. The output files from this step serve as the basis in
Step 18 for the creation of the final LEHD - BR crosswalk output files.
Step 18: Step 18 conducts the final crosswalk construction. It is done for 1990 - 2001
and 2002 - current, separately. Additionally, it is done at the establishment-level and the
employer-level, separately.
Step 19: Recall, the establishment-level BR input files contain all the establishments as-
sociated with all the enterprises (identified by the Alpha identifiers) in the BR. The employer-
level BR input files, on the other hand, contain all the single-unit establishments (enterprises
16This is done separately for the employer-level input files and the establishment-level input files.
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with only one establishment) and all the submasters representing only a subset of establish-
ments contained in the MU files. Therefore, the employer-level crosswalk is systematically
missing the group of employers associated with the establishments contained in the BR -
MU files that do not belong to any submasters. To assess the importance of these employers,
weighted and unweighted percentages of establishments in the MU file that do not belong to
any submasters are computed using all the establishments in the MU files as the universe.
The weight used is the annual establishment-level reported employment. The results are
presented in Section 2.4.3.
Step 20: False match rates and false non-match rates are calculated in Step 20. The
methodology and the results are presented and discussed in Section 2.4.3.
2.4.3 LEHD - BR Match Rate
In this section, match rates at various levels are presented and discussed.
Match Rate at the FAS EIN Level
The match rate at the FAS EIN level by year is computed for both the establishment-level
and the employer-level LEHD - BR crosswalks. It is done separately first using LEHD and
then using the BR as the universe. The results are presented in Table 2.4. Columns (1) and
(4) present the number of unique FAS EINs that are matched between the LEHD and the
BR. Columns (2) and (5) are computed using the valid FAS EINs in LEHD as the universe.
Columns (3) and (6) are computed using the (FAS )EINs (that are associated with both
active and inactive establishments or employers) in BR as the universe.
In the establishment-level LEHD - BR crosswalk, more than 90% of the valid FAS EINs
in LEHD can be matched to the BR each year (Column (2)). In comparison, a much lower
percentages of (FAS )EINs in the BR can be matched to the LEHD, especially in the earlier
years when LEHD program had less participating states. For instance, in 1990, less than
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30% of (FAS )EINs in the BR can be matched. This percentage has gradually increased over
the years, though it has always remained below 50% until the 2002 BR redesign. Column
(3) shows a clear increase in 2002 in the percentage of (FAS )EINs in the BR that can be
matched to LEHD (from 39.7% in 2001 to 65.9% in 2002). Interestingly, after 2002, this
percentage decreases annually from close to 66% in 2002 to lower than 40% in 2012.
One possible reason for such an unexpected trend could be that, contrary to what has
been recommended, all the establishments are used in the creation of the LEHD - BR cross-
walk regardless of its activity status. To reconcile the decline in FAS EIN match rate after
2002, the FAS EIN level match and the match rate computation are conducted again using
only active-establishment-associated (FAS )EINs in the BR. 17 The results are presented
in Table 2.A. By comparing columns (3) in Table 2.4 and Table 2.A, when using only the
active-establishment-associated (FAS )EINs, the highest match rate between LEHD and BR
is achieved in 2001, right before the 2002 BR redesign. In 2002, the match rate declines by
more than 15%. And the declining trend in the match rate after 2002 is similar to that in
Table 2.4. Therefore, it can be concluded that the unexpected decline in Table 2.4 is unlikely
to be caused by using all (FAS )EINs in the BR. Additionally, by comparing columns (2)
in Table 2.4 and Table 2.A, we can see that using only the active-establishment-associated
(FAS )EINs usually renders lower match rates in LEHD. It verifies that by using all estab-
lishments from the BR, higher match validity is indeed achieved.
A close comparison between column (1) and (4), column (2) and (5), and column (3) and
(6) in Table 2.4 indicates that the yearly match rate at the FAS EIN level in the employer-
level LEHD - BR crosswalk mirrors almost exactly the same pattern as what is described in
the establishment-level LEHD - BR crosswalk.
17The activity status is defined by the variable “active”.
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Match Rate at the FAS EIN - State Level
The match rate at the FAS EIN - State level and the FAS EIN coverage rate are computed
for both the establishment-level and the employer-level LEHD - BR crosswalks, again using
the LEHD and BR universes separately. The results for the establishment-level LEHD - BR
crosswalk are presented in Table 2.5 (Columns (1) - (3)) and Table 2.6 (Columns (1) - (3)).
The results for the employer-level LEHD - BR crosswalk are presented in Table 2.7 (Columns
(1) - (3)) and Table 2.8 (Columns (1) - (3)). In addition, in these four tables, the percentage
of FAS EIN - State pairs that can be one-to-one or one-to-many linked between LEHD and
BR and the corresponding FAS EIN coverage rate are also presented (Columns (4) - (6) in
Tables 2.5, 2.6, 2.7, 2.8).
In Table 2.5, Column (1) presents the number of unique FAS EIN - State pairs that
can be successfully matched between LEHD and BR in the establishment-level LEHD - BR
crosswalk. Columns (2) and (3) compute the match rates of FAS EIN - State pairs using
the LEHD and the BR as the universe separately. For instance, in LEHD (Column (2)),
the matched FAS EIN - State can account for more than 85% of all FAS EIN - State pairs
in LEHD each year before 2002. In 2002, we observe a more-than-20-percent decrease in
terms of match rate (from 85.5% in 2001 to 63.6% in 2002). Since 2002, the match rate has
gradually increased to close to 78% in 2012. In BR ((column (3)), on the other hand, we
observe a significant lower match rate, especially in the earlier years. It gradually increases
to close to 40% with 49.1% being the highest match rate which is observed in 2004.
The FAS EIN coverage rate, which measures the percentages of the unique FAS EINs
that can be accounted for by the FAS EIN - State match in the establishment-level LEHD
- BR crosswalk, is presented in Table 2.6. Specifically, Column (1) presents the count of
FAS EINs covered by the matched FAS EIN - State pairs (i.e., Column (1) in Table 2.5).
Columns (2) and (3) compute the FAS EIN coverage rates using the FAS EINs in LEHD
and BR as the universe separately. Between 1990 and 2001, in LEHD, more than 90% of
FAS EINs are covered by the FAS EIN - State match each year. Similar to the FAS EIN -
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State match rate, this coverage rate decreases substantially in 2002 and has remained lower
since then. In the BR, usually between 30% and 48% of the (FAS )EINs are covered by
the FAS EIN - State match each year. A close comparison between Columns (2) and (3) in
Table 2.6 and those in Table 2.4 reveals that each year only a small fraction of FAS EINs
in LEHD and BR cannot be matched once geographic information (state) is used to further
refine the match.
Not every matched FAS EIN - State pair yields feasible record linkage between LEHD
and BR. It depends on the number of entities associated with a particular FAS EIN - State
pair in both input files. Columns (4) - (6) in Table 2.5 repeat the exercise done for Columns
(1) - (3), but for those FAS EIN - State pairs that permit one-to-one or one-to-many record
linking between LEHD and BR. Comparing Columns (4) - (6) to Columns (1) - (3) shows
that the vast majority of FAS EIN -State pairs that can be matched between LEHD and BR
do permit one-to-one or one-to-many record linking. The FAS EIN coverage rates of these
FAS EIN - State pairs in LEHD and BR are presented in Columns (4) - (6) in Table 2.6. As
we can see, in terms of magnitude, they are quite similar to those listed in Columns (2) and
(3) in the same table, respectively. The exercise is repeated for the employer-level LEHD
- BR crosswalk. The results are presented in Table 2.7 and Table 2.8. Overall, both the
trends and the magnitudes of the match rates and FAS EIN coverage rates are very similar
to the establishment-level LEHD - BR crosswalk.
Recall that in Step 19 of Section 2.4.2, it is stated that the employer-level crosswalk
systematically misses the group of employers associated with those establishments in the
BR - MU files that do not belong to any submasters. To assess the importance of these
employers, weighted and unweighted percentages of establishments in the MU file that do
not belong to any submasters are computed using all the establishments in the MU files as
the universe. The weight used is the annual establishment-level reported employment. The
results are presented in Table 2.9.
In 1990 - 2001, the unweighted percent of MU establishments that do not belong to
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any submasters are almost always below 10%. The unweighted percentage gets relatively
higher after 2002 and remains between 20 - 40% each year. Though the magnitude becomes
alarmingly large, once it is weighted by the annual establishment-level reported employment,
these establishments/employers become rather insignificant. Column (3) in Table 2.9 shows
that the weighted percent of establishments in the BR - MU file that do not belong to any
submasters always remains below 5%. The weighted percentage becomes negligible after
the 2002 BR redesign and always remains below 0.5%. Therefore, although the employer-
level crosswalk systematically misses this group of employers, it appears to be an insignificant
portion of employment and therefore should not affect our ability to capture the vast majority
of employers in this level of the crosswalk files.
False Match & False Non-Match Rate at the FAS EIN - State Level
To further evaluate the quality of the FAS EIN - State match, false match rate and false
non-match rate at the FAS EIN - State level are computed for 2002. 2002 is chosen as a
reference year because: (1) it is an economic census year; (2) it is the year in which BR was
redesigned; (3) it is the year in the middle of 1990 - 2012. Company name, county, physical
and mailing address are used to facilitate the manual comparison and the identification of
the false matches and false non-matches. The variables from the 2002 BR - SU and BR -
MU files that contain this information include: company names, county code for physical
address, mailing address city, physical address city, mailing address street, and physical
address street.
The variables containing the similar information in the LEHD Infrastructure File System
come from the quarterly SEIN-SEINUNIT-level ES-202 files. These variables are: name legal
(legal/corporate name), name trade (trade/DBA name), name worksite (worksite name,
i.e., reporting unit description), county (county code), address city (physical location ad-
dress city), other address city (mailing/other address city), address street1 (physical location
address street1), address street2 (physical location address street2), other address street1
106
(mailing/other address street1), other address street2 (mailing/other address street2).
In order to compute the false match rate, all the SEINs that can be linked to a BR estab-
lishment are stratified into three strata using the SEIN-level employment measure (variable
sein best emp): small (less than 20 employees), medium (20 - 499 employees), and large
(500+ employees). Then, 300 firms are randomly sampled from each stratum. This is done
for the establishment-level and the employer-level crosswalk files separately.
To merge in the company name, county, and address information from the BR, the
stratified random sample of 900 SEINs from the establishment-level crosswalk file are first
merged back to the establishment-level LEHD - BR crosswalk to obtain all the establishment
identifiers and its associated unique line number. Then, the BR company name, county, and
address variables are merged in using the establishment identifiers and its associated unique
line number. The same steps are repeated for the employer-level crosswalk file to bring in
the BR company name and address information.
Because the LEHD ES-202 files are quarterly and the LEHD - BR crosswalk files are
annual, similar annualization as described in Section 2.3.1 is conducted and the company
name and address information of the quarter that is closest to March 12th is retained. Addi-
tionally, because the LEHD ES-202 files are at the SEIN-SEINUNIT level and the LEHD -
BR crosswalk files are at the SEIN level, the company name and address information of the
establishments (i.e., SEINUNITs) that are located in the SEIN employment mode cleaned
county (MODE ES COUNTY EMP) is merged in.
To determine whether a linked SEIN - FAS EIN - State - BR establishment is a false
match, a fuzzy logic is applied. In short, for an SEIN - FAS EIN - State - BR establishment
record, as long as the company name and county information from the LEHD ES-202 file
matches the company name and county information of any establishments from the BR file,
it is considered to be a true match. Otherwise, it is considered to be a false match. Since the
company name and address information of the establishments located in other counties (i.e.
counties besides the SEIN employment mode cleaned county) are not used, for the purpose
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of identifying the false match cases, the company name and county information is considered
to be primary. The actual physical or mailing address is considered to be secondary. That is
to say, for a linked SEIN - FAS EIN - State - BR establishment, if the county and company
names are matched, but the physical and mailing address from the BR and the LEHD ES-
202 files do not match, it is still considered as a true match. If company name, county, and
address information is all missing either in the LEHD ES-202 file or in the BR file, it is
considered to be an unknown case. The false match rate for the establishment-level and the
employer-level LEHD - BR crosswalk are presented in the upper panel of Table 2.10.
Overall, in the establishment-level crosswalk file, the random sample of 900 SEINs results
in 8158 SEIN - FAS EIN - State - BR establishment pairs. The lower bound of the false match
rate is calculated using the identified false match cases alone. The upper bound of the false
match rate is calculated using both the identified false match cases and the unknown cases.
As seen in Table 2.10, the lower bound of the false match rate in the establishment-level
crosswalk file never exceeds 1%. If all the unknown cases were false matches, the false match
rate for the small firms is 13.3% and the false match rates for the medium size firms and
the large firms are always below 10%. In comparison, the random sample of 900 SEINs from
the employer-level crosswalk file results in 901 SEIN - FAS EIN - State - BR establishment
pairs. The false match rate is very similar to that of the establishment-level crosswalk in
terms of magnitude.
In order to compute the false non-match rate, all the SEINs that cannot be linked to
the BR are stratified into three strata using the SEIN-level employment measure (variable
sein best emp): small (less than 20 employees), medium (20 - 499 employees), and large
(500+ employees). Then, 300 firms are randomly sampled from each stratum. This is done
for the establishment-level and the employer-level crosswalk files, separately. Then, the
company name, county, and address information from the LEHD ES-202 files are merged in
the same manner as done for the false match rate calculation. The false non-match rate for
the establishment-level and the employer-level LEHD - BR crosswalk files are presented in
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the lower panel of Table 2.10.
Overall, in the establishment-level crosswalk file, the random sample of 900 SEINs results
in 2716 SEIN - SEINUNIT pairs. The similar fuzzy logic described above is also applied.
That is to say, as long as the company name and county information matches the company
name and county information of any establishments from the BR file, it is considered as a false
non-match. Otherwise, it is considered to be a true non-match case. Again, the company
name and county information instead of physical and mailing address is placed with higher
weight. The lower bound of the false non-match rate is calculated using the identified false
non-match cases alone. The upper bound of the false non-match rate is calculated using
both the identified false non-match cases and the unknown cases. As seen in Table 2.10,
the lower bound of the false non-match rate in the establishment-level crosswalk file is 44%
for the small firms, 60.3% for the medium size firms and more than 73% for the large firms.
The upper bound of the false non-match rates for these three groups of firms are 66.7%,
73.3%, and 81.3%, respectively. The random sample of 900 SEINs results in 3591 SEIN -
SEINUNIT pairs in the employer-level crosswalk file. The magnitude of the false non-match
rates is very similar as compared to that of the establishment-level crosswalk file.
Taking the false match rates and non-match rates together, it can be concluded that, if an
SEIN - FAS EIN - State - BR establishment match is formed in the LEHD - BR crosswalk,
it is likely to be a very accurate match. However, for those SEINs in the LEHD that cannot
be linked to any establishment in the BR, it is highly likely that it is a false non-match.
The reason detected for such high false non-match rates is the high rate of missing two-digit
state FIPS codes in the BR. Therefore, if the two-digit state FIPS code quality in the BR
were to increase, an even higher match rate can be achieved.
2.4.4 How to Use the LEHD - BR crosswalk
Because the LEHD - BR crosswalk is created at two different levels – the establishment-level
and the employer-level, it is up to researchers to choose the level of analysis they want to
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conduct. Once it is determined, researchers may use the appropriate crosswalk file. To select
the part of the crosswalk where successful linkages between BR establishments and SEINs in
the LEHD are formed, set flag fas ein = ’M’ and flag fas ein st = ’M’ and fas ein st 1toM flag
= ’1’. To select all the data records from the BR, set flag fas ein != ’L’ and flag fas ein st
!= ’L’. To select all the data records from the LEHD - ECF, set flag fas ein != ’B’ and
flag fas ein st != ’B’.
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2.5 Appendix
2.5.A. List of Acronyms
BDS: Business Dynamics Survey
BEL: Business Establishment List
BLS: Bureau of Labor Statistics
BMF: Business Master File Entity/Directory
BR: Business Register
CBP: County Business Patterns
CFN: Census File Number
ECF: Employer Characteristics File
EIN: Employer Identification Number
FAS: Firm Age and Size
FAS EIN: Employer Identification Number developed for FAS project
HRS: Health and Retirement Study
IRS: Internal Revenue Service
LBD: Longitudinal Business Dynamics
LEHD: Longitudinal Employer - Household Dynamics
MU: Multi-Unit
NAICS: North American Industry Classification System
NECF: National Employer Characteristics File
PPN: Permanent Plant Number
QCEW: Quarterly Census of Employment and Wages
SEIN: State Employer Identification Number (State-level UI account identifier)
SEINUNIT: SEIN Establishment Identifier
SIC: Standard Industrial Classification
SPF: Successor-Predecessor File
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SSA: Social Security Administration








Figure 2.2. Simple Organizational Structures of Firms in the Business Register
Panel A. Single-Unit Enterprise
Panel B. Multi-Unit Enterprise With No Submasters
Panel C. Multi-Unit Enterprise With Submasters
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Table 2.1. Valid FAS EIN By Year in LEHD - ECF
Year
Valid FAS EIN Invalid FAS EIN All FAS EIN
Percent Percent Percent
(1) (2) (3)
1990 94.7 5.28 100.0
1991 95.9 4.15 100.0
1992 95.4 4.57 100.0
1993 95.7 4.31 100.0
1994 95.9 4.09 100.0
1995 96.4 3.65 100.0
1996 96.1 3.93 100.0
1997 96.4 3.65 100.0
1998 97.1 2.95 100.0
1999 97.4 2.57 100.0
2000 97.2 2.79 100.0
2001 97.7 2.31 100.0
2002 98.1 1.89 100.0
2003 98.4 1.62 100.0
2004 98.4 1.56 100.0
2005 98.6 1.43 100.0
2006 98.7 1.32 100.0
2007 98.7 1.28 100.0
2008 98.7 1.26 100.0
2009 98.8 1.17 100.0
2010 98.8 1.25 100.0
2011 98.0 2.02 100.0
2012 97.7 2.26 100.0
Notes: Data from the LEHD 2011 Snapshot are used. The
percentages are calculated using the LEHD - ECF firm age
and firm size file. A valid FAS EIN is defined as the one
created directly using EIN by pre-pending five zeros. All
other FAS EINs are defined as invalid FAS EINs. The per-
centages do not sum to 100 due to rounding, which was
done for disclosure avoidance purposes.
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Table 2.2. Summary of the CFN Duplication in the 1993 Business Register SU
& MU Files
File Type CFN Frequency (CFN FREQ) Unique CFN No. of Observation
SU 2 56 112
SU 4 1 4
MU 3 1 3
Notes: Data from the 1993 BR SU and MU files are used.
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Table 2.3. Summary of the Establishment Identifier Duplication in the Business
Register SU Files, 2002-2012
Year Entity Type
Estab. Identifier
Frequency Unique No. of
(Estab Identifier FREQ) Estab. Identifier Observation
2002 Establishment 2 3684 7368
2002 Submaster 2 1 2
2003 Establishment 2 3768 7536
2003 Submaster 2 15 30
2004 Establishment 2 3828 7656
2004 Submaster 2 22 44
2005 Establishment 2 3860 7720
2005 Submaster 2 22 44
2006 Establishment 2 3844 7688
2006 Submaster 2 26 52
2007 Establishment 2 3788 7576
2007 Submaster 2 63 126
2008 Establishment 2 3780 7560
2008 Submaster 2 64 128
2009 Establishment 2 3779 7558
2009 Submaster 2 61 122
2010 Establishment 2 3714 7428
2010 Submaster 2 59 118
2011 Establishment 2 3700 7400
2011 Submaster 2 61 122
2012 Establishment 2 3662 7324
2012 Submaster 2 84 168
Notes: Data from the 2002 - 2012 BR SU files are used.
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Table 2.4. Match Rate at the FAS EIN Level, By Year
Year
Establishment-Level Match Employer-Level Match
Universe: (Valid) FAS EIN in
LEHD BR LEHD BR
Count Percent Percent Count Percent Percent
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
1990 2420000 94.9 27.6 2420000 94.9 27.7
1991 3350000 95.2 36.9 3350000 95.2 37.0
1992 3440000 95.1 35.7 3440000 95.1 35.8
1993 3540000 95.0 33.4 3540000 95.0 33.5
1994 3880000 94.3 36.1 3880000 94.3 36.2
1995 4310000 94.8 37.6 4310000 94.8 37.7
1996 4570000 93.8 44.6 4570000 93.8 44.7
1997 4650000 94.3 43.6 4650000 94.2 43.6
1998 5270000 94.4 45.0 5270000 94.4 45.1
1999 5530000 95.0 43.2 5530000 95.0 43.3
2000 5740000 95.2 41.7 5740000 95.2 41.8
2001 5860000 95.8 39.7 5860000 95.8 39.8
2002 5940000 93.4 65.9 5930000 93.3 66.5
2003 6120000 93.8 64.2 6110000 93.7 64.8
2004 6200000 93.9 61.6 6200000 93.9 62.1
2005 6330000 93.9 59.0 6330000 93.9 59.5
2006 6400000 93.9 56.6 6400000 93.9 57.0
2007 6460000 93.9 53.8 6460000 93.9 54.1
2008 6440000 93.6 51.4 6440000 93.6 51.7
2009 6300000 93.4 48.3 6300000 93.4 48.6
2010 6230000 93.0 46.0 6220000 93.0 46.3
2011 6170000 92.7 44.1 6170000 92.7 44.3
2012 5630000 93.3 38.5 5630000 93.3 38.7
Notes: Data from the 2011 LEHD Snapshot and 1990 - 2012 BR files
are used. All the numbers are rounded to three significant digit for
disclosure avoidance purposes. The universe used to compute the
match rate in Columns (2) and (5) is all valid FAS EIN in LEHD by
year. The universe used to compute the match rate in Columns (3)
and (6) is all EIN in the BR files by year, after the duplicates are
edited.
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Table 2.5. Match Rate at the FAS EIN - State Level in the
Establishment-Level LEHD - BR Crosswalk, By Year
Year
Matched One-to-One/Many Matched
Universe: FAS EIN - State in Universe: FAS EIN - State in
LEHD BR LEHD BR
Count Percent Percent Count Percent Percent
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
1990 2390000 88.2 26.7 2390000 88.0 26.7
1991 3330000 89.1 36.1 3330000 88.9 36.0
1992 3440000 89.3 35.0 3440000 89.3 35.0
1993 3450000 86.9 32.0 3450000 86.8 31.9
1994 3890000 87.8 35.4 3880000 87.8 35.3
1995 4330000 87.8 37.0 4330000 87.7 37.0
1996 4580000 86.1 43.9 4580000 86.1 43.9
1997 4680000 86.6 43.0 4680000 86.5 42.9
1998 5320000 85.8 44.5 5320000 85.8 44.4
1999 5580000 85.8 42.7 5580000 85.7 42.7
2000 5790000 85.3 41.3 5790000 85.3 41.2
2001 5920000 85.5 39.3 5920000 85.5 39.3
2002 4580000 63.6 49.0 4580000 63.6 49.0
2003 4820000 65.2 48.8 4820000 65.1 48.7
2004 5130000 68.4 49.1 5130000 68.4 49.0
2005 5360000 70.0 48.2 5360000 69.9 48.2
2006 5560000 71.4 47.3 5560000 71.4 47.3
2007 5900000 74.7 47.2 5900000 74.7 47.2
2008 5880000 74.2 45.1 5870000 74.1 45.1
2009 5790000 74.4 42.8 5790000 74.3 42.8
2010 5740000 74.0 40.8 5740000 74.0 40.8
2011 5720000 73.7 39.3 5710000 73.7 39.3
2012 5430000 77.5 35.7 5420000 77.5 35.7
Notes: Data from the 2011 LEHD Snapshot and 1990 - 2012 BR files are
used. All the numbers are rounded to three significant digit for disclo-
sure avoidance purposes. Column (4) is a subset of Column (1), however,
due to rounding and the small number of FAS EIN - State associated with
multiple entities in both LEHD and BR, it is not obvious. The universe
used to compute Columns (2) and (5) is valid FAS EIN - State in LEHD
by year. The universe used to compute Column (3) and (6) is EIN - State
in the Establishment-level BR files by year, after the duplicates are edited.
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Table 2.6. FAS EIN Coverage Rate in the FAS EIN - State Level




Universe: FAS EIN in Universe: FAS EIN in
LEHD BR LEHD BR
Count Percent Percent Count Percent Percent
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
1990 2340000 91.9 26.8 2340000 91.8 26.7
1991 3270000 92.9 36.0 3270000 92.8 36.0
1992 3370000 93.2 35.0 3370000 93.2 35.0
1993 3380000 90.7 31.9 3370000 90.7 31.9
1994 3800000 92.3 35.3 3800000 92.2 35.3
1995 4220000 92.9 36.9 4220000 92.9 36.9
1996 4480000 91.8 43.7 4470000 91.7 43.7
1997 4560000 92.5 42.7 4560000 92.5 42.7
1998 5180000 92.7 44.2 5180000 92.7 44.1
1999 5430000 93.1 42.4 5430000 93.1 42.4
2000 5630000 93.3 40.9 5630000 93.3 40.9
2001 5750000 93.8 38.9 5750000 93.8 38.9
2002 4390000 69.0 48.7 4390000 69.0 48.7
2003 4620000 70.9 48.6 4620000 70.9 48.5
2004 4930000 74.7 49.0 4930000 74.7 49.0
2005 5170000 76.6 48.1 5160000 76.6 48.1
2006 5360000 78.5 47.3 5350000 78.5 47.3
2007 5680000 82.5 47.2 5680000 82.5 47.2
2008 5660000 82.2 45.1 5650000 82.2 45.1
2009 5570000 82.6 42.7 5570000 82.6 42.7
2010 5520000 82.4 40.8 5520000 82.4 40.8
2011 5490000 82.5 39.2 5490000 82.5 39.2
2012 5210000 86.3 35.6 5210000 86.3 35.6
Notes: Data from the 2011 LEHD Snapshot and 1990 - 2012 BR files
are used. All the numbers are rounded to three significant digit for
disclosure avoidance purposes. Columns (1) and (4) count the unique
FAS EIN in FAS EIN - State pairs presented in Columns (1) and (4)
in Table 2.5, respectively. The universe used to compute Columns (2)
and (5) is valid FAS EINs in LEHD by year. The universe used to com-
pute Columns (3) and (6) is EINs in the Establishment-level BR files
by year, after the duplicates are cleaned.
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Table 2.7. Match Rate at the FAS EIN - State Level in the
Employer-Level LEHD - BR Crosswalk, By Year
Year
Matched One-to-One/Many Matched
Universe: FAS EIN - State in Universe: FAS EIN - State in
LEHD BR LEHD BR
Count Percent Percent Count Percent Percent
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
1990 2320000 85.6 26.6 2320000 85.6 26.6
1991 3250000 86.8 35.9 3250000 86.8 35.9
1992 3350000 86.8 34.8 3350000 86.8 34.8
1993 3340000 84.2 31.7 3340000 84.2 31.7
1994 3770000 85.3 35.2 3770000 85.3 35.2
1995 4200000 85.2 36.7 4200000 85.2 36.7
1996 4450000 83.8 43.5 4450000 83.8 43.5
1997 4540000 83.9 42.6 4540000 83.9 42.6
1998 5150000 83.2 44.0 5150000 83.2 44.0
1999 5400000 83.0 42.3 5400000 83.0 42.3
2000 5600000 82.6 40.8 5600000 82.6 40.8
2001 5720000 82.7 38.8 5720000 82.7 38.8
2002 4270000 59.2 47.8 4270000 59.2 47.8
2003 4510000 60.9 47.7 4510000 60.9 47.7
2004 4820000 64.3 48.3 4820000 64.3 48.3
2005 5060000 66.0 47.5 5060000 66.0 47.5
2006 5260000 67.6 46.8 5260000 67.6 46.8
2007 5590000 70.8 46.7 5590000 70.8 46.7
2008 5570000 70.2 44.6 5570000 70.2 44.6
2009 5490000 70.4 42.3 5490000 70.4 42.3
2010 5440000 70.1 40.3 5440000 70.1 40.3
2011 5480000 70.6 39.3 5480000 70.6 39.3
2012 5190000 74.2 35.6 5190000 74.2 35.6
Notes: Data from the 2011 LEHD Snapshot and 1990 - 2012 BR files are
used. All the numbers are rounded to three significant digit for disclosure
avoidance purposes. Column (4) is a subset of Column (1), however, due to
rounding and the small number of FAS EIN - State records associated with
multiple entities in both LEHD and BR, it is not obvious. The universe
used to compute Columns (2) and (5) is valid FAS EIN - State in LEHD
by year. The universe used to compute Columns (3) and (6) is EIN - State
in the Employer-level BR files by year, after the duplicates are cleaned.
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Table 2.8. FAS EIN Coverage Rate in the FAS EIN - State Level




Universe: FAS EIN in Universe: FAS EIN in
LEHD BR LEHD BR
Count Percent Percent Count Percent Percent
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
1990 2320000 91.1 26.6 2320000 91.1 26.6
1991 3250000 92.3 35.9 3250000 92.3 35.9
1992 3350000 92.5 34.8 3350000 92.5 34.8
1993 3340000 89.8 31.7 3340000 89.8 31.7
1994 3770000 91.6 35.2 3770000 91.6 35.2
1995 4200000 92.4 36.7 4200000 92.4 36.7
1996 4450000 91.3 43.5 4450000 91.3 43.5
1997 4540000 92.0 42.6 4540000 92.0 42.6
1998 5150000 92.3 44.0 5150000 92.3 44.0
1999 5400000 92.7 42.3 5400000 92.7 42.3
2000 5600000 93.0 40.8 5600000 93.0 40.8
2001 5720000 93.5 38.8 5720000 93.5 38.8
2002 4270000 67.1 47.8 4270000 67.1 47.8
2003 4510000 69.1 47.7 4510000 69.1 47.7
2004 4820000 73.0 48.3 4820000 73.0 48.3
2005 5060000 75.1 47.5 5060000 75.1 47.5
2006 5260000 77.1 46.8 5260000 77.1 46.8
2007 5590000 81.1 46.8 5590000 81.1 46.8
2008 5570000 80.9 44.7 5570000 80.9 44.7
2009 5490000 81.3 42.3 5490000 81.3 42.3
2010 5430000 81.2 40.4 5430000 81.2 40.4
2011 5480000 82.2 39.3 5480000 82.2 39.3
2012 5190000 86.0 35.6 5190000 86.0 35.6
Notes: Data from the 2011 LEHD Snapshot and 19905 - 2012 BR files
are used. All the numbers are rounded to three significant digit for
disclosure avoidance purposes. Columns (1) and (4) count the unique
FAS EIN in FAS EIN - State pairs presented in Columns (1) and (4) in
Table 2.5, respectively. The universe used to compute Columns (2) and
(5) is valid FAS EINs in LEHD by year. The universe used to compute
Columns (3) and (6) is EINs in the Employer-level BR files by year,
after the duplicates are edited.
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Table 2.9. Weighted and Unweighted Percentage of Establishments in the
BR - MU File That Does Not Belong to a Submaster, By Year
Year
(Unweighted) Count (Unweighted) Percent (Weighted) Percent
(1) (2) (3)
1990 216000 11.6 4.56
1991 66300 4.05 1.46
1992 121000 6.19 1.11
1993 153000 7.57 1.20
1994 198000 8.87 1.29
1995 251000 10.7 1.20
1996 77400 4.35 1.52
1997 162000 7.55 1.27
1998 235000 10.1 0.84
1999 319000 12.5 0.93
2000 400000 14.6 0.88
2001 607000 20.4 2.15
2002 1310000 40.9 0.45
2003 1310000 39.3 0.43
2004 1310000 37.8 0.33
2005 1310000 36.5 0.31
2006 1310000 34.9 0.28
2007 1300000 32.4 0.01
2008 1300000 31.2 0.15
2009 1300000 30.4 0.15
2010 1310000 29.5 0.15
2011 1310000 28.7 0.15
2012 1310000 27.4 0.13
Notes: Data from the 1990 - 2012 BR - MU files are used. All the num-
bers are rounded to three significant digit for disclosure avoidance purposes.
The universe used to computed Columns (2) and (3) is all establishments in
the BR - MU files by year, after the duplicates are edited. Column (3) is
weighted by establishment-level reported employment.
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Table 2.10. False Match Rate and False Non-Match Rate in 2002
Level Firm Size Group Observation
Unique False Match Rate
SEIN Lower Bound Upper Bound
Establishment-level
0 - 19 318 300
0.00 0.133
(0.006) (0.017)
20 - 499 713 300
0.0067 0.0867
(0.006) (0.017)




0 - 19 300 300
0.0133 0.153
(0.006) (0.023)
20 - 499 300 300
0.0033 0.0766
(0.006) (0.017)
500 + 301 300
0.0133 0.0800
(0.006) (0.017)
Level Firm Size Group Observation
Unique False Non-Match Rate
SEIN Lower Bound Upper Bound
Establishment-level
0 - 19 300 300
0.44 0.667
(0.029) (0.029)
20 - 499 410 300
0.603 0.733
(0.029) (0.029)




0 - 19 300 300
0.457 0.697
(0.029) (0.029)
20 - 499 478 300
0.67 0.82
(0.029) (0.029)
500 + 2813 300
0.767 0.86
(0.029) (0.029)
Notes: Data are from the 2002 establishment-level and employer-level LEHD - BR crosswalk files,
2002 BR - SU and MU files, and 2002 quarter 1 - 4 ES - 202 files from the 2011 snapshot of the
LEHD infrastructure files. An observation in the upper panel (false match rate) is a unique SEIN
- FAS EIN - State - BR establishment in the crosswalk files. An observation in the lower panel
(false non-match rate) is a unique SEIN - SEINUNIT in the LEHD ES-202 file. The universe used
in computing the false match rate and false non-match rate is 300 unique SEINs in each firm size
category. The numerator used to calculate the lower bound of the false match (non-match) rate is
the identified false match (non-matched) cases. The numerator used to calculate the upper bound
of the false match (non-match) rate is the sum of the identified false match (non-match) cases and
the unknown cases. Bootstrap standard errors are presented in parentheses.
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Appendix Table 2.A. Match Rate at the FAS EIN Level, By
Year
Year
Establishment-Level Match Employer-Level Match
Universe: (Valid/Active) FAS EIN in
LEHD BR LEHD BR
Count Percent Percent Count Percent Percent
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
1990 2260000 88.7 40.3 2130000 83.4 40.0
1991 3100000 88.1 55.6 2940000 83.5 55.3
1992 3170000 87.8 56.3 2970000 82.1 55.9
1993 3340000 89.7 37.5 3140000 84.3 36.5
1994 3560000 86.4 61.0 3350000 81.3 60.7
1995 3940000 86.6 66.5 3720000 81.8 66.4
1996 4140000 84.9 69.1 3940000 80.8 69.0
1997 4220000 85.5 69.8 3990000 80.9 69.5
1998 4650000 83.3 76.5 4410000 78.9 76.4
1999 4790000 82.3 78.5 4550000 78.0 78.4
2000 5050000 83.7 82.2 4800000 79.6 82.2
2001 5120000 83.7 83.8 4900000 80.0 83.7
2002 5930000 93.3 66.5 5690000 89.4 65.6
2003 6110000 93.7 64.8 5890000 90.0 63.9
2004 6200000 93.9 62.1 5960000 90.3 61.2
2005 6330000 93.9 59.5 6100000 90.5 58.6
2006 6400000 93.9 57.0 6180000 90.7 56.2
2007 6460000 93.9 54.1 6210000 90.2 53.2
2008 6440000 93.6 51.7 6200000 90.1 50.8
2009 6300000 93.4 48.6 6070000 89.9 47.7
2010 6220000 93.0 46.3 6000000 89.6 45.4
2011 6170000 92.7 44.3 5950000 89.3 43.4
2012 5630000 93.3 38.7 5390000 89.3 37.7
Notes: Data from the 2011 LEHD Snapshot and 1990 - 2012 BR files
are used. All the numbers are rounded to three significant digit for
disclosure avoidance purposes. The universe used to compute the
match rates in Columns (1) and (3) is valid FAS EINs in LEHD by
year. The universe used to compute the match rates in Columns (2)
and (4) is EINs associated with active establishments in the BR files
by year, after the duplicates are cleaned.
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Chapter 3
The One Child Policy and
Educational Attainment in China
3.1 Introduction
Controlling population growth and increasing child quality are generally considered critical
for overall economic advancement at both the macroeconomic and the microeconomic levels.
Among the policy instruments used in developing countries to promote economic develop-
ment are programs designed to reduce the size of families (Rosenzweig and Zhang, 2009).
One important motivation for these policies is the idea that reductions in family size can lead
to increased allocation of resources for investments in human capital. This view is supported
by the influential model developed by Becker and Lewis (1973), which suggests a trade-off
between the quantity of children and average child quality. For policy makers in developing
countries, understanding this trade-off is particularly relevant because many governments
have attempted to reduce fertility with the explicit goal of increasing average population
quality via human capital investment.
The empirical evidence on the magnitude of the quantity-quality trade-off, or even its
existence, is mixed at best. On the one hand, some studies provide evidence showing that
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family size has a negative effect on children’s schooling (Blake, 1981; Hanushek, 1992; Lee,
2012; Rosenzweig and Wolpin, 1980; Rosenzweig and Zhang, 2009). On the other hand,
more recent studies have found no effect, or even a positive effect, of family size on child
outcomes (Angrist et al., 2005, 2010; Black et al., 2005; Guo and VanWey, 1999; Lee, 2008;
Qian, 2009).
Theoretically, either outcome is possible within a consistent model of optimal family size
and educational investment (Qian, 2009). For instance, the negative quantity-quality trade-
off can arise from the assumption that the cost of average quality is an increasing function
of the number of children (Becker and Lewis, 1973; Qian, 2009). Meanwhile, the comple-
mentarity between family size and children’s average quality can arise from the assumption
that there exist economies of scale in raising children. Though the assumption leading to
a trade-off seems reasonable in many contexts, the economy of scale assumption may be
equally reasonable in others. For example, transferring books, clothes, and knowledge is
much easier among children of the same household than across households (Qian, 2009).
The challenge for empirical research has been to find sources of exogenous variation in
family size that permit the identification of the trade-off between family size and average
child quality as implied by the Becker-Lewis quantity-quality model (Angrist et al., 2010;
Rosenzweig and Wolpin, 1980; Rosenzweig and Zhang, 2009; Qian, 2009). Direct interpreta-
tion and inference using the cross-sectional correlation between family size and the quality
of children suffers from potential endogeneity bias. The main source of endogeneity is het-
erogeneity in parental preferences. For instance, one possibility could be that parents who
value child quality more may also prefer to have fewer children. If such parental heterogene-
ity exists, the trade-off between family size and average child quality will be over-estimated.
To address these concerns, existing studies have carefully designed identification strategies
that exploit plausibly exogenous variation in the quantity of children caused by twinning
or by the sex composition of the first two children (Angrist et al., 2005, 2010; Black et al.,
2005; Conley, 2000; Conley and Glauber, 2006; Rosenzweig and Wolpin, 1980; Rosenzweig
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and Zhang, 2009).
Rosenzweig and Zhang (2009), for example, study whether reduction in fertility increase
human capital investment per child using the Chinese Child Twins Survey (CCTS) data
collected in Yunnan Province in China. Because China’s One Child Policy is strictly en-
forced in Yunnan’s urban areas, twinning on the first birth results in one exogenous extra
birth which allows the authors to identify the quantity-quality trade-off at birth parity one.
Alternatively, in the rural areas where the survey was conducted, all families are permitted
to have two children. The authors replicate the parity-N twins methodology at N = 2 to
look at the impact of one extra birth on both the twins and the non-twins within the family.
Overall, the authors find that an extra child at parity one or at parity two, net of one compo-
nent of birth-endowment effects, significantly decreases the schooling progress, the expected
college enrollment, and grades in school. Despite the significant trade-off between quantity
of children and child quality in China, using the estimated effect of China’s One Child Pol-
icy on family size from McElory and Yang (2000) and Qian (2009), Rosenzweig and Zhang
(2009) claim that the contribution of the One Child Policy in China to the development of
its human capital is modest.
Unlike most previous studies, which rely on the exogenous variation in family size pro-
vided by twinning, in this paper, the identification strategy is established by exploiting the
exogenous variation provided by China’s family planning policy and its subsequent relax-
ation to study child’s quantity-quality trade-off in urban and rural China. Specifically, I
partially address the issue of potential endogeneity in estimating the effect of family size
on average child quality by instrumenting the family size with China’s One Child Policy
implementation and its subsequent relaxation.
Lee (2012) uses the China Health and Nutrition Survey data and shows that children
in one-child households enjoyed significantly improved educational opportunities compared
to children in multiple-child households. The analysis is done by gender group and for
urban/rural households separately. The author attributes such an effect to China’s One Child
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Policy because he claims that without the policy, China would not have achieved such a high
one-child rate so quickly (Lee, 2012). In addition, Lee (2012) also finds that the improvement
was larger for girls than that for boys. To account for the potential endogeneity between
family size and children’s education, Lee (2012) instruments for family size (single-child
versus multiple-child) using the height of a child. The author finds that the instrumental
variable (IV) estimates and the ordinary least square estimates are similar. Though the
author realizes the potential endogeneity between family size and children’s education due
to parents’ tastes and preferences, the instrument chosen is poor and is very likely to have
violated the exclusion restriction assumption of the Instrumental Variable approach. For
instance, the height of a child may reflect his/her birth endowment that also has a positive
effect on his/her schooling.
Qian (2009), on the other hand, exploits the plausible regional and time variation in
the relaxation of China’s One Child Policy and its effect on family size to estimate the
trade off between family size and school enrollment of the first child in rural China. This
paper matches the 1% sample of the 1990 Population Census with the 1989 China Health and
Nutrition Survey at the county level and shows that an additional child significantly increased
the probability of the school enrollment of first-born children by about 16 percentage points.
In addition, Qian (2009) finds that such effect is larger for households where the children are
of the same sex. Qian (2009)’s empirical strategy exploits three facts: first, an individual
is only affected by the One Child Policy relaxation if she is born in a relaxed area; second,
among first-born children born in relaxed areas, only girls are affected; and lastly, a girl is
more likely to gain a sibling due to the policy relaxation if she is younger at the time of the
policy relaxation enactment (Qian, 2009). 1 Qian (2009), however, studies rural households
only. More importantly, the outcome variable used in her paper only measures whether one
is currently enrolled in school, which can not measure and capture the quality of children
properly.
1Details on the China’s One Child Policy relaxation are provided in Section 3.2.
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The empirical strategy utilized in this paper follows closely to Qian (2009). Instead of
purely focusing on rural households, I analyze urban and rural Chinese households separately.
Moreover, instead of focusing on the probability of whether one is currently enrolled in school,
the outcome variable used in this paper is completed years of schooling which can measure
the quality of children more accurately and properly. In this paper, only Han Chinese
households are studied. Ethnic minorities were never included. The reasons are two-fold:
first, ethnic minorities are always exempted from the China’s family planning policy and
its subsequent policy modification; and more importantly, during the early market reform
period in China which was also the period when China’s One Child Policy was announced,
educational disparities between ethnic minorities and Han Chinese were reinforced (Hannum,
2002; Hannum et al., 2008). Specifically, using the census data, (Hannum, 2002) shows that
between 1982 and 1990, although entrance rate to primary schools rose for all ethnic groups,
the already-disadvantaged minorities suffered from a relative decrease in the transition rate
to junior high school from primary school. Therefore, the rising disparity in transitions
to secondary schools has strengthened the historical educational disadvantage of the ethnic
minorities concentrated in less-developed regions (Hannum, 2002; Hannum et al., 2008).
Such exacerbating disparity renders ethnic minorities a poor control group for this paper.
In this paper, I exploit the plausible exogenous changes in family size caused by China’s
initial One Child Policy and its subsequent policy relaxation to estimate the causal effect
of family size on educational attainment in China. Specifically, to date, urban Han Chinese
households have been continuously subject to the strict One Child Policy (OCP). I use the
timing of the implementation of the policy to instrument for the family size of children born
in urban Han Chinese households. This instrumental variable strategy exploits the fact that
a Han Chinese who was born after the OCP implementation is affected while one born before
should not be. In other words, I use the intent-to-treat effect of China’s OCP to instrument
family sizes.
In comparison, while rural Han Chinese households were initially subject to the One
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Child Policy, a subsequent policy relaxation allowed rural families to have a second child if
the first birth was a girl. The official relaxation occurred approximately five years after the
initial policy implementation. Given the fairly short policy spacing, it is almost impossible
to disentangle the effects on family size of the two. Therefore, for children born in rural
areas, the policy variable used to instrument the family size will identify the composite
effect of both the initial policy implementation and the subsequent relaxation. Two facts
are exploited: first, an individual who was born after the implementation is affected by the
policy itself and by the subsequent policy relaxation; second, family size is likely to be bigger
in households whose first birth was a girl. The instrument for family size is therefore the
interaction of the first-born child’s sex and the One Child Policy variable. However, given
the nature of the policy relaxation, parents may have chosen to keep girls in order to have
a second child. Such household preferences could contaminate the instrumental variable
estimates. This is the source of endogeneity that is not well tackled in this paper.
Overall, I find that the average family size has decreased substantially since the One
Child Policy implementation. Additionally, first-born child being female in the rural area
after the implementation of the One Child Policy has a positive effect on family size, which
reflects the nature of the family planning policy relaxation and the “1-son-2-child” rule. For
the urban-area sample, I find clear evidence indicating that there is indeed a negative trade-
off between child’s quantity and quality. Other things equal, an additional child can lead
to a decrease of 1.2 years of schooling. A simple back-of-the-envelope calculation reveals
that the implementation of the OCP has significantly increased the average completed years
of schooling by approximately 0.68 years in urban China. A further comparison between
urban female sub-sample and urban male sub-sample shows that, though the family policy
implementation has a smaller effect on family size for female, the negative trade-off effect
is much more prominent for female. It turns out that the implementation of the OCP has
increased the average completed years of schooling for females more than that for males.
However, unlike the urban-area sample, no significant effects of family size on educational
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attainment for the rural sample are found.
There are caveats in this paper. For instance, the well-documented birth order effect and
sibling sex composition effect are not analyzed here. Additionally, some potential endogeneity
issues induced by the implementation of the OCP and its subsequent policy relaxation on
rural households’ preferences over girls are not well dealt with and this could contaminate
the results in this paper. Thus, future research is needed to tackle these issues.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 3.2 review China’s family planning policies.
Section 3.3 reviews Becker and Lewis (1973) child quantity-quality trade-off model. Sec-
tion 3.4 discusses the China Health and Nutrition Survey data and the sample used in this
paper. Section 3.5 lays out the empirical identification strategy. Section 3.6 presents the
descriptive statistics and econometric evidence. Finally, section 3.7 concludes.
3.2 Background
After two decades of rapid population growth under Mao’s “people are wealth” propaganda,
in the 1970s, the Chinese government enacted a serious of policies to slow population growth.
Beginning in the early 1970s, the central government initiated the “Later [age], longer [the
spacing of births], fewer [number of children]” family-planning campaign (McElory and Yang,
2000). Implementation of the campaign relied mostly on propaganda, “persuasion,”, and
social pressure (McElory and Yang, 2000). Incentives in various forms for parents who
spaced the births of their children at least four years apart was offered (Croll et al., 1985).
However, due to the rapid population growth in the 1950s and 1960s, the age structure
of China’s population by the end of 1970s was such that 50% and 65% of the population
were under the ages of 20 and 30, respectively (Croll et al., 1985). Absent aggressive abate-
ment strategies, population growth rates were expected to be extraordinarily high during the
1980s. As a consequence, the government abandoned these indirect controls and moved to a
more restrictive policy, which is the so-called the One Child Policy (OCP) (Croll et al., 1985;
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Edlund et al., 2007; McElory and Yang, 2000; Rosenzweig and Zhang, 2009; Lee, 2012). The
OCP was officially announced in 1979. Although it is recorded that the actual implemen-
tation began in certain region as early as 1978, the One Child Policy was firmly enforced
by 1980 (Croll et al., 1985). The policy applies to all individuals of Han Chinese ethnicity,
a group that comprises more than 90% of China’s total population. Ethnic minorities were
always exempted from the family planning policies. The specifics of the OCP and its en-
forcement vary from one place to another in China (Rosenzweig and Zhang, 2009). Usually,
in urban areas, the OCP was strictly enforced and second births were permitted only in
a handful of extenuating circumstances (McElory and Yang, 2000; Rosenzweig and Zhang,
2009). In rural areas, however, the OCP was enforced in a laxer manner. For instance,
(Rosenzweig and Zhang, 2009) find that households from some rural communities in Yunnan
Province are encouraged to have one child but are always exempted from the strict OCP.
Unexpectedly, China’s family planning policy led to massive female infanticide, gender-
specific abortions, and civil protests upon its implementation. These incidents were particu-
larly pervasive in the rural areas where the long-existing son preference is much stronger. As
a results, in rural areas, the One Child Policies were liberalized (McElory and Yang, 2000;
Greenlaugh, 1986; Qian, 2009). As shown in civil records, local governments began issuing
permits for a second child as early as 1982. In response to severe political pressure and
to curb female infanticide, in 1984 the central government officially issued “Document 7,”
which introduced the policy relaxation to the OCP. Although this policy reform still strictly
prohibited third births among Han Chinese, it significantly expanded the conditions under
which couples were allowed to have second births. The main relaxation following “Document
7” is called the “1-son-2-child” rule (Greenlaugh, 1986). This rule allowed rural Han Chinese
couples to have a second child if their first born child was a girl (Greenlaugh, 1986). Qian
(2009) cites statistics showing that while in 1982 the second child permits were allotted to
only 5% of rural households, this share had increased to 50% by 1986.
Given the differential enforcement of the One Child Policy and the subsequent rural-
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area specific One Child Policy relaxation, this paper will separately analyze urban and rural
households. In addition, because of the close spacing between the initial OCP announcement
and its subsequent relaxation, the regional and temporal variation in the announcement of
the policy relaxation, and the variation in the enforcement across rural communities, I use the
combined intent-to-treat effect of China’s OCP and its subsequent relaxation to instrument
family size for rural-area households.
3.3 Conceptual Framework
In this section, I present a simple model of households that allows for heterogeneity in child
quality, which closely follows the work by (Becker and Lewis, 1973; Becker and Tomes, 1976;
Qian, 2009). I assume that each household has a utility function of the following general
form
U = U(n, {ei}ni=1, y) (3.1)
where n is the number of children, {ei}ni=1 represents the quality of each child in terms of
educational attainment, and y is the aggregate amount of all other commodities. The cost
of achieving education level ei depends on the level of education itself and the number of
children in the household. The function can be represented as
c(ei) = h(ei, n) (3.2)
where c(ei) is a convex function in ei. If there is a fixed cost associated with educating each
child, which is denoted as z, then the total cost of education in a household with n children
and chosen levels of education {ei}ni=1 can be written as
n∑
i=1
(z + h(ei, n)).
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(z + h(ei, n)) + py 6 I (3.3)
where I is the total household income.
The constrained maximization problem faced by this household can be written as
ς = maxU(n, {ei}ni=1, y)− λ[
n∑
i=1
(z + h(ei, n)) + py − I]. (3.4)


















− λp ≡ 0.
Denote the optimal education, number of children, and other commodity consumption as e∗,
n∗, and y∗. At the optimum, for all i,
∂U
∂n∗







The negative trade-off between the quantity and quality of children stems from the fact
that the shadow price of children with respect to quantity is positively correlated with
the quality of children. Similarly, the shadow price of children with respect to quality
is positively correlated with the quantity of children. For instance, at the optimum, any
positive perturbation in n∗ will increase the shadow price of children with respect to quality,
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which will lead to a decrease in e. And vise versa, any positive perturbation in e∗ will increase
in the shadow price of children with respect to quantity, which will lead to a decrease in n.
3.4 Data & Sample
3.4.1 Data
The data used in this paper are from the 1989, 1991, 1993, 1997, 2000, 2004, 2006, 2009, and
2011 China Health and Nutrition Survey (CHNS). The survey uses a multistage, random
cluster process to draw a sample of about 4,400 households with a total of 19,000 individuals
in nine provinces that vary substantially in geography, economic development, and other
critical variables. 2 Specifically, counties in the nine provinces were first stratified by income,
and a weighted sampling scheme was used to randomly select four counties in each province.
In addition, the provincial capital and a lower income city were selected when feasible.
Villages and townships within the counties and urban and suburban neighborhoods within
the cities were selected randomly. In 1989 to 1993 there were 190 primary sampling units,
and a new province and its sampling units were added in 1997.
According to the CHNS research team, the follow-up levels are high and the follow-ups
of households that move within the primary sampling units and some larger urban entities
are attempted. However, families that migrate from one community to a new one (a non-
primary-sample-unit community) are not followed. The first round of the CHNS, including
household, community, and health/family planning facility data, was collected in 1989. Since
the 1993 survey, all new households formed from sample households were added. Since 1997,
new households in original communities were also added to replace households no longer
participating in the study. Also since 1997, new communities in original provinces have been
added to replace sites no longer participating. A new province was also added in 1997 when
2These nine provinces are: Guangxi, Guizhou, Heilongjiang, Henan, Hubei, Hunan, Jiangsu, Liaoning,
and Shandong.
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one province was unable to participate. The dropped province returned to the study in 2000.
3
The 1989 CHNS surveyed 15,917 individuals comprised 3795 households. The 1991 CHNS
surveyed only individuals belonging to the original sample households, which resulted in a
total of 14,778 individuals comprised 3616 households. For the 1993 CHNS, all new house-
holds formed from sample households who resided in sample areas were added to this sample,
resulting in a total of 13,893 individuals comprised of 3441 households. For the CHNS 1997,
all newly formed households who resided in sample areas (and additional households to re-
place those no longer participating) were added to the sample. New communities were also
added to replace communities no longer participating, and Heilongjiang province replaced
Liaoning province. A total of 14,426 individuals participated in 1997 comprised of 3875
households. In the 2000 CHNS, newly formed households, replacement households, and re-
placement communities were again added, and Liaoning province returned to the study. A
total of 15,648 individuals participated in 2000 comprised of 4403 households. 4
The CHNS data include variables for educational attainment measured in completed
years of schooling, relationships among household members, and many other individual-,
household-, and community-level characteristics. In particular, the Ever-Married Women
Survey component includes complex marriage and fertility histories of women who are 52
years old or younger. This survey component allows children to be linked to their mothers
within the household. Thus, family size can be calculated. Using birth date, I can reconstruct
birth order and family composition in the sample. Births outside of marriage were rare in
China during this period. Therefore, the family size calculation is considered to be rather
reliable.
3Details are obtained from http://www.cpc.unc.edu/projects/china/about/proj_desc/survey.




As discussed before, the samples used in this paper only include Han Chinese individuals.
Given the high follow-up level, for an individual who is interviewed in more than one wave
of the CHNS survey, data from the most recent survey year is utilized for this individual. If
the educational attainment measured in completed years of schooling is missing in the most
recent survey year, the highest non-missing educational attainment variable from previous
survey years is used.
Unlike most literature on U.S. education which usually uses population aged 25 and over
as target sample group, the urban and rural samples in this paper are restricted to individuals
who are at least 18 years older and currently not in school. The main reason is two-fold:
first, China has a nine-year compulsory education system, which includes six years of primary
education starting at age six or seven, and three years of junior secondary education covering
ages 12-15(or 13-16 if one starts primary school at age seven); 5 second, the average education
level in China is much lower and most people in China have finished school by 18 or even
younger. Table 3.1 provides the educational attainment for total population aged 15 and
over in China from 1950 to 2000. The data is borrowed from the Barro-Lee Educational
Attainment Dataset. 6 From Table 3.1 we can see that from 1950 to 2010, the average years
of schooling have more than tripled for the population aged 15 and over. Even so, in 2010,
the average years of schooling is only 8.11 years. That is to say, in 2010 among population
aged 15 and over, an average educated person would have completed school when she was
14 or 15 years old (depending on whether she started at age 6 or 7). Hence, by focusing on
individuals aged 18 and over in the CHNS data, I should be able to capture most individuals’
completed education levels.
The final urban-area samples include 951 individuals with 436 females and 515 males.
The final rural-area samples include 2158 individuals with 923 females and 1235 males.
5Details on the education system can be found on China’s Ministry of Education website.
6Details about the Barro-Lee Educational Attainment Dataset can be found at http://www.barrolee.
com/ and Barro and Lee (2013).
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3.5 Empirical Strategy
I conduct empirical analyses and estimation for urban and rural households separately and
contrast the findings. The rationale for separate urban and rural analyses are: first, urban
and rural households endure differential treatment from China’s family planning policies.
Overall, urban households have been continuously subjected to the strict One Child Pol-
icy whereas rural households were initially subject to the strict One Child Policy and later
became eligible for the policy relaxation. Second, urban and rural households may have
heterogeneous preferences over children quantity, quality, and other demographic charac-
teristics. The One Child Policy relaxation for rural households is believed to be a direct
consequence of female infanticide, pervasive sex-selective abortions, and civil protests in ru-
ral China (Croll et al., 1985). Overall, rural households may have stronger son preferences
due to social norms and economic exigencies. Such intrinsic preference heterogeneity makes
it necessary to analyze rural and urban households separately. Third, China has always
been characterized by its urban-rural divide in a wide range of economic aspects such as
income, education, and health. Since the economic reform was initiated, that urban-rural
divide has widened substantially (Knight and Song, 1999). Inequality in education provision
between urban and rural areas significantly increased in the 1980s due to the decentraliza-
tion of expenditure responsibilities and the reduction in subsidies from rich regions to poor
regions. Hannum and Park (2007) find that many rural schools were closed and rural school
enrollment rates decreased substantially. It is also likely that the unobservable quality of
schools declined due to lack of funding in rural areas relative to urban areas. To allow for
different trends related to these factors, I conduct analyses for rural and urban households
separately.
The main structural equation can be written as
schoolingitc,y = α + sibsizeitc,yβ +X
′
itc,yδ + ttrendyφ+ γc + itc,y (3.7)
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where the dependent variable schoolingitc,y measures completed years of formal schooling for
individual i, in province c, born in cohort t (t can take the following two values: pre-OCP
or post-OCP), observed in CHNS wave y; 7 sibsizeitc,y measures the family size; Xitc,y is a
vector of individual characteristics which is comprised of individual i’s sex, mother’s age at
birth, mother’s education, and log per capita household income. Lastly, γc controls for fixed
province effects. ttrendy controls for a linear time trend where ttrendy = y − 1988. 8 itc,y
is the error term.
This structural equation faces the potential endogeneity problem that family size and
human capital investment in these children are jointly determined by parents. For instance,
one possibility is that parents who place higher value on education also prefer fewer children.
If this were the case, the simple least squares estimates will over-estimate the (absolute value
of the) negative effect of an additional child on schooling. To address this concern, I exploit
the plausibly exogenous variation in family size provided by the One Child Policy and its
subsequent policy relaxation.
Because urban households were strictly subject to the One Child Policy without relax-
ation, regardless the sex of children, family size should be negatively correlated with year
of birth. In other words, year of birth determines an individual’s exposure to the imple-
mentation of the One Child Policy, which is exogenous. The exclusion restriction for the
instrument is that it must be correlated with family size and affect the outcome variable,
years of schooling, only through sibsize. The identification strategy for urban households
7Recall, as described in Section 1.3.2, for an individual who is interviewed in more than one wave of the
CHNS survey, data from the most recent survey year is utilized for this individual.
8For the urban sample, an alternative specification with a fixed survey-year effect rather than a linear
time trend is also explored. The results from both specifications are very similar. However, given the sample
size, the alternative specification with the fixed survey-year effect is not of sufficient rank to perform model
tests when I estimate Equation 3.7 for female and male separately. Additionally, the fixed survey-year effect
and province effect is further replaced by fixed province trends. Similarly, given the sample size, it is not
of sufficient rank to perform the model test. Therefore, for this paper, the preferred specification is the one
controlling for a linear time trend and fixed province effect. For the rural sample, similar conclusions can be
reached regarding the specifications with the fixed survey-wave effect and with the linear time trend. The
rural sample size is large enough to allow specification with fixed province trends. The results, which are
not reported in the paper, are very comparable to those obtained using the preferred specification.
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can be written as
sibsizeitc,y = τ +OCPitc,yθ +X
′
itc,yη + ttrendyφ+ γc + ξitc,y (3.8)
Since the official announcement date of the OCP was 1979, I set OCPitc,y equal to one for
individuals born in or after 1979 and zero otherwise. All other covariates are defined as in
Equation 3.7.
In comparison, rural households were subject to the initial One Child Policy just like
urban households. However, approximately three to four years into the policy, rural house-
holds became eligible for the One Child Policy relaxation, which is often referred to as the
“1-son-2-child” rule. The relaxation allowed rural parents to have a second child if the first-
born child was a girl. Therefore, year of birth and the sex of a household’s first-born child
jointly determine an individual’s exposure to the policy relaxation. First, family size should
be negatively correlated with exposure to the initial OCP implementation. Among those
individuals who were born after the OCP implementation, given the “1-son-2-child” rule,
family size should be positively correlated with the first-born being a girl. The interaction
term of the first-born’s sex and one’s year of birth therefore, captures the differential effect
of the relaxation on family size. To summarize, the instruments for family size for rural
households include the following two terms: an individual’s year of birth, which determines
her exposure to the initial OCP implementation; and the interaction of the first-born’s sex
with one’s year of birth, which captures the additional effect due to the subsequent OCP
relaxation. The identification strategy for rural households can be written as
sibsizeitc,t = τ+OCPRelaxitc,yθ+OCPRelaxitc,y×FB sexitc,yψ+X ′itc,yη+ttrendyφ+γc+ξitc,y
(3.9)
As noted above, OCPRelaxitc,y equals one for individuals born in or after 1979 and zero
otherwise. It captures the composite effect due to the initial OCP implementation and
its subsequent modification. In Equation 3.9, FB sex is an indicator for first-born being
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a girl. Therefore, the endogenous family size is instrumented using OCPRelaxitc,y and
OCPRelaxitc,y × FB sexitc,y. All other covariates are defined as in Equation 3.7. In or-
der to accurately estimate the main effect and the interaction effect, for rural households,




Figure 3.1 and Figure 3.2 plot the share of male and female in the urban-area sample and
the rural-area sample by the One Child Policy variable, respectively. The One Child Policy
variable for the urban-area sample is referred to as “OCP” mainly because urban households
are only subjected to the implementation of the original One Child Policy. Individuals
born in or before 1978 are considered to the pre-OCP cohort and individuals born in or
after 1979 are considered to be the post-OCP cohort. The One Child Policy variable for
the rural-area sample is referred to as “OCPRelax” to acknowledge the combined effect
from both the initial One Child Policy implementation and its subsequent policy relaxation.
As discussed before, given the close spacing between the initial implementation and the
subsequent relaxation, as well as the differential enforcement across localities, disentangling
the two effects is very difficult. Individuals born in or before 1978 in rural areas are considered
to be the pre-OCPRelax cohort and individuals born in or after 1979 are considered to be
the post-OCPRelax cohort.
Specifically, Figure 3.1 shows that the post-OCP cohorts in the urban areas clearly have
more unbalanced sex ratios (male/female) as compared to the pre-OCP cohorts. A similar
pattern exists in the rural sample as well, which can be seen in Figure 3.2. Using China’s 1990
Census data and a difference-in-difference estimator, Zhang (2011) find that the enforcement
of the OCP has led to 4.4 extra boys per 100 girls in the 1980s, which can account for about
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94% of the total increase in sex ratios during this period. Figure 3.1 and Figure 3.2 confirm
the results in Zhang (2011).
Table 3.2 presents the descriptive statistics by birth cohort (pre-OCP cohort vs post-OCP
cohort) and sex using the urban sample. A brief comparison reveals that, the post-OCP
individuals, on average, live in households with higher per capita income (Log Per Capita
Household Income) and are younger (Age) compared to the pre-OCP individuals. The
mothers of the post-OCP individuals are on averaged better educated (Mother’s Education)
and share similar age when giving birth (Mother’s Age at Birth).
Table 3.2 also shows that the average years of schooling have increased comparing the pre-
OCP and the post-OCP cohorts. For the pre-OCP cohort (OCP = 0), the average completed
years of schooling is 10.4 years. In comparison, the post-OCP cohort, on average, has 12.4
years of schooling. The magnitude of the increase is larger for females than for males. A direct
consequence is a reversal in the educational gap between men and women. In particular,
the average years of schooling for men born in urban areas before the implementation of the
OCP is around 10.6 years, whereas the average number of years of schooling for women born
in the same cohort is slightly less 10.3 years. This difference disappears when we look at
men and women born after the OCP implementation. In fact, among the post-OCP cohorts,
women have slightly higher education than men (12.7 years for women and 12.2 for men).
The trend in average completed years of schooling by birth cohort and sex for the urban
sample is further visualized in Figure 3.3.
Table 3.2 also shows that the average family size (number of children which is mea-
sured by sibsize) has decreased substantially since the OCP implementation. Specifically,
for an average individual in pre-OCP cohort, the average family size was 2.69. This num-
ber decreased by almost one birth to 1.75 for an average post-OCP-cohort individual. This
statement holds true for both men and women, although the decrease in average family size
for women is smaller than that for men. On average, women always live in households with
more children. The trend in family size before and after the implementation of the One
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Child Policy is illustrated in Figure 3.5. Taken together, the descriptive statistics computed
using the sample of urban households suggest a negative correlation between family size
and education, which suggests that there is a trade-off between the quantity and quality of
children.
Table 3.3 computes the same set of descriptive statistics for the rural sample. In addition,
Figure 3.4 and Figure 3.6 depict similar trends in mean family size and completed years of
schooling for the rural sample. The overall trends described above for the urban sample
also hold for the rural sample. From Table 3.3 one can see that a trade-off between the
quantity and quality of children also seems to exist. The negative trade-off seems to be more
prominent for women. In addition, a close comparison between Table 3.2 and Table 3.3
shows a smaller effect of China’s family planning policy on family size (sibsize) in rural
households compared to urban households. It seems to confirm the existence of an effect of
both the OCP implementation and its subsequent policy relaxation. Given the nature of the
“Document 7” and the “1-son-2-child” rule (Qian, 2009), among individuals who were born
in or after 1979, family size should be positively correlated with the first-born child being a
girl. Table 3.4 presents the descriptive statistics for the post-OCPRelax cohort by first-born
child sex. From Table 3.4, we can clearly see that, for the post-OCPRelax cohort, average
family size of those households with female first-borns is substantially larger (2.83 vs 2.30).
Table 3.4 further confirms the positive effect of the OCP relaxation on family size in rural
China.
In summary, the descriptive statistics presented thus far suggest that China’s family
planning policies do have a significant effect on family size and that there seems to be a
negative trade-off between family size and child’s educational attainment. In Section 3.6.2,
econometric evidence is presented to examine whether indeed there is a causal relationship
between family size and educational attainment.
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3.6.2 Econometric Evidence
Table 3.5 shows the simple least squares estimates and instrumental variables (2SLS) esti-
mates of the quantity-quality trade-off effect for the urban sample. This is estimated using
Equation 3.7 and Equation 3.8. The vector of individual characteristics includes individual
i’s sex, mother’s age at birth, mother’s education, and log per capita household income.
Results from two specifications are reported: one with linear time trends and one with
survey-wave fixed effects. The preferred specification is the one controlling for the linear
time trends (Columns (4) - (6) in Table 3.5). Results from these three columns will be
discussed.
The upper panel in Table 3.5 presents the simple OLS estimates using the urban sample,
the urban female sub-sample, and the urban male sub-sample, separately. The OLS estimates
indicate that, other things equal, an additional sibling is associated with 0.47 years less
schooling. This finding is consistent with the existence of trade-offs between the quantity
and quality of children. When I repeat the same exercise using the urban female sub-sample
and the urban male sub-sample separately the negative quantity-quality trade off appears
larger for men than for women.
To address the potential endogeneity issue of family size as discussed before, the 2SLS
estimate from the first-stage and second-stage are presented in the middle and lower panels
of Table 3.5. The first-stage regression result indicates that the implementation of the
One Child Policy had a significant effect on family size. Specifically, other things equal,
the implementation of the One Child Policy directly led to a decrease in family size of
0.57 children for the urban sample. In addition, the main-stage estimate shows that an
additional child can lead to a decrease of 1.2 years of schooling. A simple back-of-the-
envelope calculation reveals that the implementation of the OCP has significantly increased
the average completed years of schooling for urban sample by approximately 0.68 years (=
(-0.57) × (-1.20)). I further repeat the 2SLS estimations for urban female and urban male
sub-samples separately. The results show that the implementation of the OCP has a larger
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effect on family size for males than for females (−0.75 for males and −0.27 for females).
However, other things equal, an additional child can decrease the average years of schooling
for females by 2.8 years, which is three times as large as the effect of one additional child
on male educational attainment. A similar back-of-the-envelope calculation shows that the
implementation of the OCP has increased the average completed years of schooling for female
by about 0.76 years, which is larger than that for male (0.68 years). This may help explain
the disappearance of educational gap between males and females before and after the OCP
implementation.
Table 3.6 presents the simple OLS estimates and 2SLS estimates of the quantity-quality
trade-off effect for rural households. This is done using Equation 3.7 and Equation 3.9. The
vector of individual characteristics includes individual i’s sex, mother’s age at birth, mother’s
education, log per capita household income, and first-born child’s sex. The last covariate is
added such that the main effect and the interaction effect of the OCP implementation and
its subsequent relaxation can be correctly estimated using the 2SLS estimates. This variable
is also added to the OLS specification to ensure comparable results obtained using OLS and
2SLS estimation strategies. Similarly, results from two specifications are reported: one with
linear time trends and one with survey-wave fixed effects. As discussed in Footnote 8, the
preferred specification is the one controlling for the linear time trends (Columns (4) - (6) in
Table 3.6). Results from these three columns will be discussed.
The upper panel in Table 3.6 presents the simple OLS estimates using the rural sample,
the rural female sub-sample, and the rural male sub-sample, separately. Similar to the urban
households, rural households also exhibited a negative trade-offs between the quantity and
quality of children when using the full rural sample and the rural female sub-sample. When
comparing results obtained using the female and male sub-sample, it appears that the nega-
tive trade-off effect between family size and educational attainment is larger and significant
for female relative to male. This seems to suggest that the particularly strong, long-lasting,
and persistent son preference in the rural area has rendered women in a disadvantaged po-
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sition.
Due to concerns about potential endogeneity issues, I also present the 2SLS estimates
using Equation 3.7 and Equation 3.9. To restate, the identification strategy exploits two
facts here: first, individuals are exposed to the treatment of the initial OCP implementation
and its subsequent relaxation if and only if one was born in or after 1979; secondly, among
individuals who were born after the initial OCP implementation, one is only affected by the
policy relaxation if the first-born child in his household is female. Therefore, for rural sample,
family size is instrumented using the policy variable (OCPRelax) and the interaction term
between OCPRelax and the first-born child’s sex (FB sex). The first-stage and second-stage
results are presented in Table 3.6.
The lower panel in Table 3.6 shows the first-stage result: the combined effect of the
OCP implementation and its subsequent policy relaxation on rural family size. The first-
stage result first exhibits a clear binding effect due to the initial implementation and the
subsequent policy relaxation. For instance, the OCP implementation and its subsequent
relaxation have significantly decreased the average family size by 0.44 births (Column (4) in
Table 3.6. It is evaluated at the mean first-born sex (which is 0.48 in the full rural sample),
i.e., −0.60 + 0.33 × 0.48.). Here, we can see that the effect of the family policy on family
size in rural China is noticeably smaller in comparison to urban China. Overall, this similar
effect and trend holds true for both the rural female sub-sample and the rural male sub-
sample. As hypothesized, the subsequent policy relaxation, the “1-son-2-child,” rule, has a
significant positive effect on family size for households with first-born child being female.
Other things equal, individuals born in or after 1979 to households with first-born child
being female, on average, live in households with 0.33 more children compared to individuals
born in the same cohorts but to households with first-born child being male. Interestingly,
when I examine the female sub-sample and the male sub-sample separately, the interaction
effect is only significant for female group.
However, unlike the urban-area sample, the second-stage estimate of the effect of family
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size on educational attainment for the rural sample are all insignificant. On possible cause for
the results is that there is an additional potential source of endogeneity is not well accounted
for in this paper. For instance, when the One Child Policy relaxation is announced, rural
parents may choose to keep girls so that they can be eligible for the “1-son-2-child” rule.
Therefore, the 2SLS estimates presented here may be biased by the change in parental
preferences and they should be interpreted with caution.
3.7 Conclusion
Many believe that family size and child’s average quality are inversely correlated. This paper
exploits plausibly exogenous changes in family size caused by the initial implementation and
subsequent relaxations in China’s One Child Policy to estimate the causal effect of family
size on educational attainment. The data used in this paper are from the 1989, 1991, 1993,
1997, 2000, 2004, 2006, 2009, and 2011 China Health and Nutrition Survey (CHNS).
Overall, I find that the average family size has decreased substantially since the One
Child Policy implementation, which implies the binding effect of China’s family planning
policy. Additionally, first-born child being female in the rural area after the implementation
of the One Child Policy has a positive effect on family size, which reflects the nature of the
family planning policy relaxation and the “1-son-2-child” rule. For the urban-area sample,
I find clear evidence indicating that there is indeed a trade-off between child’s quantity
and quality. Other things equal, an additional child can lead to a decrease of 1.2 years of
schooling. A simple back-of-the-envelope calculation reveals that the implementation of the
OCP has significantly increased the average completed years of schooling of urban sample by
approximately 0.68 years. A further comparison between female sub-sample and male sub-
sample shows that, though the family policy implementation has a smaller effect on family
size for female, the negative trade-off effect is much more prominent for female. Thus, it
turns out that the implementation of the OCP has increased female average completed years
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of schooling more than that for male by 0.076 years.
Unlike the urban-area sample, no significant effects of family size on educational attain-
ment for the rural sample are found. One possible reason for the results is other potential
sources of endogeneity that is not well accounted for. For instance, when the One Child
Policy relaxation is announced, rural parents may choose to keep girls so that they can be
eligible for the “1-son-2-child” rule. Therefore, the 2SLS estimates presented here may be
biased due to the parental preference change and should be interpreted with caution. Several
other caveats also exist, for instance, the well-documented birth order effect and sibling sex
composition effect are overlooked in this paper. Cautious interpretation of the results is
recommended.
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Figure 3.1. Percentage of Male and Female By One Child Policy Variable (OCP) in
Urban Area





Notes: Data are based on author’s own calculation using the China Health and Nutrition Survey
(CHNS) 1989, 1991, 1993, 1997, 2000, 2004, 2006, 2009, and 2011 Data. The urban-area sample
includes individuals who are at least 18 years old and currently not in school. Pre-OCP cohort
includes individuals born before 1979; Post-OCP cohort includes individuals born in or after 1979.
Blue bars represent male. Red bars represent female. The green dash line is the reference line at
50 percentage point.
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Figure 3.2. Percentage of Male and Female By One Child Policy Variable (OCPRelax)
in Rural Area





Notes: Data are based on author’s own calculation using the China Health and Nutrition Survey
(CHNS) 1989, 1991, 1993, 1997, 2000, 2004, 2006, 2009, and 2011 Data. The rural-area sample
includes individuals who are at least 18 years old and currently not in school. Pre-OCPRelax
cohort includes individuals born before 1979; Post-OCPRelax cohort includes individuals born in
or after 1979. Blue bars represent male. Red bars represent female. The green dash line is the
reference line at 50 percentage point.
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Figure 3.3. Average Completed Years of Schooling By Sex and One Child Policy Vari-

























Notes: Data are based on author’s own calculation using the China Health and Nutrition Survey
(CHNS) 1989, 1991, 1993, 1997, 2000, 2004, 2006, 2009, and 2011 Data. The urban-area sample
includes individuals who are at least 18 years old and currently not in school. Pre-OCP cohort
includes individuals born before 1979; Post-OCP cohort includes individuals born in or after 1979.
Blue bars represent male. Red bars represent female.
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Figure 3.4. Average Completed Years of Schooling By Sex and One Child Policy Vari-

























Notes: Data are based on author’s own calculation using the China Health and Nutrition Survey
(CHNS) 1989, 1991, 1993, 1997, 2000, 2004, 2006, 2009, and 2011 Data. The rural-area sample
includes individuals who are at least 18 years old and currently not in school. Pre-OCPRelax
cohort includes individuals born before 1979; Post-OCPRelax cohort includes individuals born in
or after 1979. Blue bars represent male. Red bars represent female.
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Notes: Data are based on author’s own calculation using the China Health and Nutrition Survey
(CHNS) 1989, 1991, 1993, 1997, 2000, 2004, 2006, 2009, and 2011 Data. The urban-area sample
includes individuals who are at least 18 years old and currently not in school. Pre-OCP cohort
includes individuals born before 1979; Post-OCP cohort includes individuals born in or after 1979.
Blue bars represent male. Red bars represent female.
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Notes: Data are based on author’s own calculation using the China Health and Nutrition Survey
(CHNS) 1989, 1991, 1993, 1997, 2000, 2004, 2006, 2009, and 2011 Data. The rural-area sample
includes individuals who are at least 18 years old and currently not in school. Pre-OCPRelax
cohort includes individuals born before 1979; Post-OCPRelax cohort includes individuals born in
or after 1979. Blue bars represent male. Red bars represent female.
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Table 3.1. Educational Attainment for Total Population Aged 15 and Over in
China, 1950-2010
Year
Avg. Years Highest Level Attained
of Primary Secondary Tertiary
Total Total Completed Total Completed Total Completed
Schooling % of population aged 15 and over
1950 1.57 21.79 6.79 8.01 1.47 0.34 0.17
1955 1.86 25.31 8.17 9.44 1.82 0.49 0.25
1960 2.34 28.55 12.04 12.30 2.48 0.68 0.36
1965 2.78 32.74 12.58 15.51 3.45 0.84 0.45
1970 3.43 36.93 16.66 20.28 4.58 0.84 0.43
1975 3.97 38.46 18.69 25.24 5.87 0.88 0.44
1980 4.75 38.35 20.07 33.64 9.34 0.91 0.45
1985 5.25 36.95 20.51 37.96 14.55 1.50 0.78
1990 5.62 34.55 19.89 41.30 21.78 1.93 1.02
1995 6.41 32.95 19.41 47.85 29.57 3.26 1.80
2000 7.11 30.38 18.33 54.06 36.24 4.59 2.59
2005 7.60 27.65 17.07 57.83 41.64 6.09 3.42
2010 8.11 24.45 15.28 60.95 46.49 8.05 4.58
Data Source: Education Attainment for Population Aged 15 and Over (http:
//www.barrolee.com/data/full1.htm).
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OCP = 0 OCP = 1
All Female Male All Female Male
School
10.4 10.3 10.6 12.4 12.7 12.2
(2.72) (2.72) (2.73) (2.76) (2.90) (2.61)
Sibsize
2.69 2.73 2.65 1.75 1.85 1.67
(1.26) (1.24) (1.27) (0.89) (1.01) (0.78)
Mother’s Education
4.91 4.72 5.08 8.52 8.33 8.67
(3.98) (4.15) (3.83) (3.60) (3.55) (3.65)
Mother’s Age at Birth
26.74 27.03 26.5 25.7 25.6 25.8
(5.10) (5.08) (5.12) (3.65) (3.64) (3.66)
Log Per Capita Household Income
8.67 8.51 8.82 9.25 9.19 9.30
(0.98) (0.87) (1.04) (1.05) (1.04) (1.07)
Age
28.1 25.3 30.6 24.3 23.8 24.7
(6.96) (5.55) (7.14) (3.47) (3.33) (3.54)
N 455 215 240 496 221 275
Notes: The China Health and Nutrition Survey (CHNS) 1989, 1991, 1993, 1997, 2000,
2004, 2006, 2009, and 2011 Data are used. The urban-area sample includes individuals
who are at least 18 years old and currently not in school. In particular, individuals born in
or before 1978 have OCP = 0; birth cohorts in or after 1979 have OCP = 1. Mother’s age
at birth is measured at individual i’s birth. Log per capita household income is measure
in 2011 values. Standard deviations are presented in parentheses.
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OCPRelax = 0 OCPRelax = 1
All Female Male All Female Male
School
8.87 8.28 9.35 10.1 10.1 10.1
(2.74) (2.86) (2.54) (2.48) (2.52) (2.45)
Sibsize
3.37 3.51 3.26 2.57 2.80 2.41
(1.47) (1.53) (1.41) (1.14) (1.16) (1.09)
Mother’s Education
3.41 3.10 3.66 6.40 5.96 6.70
(3.33) (3.34) (3.30) (3.79) (3.95) (3.65)
Mother’s Age at Birth
26.7 27.2 26.4 25.9 25.8 26.0
(5.10) (5.26) (4.94) (4.31) (4.15) (4.43)
Log Per Capita Household Income
8.23 7.99 8.42 8.71 8.52 8.83
(0.97) (0.89) (0.99) (1.10) (1.03) (1.13)
Age
27.2 23.3 30.3 22.8 21.6 23.6
(6.86) (4.22) (6.98) (3.42) (2.79) (3.59)
First-Born Sex (= 1 if female)
0.47 0.71 0.28 0.50 0.75 0.34
(0.50) (0.46) (0.45) (0.50) (0.44) (0.47)
N 1150 512 638 1008 411 597
Notes: The China Health and Nutrition Survey (CHNS) 1989, 1991, 1993, 1997, 2000,
2004, 2006, 2009, and 2011 Data are used. The rural-area sample includes individuals who
are at least 18 years old and currently not in school. In particular, individuals born in
or before 1978 have OCPRelax = 0; birth cohorts in or after 1979 have OCPRelax = 1.
Mother’s age is measured at individual i’s birth. Log per capita is measure in 2011 values.
Standard deviations are presented in parentheses.
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First-Born Sex = 1 (Female) First-Born Sex = 0 (Male)
Mean Standard Deviation Mean Standard Deviation
School 10.2 2.49 10.1 2.47
Sibsize 2.83 1.10 2.30 1.11
Mother’s Education 6.32 3.76 6.47 3.83
Mother’s Age at Birth 26.3 4.43 25.6 4.17
Log Per Capita Household Income 8.71 1.04 8.70 1.16
Age 22.5 3.24 23.1 3.58
N 508 508 500 500
Notes: The China Health and Nutrition Survey (CHNS) 1989, 1991, 1993, 1997, 2000, 2004, 2006,
2009, and 2011 Data are used. The rural-area sub-sample includes individuals who are at least 18
years old, currently not in school, and affected by the OCP and its subsequent relaxation (OCPRelax
= 1). Mother’s age is measured at individual i’s birth. Log per capita is measure in 2011 values.
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Table 3.5. Ordinary Least Square (OLS) and Two Stage Least Square (2SLS) Esti-
mates of the Trade-off Effect between Quantity and Quality of Children:
Urban Households
Variable All Female1 Male1 All Female Male
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
A. OLS Estimate: Schooling
Sibsize
−0.44∗∗∗ −0.38∗∗∗ −0.53∗∗∗ −0.47∗∗∗ −0.38∗∗∗ −0.57∗∗∗
(0.08) (0.11) (0.11) (0.082) (0.11) (0.11)
2SLS Estimate, Second Stage: Schooling
Sibsize
−1.07∗∗∗ −2.57 −0.90∗∗∗ −1.20∗∗∗ −2.81∗ −0.91∗∗∗
(0.38) (1.91) (0.33) (0.35) (1.60) (0.32)
2SLS Estimate, First Stage: Sibsize
OCP
−0.53∗∗∗ −0.22 −0.73∗∗∗ −0.57∗∗∗ −0.27∗∗ −0.75∗∗∗
(0.080) (0.14) (0.095) (0.080) (0.14) (0.095)
Fixed Survey-Wave Effect Y Y Y N N N
Linear time trend N N N Y Y Y
Fixed Province Effect Y Y Y Y Y Y
N 951 436 515 951 436 515
Notes: The China Health and Nutrition Survey (CHNS) 1989, 1991, 1993, 1997, 2000, 2004, 2006,
2009, and 2011 Data are used. Covariates include: mother’s education, mother’s age at birth, sex,
and log per capita household income. Robust standard errors are presented in parentheses. Indi-
viduals born in or before 1978 have OCP = 0 and individuals born in or after 1979 have OCP = 1.
∗∗ ∗ indicates significance at 1% level; ∗∗ indicates significance at 5% level; ∗ indicates significance
at 10% level.
[1] Given the sample size, it is not of sufficient rank to perform model tests for the OLS estima-
tion with fixed survey-wave effect and province effect using the female sub-sample and the male
sub-sample, separately. Results should be interpreted with caution.
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Table 3.6. Ordinary Least Square (OLS) and Two Stage Least Square (2SLS) Esti-
mates of the Trade-off Effect between Quantity and Quality of Children:
Rural Households
Variable All Female1 Male All Female1 Male
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
A. OLS Estimate: Schooling
Sibsize
−0.12∗∗∗ −0.19∗∗∗ −0.077 −0.14∗∗∗ −0.20∗∗∗ −0.093
(0.05) (0.072) (0.062) (0.047) (0.0.072) (0.063)
2SLS Estimate, Second Stage: Schooling
Sibsize
0.16 0.32 0.0072 −0.0042 0.17 0.041
(0.25) (0.50) (0.27) (0.25) (0.51) (0.27)
2SLS Estimate, First Stage: Sibsize
OCPRelax
−0.60∗∗∗ −0.70∗∗∗ −0.53∗∗∗ −0.60∗∗∗ −0.64∗∗∗ −0.54∗∗∗
(0.077) (0.19) (0.085) (0.075) (0.18) (0.083)
OCPRelax × FB sex 0.35
∗∗∗ 0.55∗∗∗ −0.060 0.33∗∗∗ 0.53∗∗∗ −0.041
(0.10) (0.19) (0.14) (0.10) (0.18) (0.14)
Fixed Survey-Wave Effect Y Y Y N N N
Linear time trend N N N Y Y Y
Fixed Province Effect Y Y Y Y Y Y
N 2158 923 1235 2158 923 1235
Note: The China Health and Nutrition Survey (CHNS) 1989, 1991, 1993, 1997, 2000, 2004, 2006,
2009, and 2011 Data are used. Covariates include: mother’s education, mother’s age at birth,
sex, first-born sex, and log per capita household income. Robust standard errors are presented in
parentheses. Individuals born in or before 1978 have OCPRelax = 0 and individuals born in or
after 1979 have OCPRelax = 1. ∗ ∗ ∗ indicates significance at 1% level; ∗∗ indicates significance at
5% level; ∗ indicates significance at 10% level.
[1] Given the sample size, it is not of sufficient rank to perform model tests for the OLS estimations
using the female sub-sample. Results should be interpreted with caution.
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